The Future of the Eastern Partnership: Approaches and Recommendations
- EESF
- 3 days ago
- 7 min read
Updated: 2 days ago
1. New Challenges, Old Solutions
The 2020s have seen the rapid collapse of the global security architecture, posing acute threats to the EU. These include Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the weakening of the U.S.-EU partnership and conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, all of which disrupt global stability. Traditionally, the main source of threats to the EU has been its eastern neighbourhood, including Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Historically, relations between the countries in these regions, primarily Russia, and Europe have always been complex. At the beginning of the 21st century, under the influence of a number of factors, these relations became not only complex, but highly confrontational.
In this regard, there is a striking discrepancy between the importance of these regions and the extent to which the EU has developed its foreign policy in this area.
Until recently, the EU's primary tools in this area were the Eastern Partnership (EaP), launched in 2009, and the Partnership for Modernisation with Russia, established in 2010 to promote economic and technological cooperation. However, both initiatives have lost their effectiveness. Cooperation with Russia ended in failure in 2014 due to the Kremlin's increasingly aggressive foreign policy. The Eastern Partnership is effectively in limbo, and there is no replacement for it.
The same applies to the foreign policy of leading EU member states towards their eastern neighbours. In 2022, Germany — the only EU member state to have historically pursued a consistent 'Eastern policy' — acknowledged that its principles (focusing on Russia and seeking rapprochement through stronger economic ties) and its implementation (energy cooperation with Russia and the emergence of a powerful pro-Russian lobby within German political elites) represented a disastrous chapter in German foreign policy[1].
In the absence of a new, comprehensive approach, the EU has focused on two practical areas of foreign policy: supporting Ukraine and containing Russia. Currently, these two issues dominate both decision-making processes and expert discussions. Recent publications on this topic include e.g. “The Russian Challenge: A Polish-German expert paper for a new Russia policy” (OSW, 2024)[2] and “New Deterrence. Western Strategy Toward the Moscow-Beijing Axis” (CASE, 2025)[3]. Overall, the EU's focus is primarily on the question, 'How can we support Ukraine and stop Russia?', rather than exploring topics such as the EU's long-term strategic interests in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or even more challenging questions such as how the EU envisages future interactions with Russia.
An important exception in this regard is the EU's connectivity policy.
Previously one of the main priorities of the Eastern Partnership and, more broadly, the EU's Global Gateway strategy, connectivity continues to be implemented despite political uncertainty, given its importance to the economies of the countries involved. Furthermore, it is now regarded as both an economic and a geopolitical priority — an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative[4].
The trade and energy corridor between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe undoubtedly serves the common interests of all three regions and can be considered an important political objective in its own right. However, Connectivity policy alone is unlikely to replace a broader EU Eastern strategy as it is essentially only a part of it.
In addition, the Connectivity concept, in its current form, suffers from the same shortcomings as the Eastern Partnership: excessive normativity, an insufficiently tailored approach, insufficient funding and an absence of an underlying geopolitical goal.
Thus, a certain political vacuum remains in relations with the EU's eastern neighbours and requires a new, comprehensive solution. Experts have mentioned this idea in passing (see, for example, the Warsaw Security Forum Report 2024, 'Pushing the EU Agenda Forward with the Weimar Triangle', where it is called the 'New Wider Europe Strategy”[5]). It requires careful consideration.
Such an Eastern policy could greatly benefit the EU. However, to create it, it would be necessary to take a significant step forward, rather than making cosmetic changes to old solutions. Furthermore, in order to take this step, it would be useful to first analyse existing experience and geopolitical challenges. This could be achieved by answering the following questions:
What are the shortcomings of the Eastern Partnership, and to what extent can its experience and framework inform the new Eastern Policy?
How can the new Eastern Policy take into account the broader geopolitical context, including energy and resource vulnerability, as well as security risks?
How can the limited range of practical measures available to the EU be expanded to counter powerful and aggressive Russian and resourceful and smart Chinese foreign policy in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia?
2. Eastern Partnership: Its Potential and Shortcomings
The Eastern Partnership was established as a forum for fostering convergence in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus during a period of economic and political stability, emphasising democratic values, reforms and civil society.
It was based on the assumption that countries to the east of the EU were interested in EU integration and joining its sphere of influence, which was partly correct at the time of its establishment.
