REVIEW OF THE REPORT “Systematic Preparation of the Lukashenko Regime for Potential Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario”
- EESF
- Aug 30
- 15 min read
1. Introduction
The report titled “Systematic Preparation of the Lukashenko Regime for Potential Entry into the War on Russia’s Side and Recommendations for Preventing This Scenario”, prepared by the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) and the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC), is presented by its authors as an “analytical” and “comprehensive” document.
The authors provide factual and argumentative evidence to support the claim that the military-political leadership of the Republic of Belarus is preparing to enter the war on Russia’s side, along with recommendations to prevent such a development.
Given the absence of external reviewers for the report and the gravity of its subject matter and claims, a thorough analysis and evaluation of the document are deemed necessary, which is the purpose of this review.
In line with this purpose, the objectives of this review are as follows:
Analysis of the facts presented in the report in terms of their accuracy and substantiation,
Analysis of the interpretation of the provided facts in terms of objectivity, logical consistency, and completeness,
Analysis of the conclusions and recommendations in terms of their substantiation and logical coherence.
2. Context and Objectives of the Report
According to the authors, the report “assesses the degree of the regime’s readiness to participate in military actions and provides recommendations on how to counter the realization of negative scenarios.” It was written in the context of the five-year confrontation between the Lukashenko regime and Western pressure, as well as three years of Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine.
Notably, the report was prepared by one of the political sides in this