However, the current reality is completely different. Full-scale war on the EU's borders, with North Korea fighting alongside Russia, coupled with China's growing influence in Asia, is forcing the EU's eastern neighbours to reconsider their foreign policy. At the same time, the EU itself is facing four major challenges:
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy: Russia has entered into a hard confrontation with the EU, which is taking on the characteristics of a hybrid conflict.
Tensions with the United States: Shifts in Washington’s priorities and the use of unilateral tariffs as tools of economic and political pressure are complicating transatlantic relations. This has led to a shift in the EU's relationship with the United States, moving from cooperation to competition, including on issues such as Greenland, Ukraine's peace agreement with Russia, and relations with countries in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and China.
Internal political challenges: The rising popularity of anti-European parties within the EU undermines cohesion and political stability.
Energy security vulnerabilities: The EU's energy dependence has been exacerbated by the ‘green transition’ and increased reliance on energy supplies from Russia. The resulting instability in the global market undermines the EU's economic competitiveness.
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that geopolitical priorities are shifting.
In Eastern Europe, for example, Belarus is aligning itself with Russia, while Ukraine and Moldova are shifting towards the EU.
In the South Caucasus Georgia is shifting towards Russia and Azerbaijan is emerging as a new geopolitical player.
Central Asia (e.g. Kazakhstan’s balancing act and Turkmenistan’s efforts to use its gas reserves for political leverage).
These shifts have resulted in three distinct groups of countries emerging:
1. Those intending to join the EU: Ukraine and Moldova (and possibly Armenia, which is a transitional case), whose accession largely depends on Russia. Georgia is also a transitional case, as it exhibits characteristics of all three groups.
2. Countries that are not interested in joining the EU, but which want economic and political rapprochement/cooperation to some extent: Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. They are not interested in the EU's normative approach, although they may approve of a rules-based order.
3. Countries that are openly opposed to the interests of the EU: Russia and Belarus. However, Belarus could also become a transitional case to group two if the relevant conditions are in place.
The principles and proposals of the Eastern Partnership are largely irrelevant for group two, and the Eastern Partnership is not equipped to deal with group three, which involves open geopolitical confrontation.
At the same time, countries in group two and even group three (e.g. Belarus) can be seen as critical, yet also contested and vulnerable. Their stability and prosperity are becoming increasingly important for EU security, particularly in terms of countering Russian aggression (e.g. Moldova and Belarus), securing energy and mineral supplies (e.g. Azerbaijan's Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) in Kazakhstan), and countering Russian and Chinese dominance (e.g. Kazakhstan's exceptional strategic and trade role, or joint control over the Black Sea).
3. Recommendations for a New Eastern policy
The following recommendations can be formulated for the new EU Eastern Strategy based on the brief analysis above:
Adopt a differentiated approach
The countries of Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are diverse and face different challenges. They cannot be treated as one size fits all (see the three groups of countries identified above).
More pragmatism, less normativism
A differentiated approach means that some countries will share more values with the EU than others. However, this should not preclude economic cooperation or a gradual convergence of values as a result of economic ties.
Prioritise security and defence
The EaP’s neglect of security and defence has left its partners vulnerable to Russian aggression and hybrid threats. To address this, the new Eastern Policy must prioritise security-focused objectives and tools to counter military escalation, cyberattacks and disinformation, ensuring the EU’s eastern flank is resilient.
Enhance energy security
Europe cannot avoid addressing the issue of diversifying energy supplies and ensuring a stable supply of rare earth elements and other valuable raw materials. These issues must be given the highest priority.
Strengthen containment and deterrence
Currently, all EU measures to contain Russia are limited to sanctions, attempts at international isolation, and supporting the Russian opposition in exile. While some of these measures have been effective, it must be acknowledged that Russia is acting much more effectively, for example by using methods of information and psychological warfare. This means that the EU needs to adapt its arsenal of deterrence measures.
This list of recommendations is by no means exhaustive and should serve as a general message and basis for further detailed discussion of the EU's new Eastern policy.
[1] Deutsche Ostpolitik bis zum Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine. In: Hansen, Husieva, Frankenthal [Hrsg.], Russlands Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine, 1. Auflage, Baden-Baden: Nomos. – S. 149.
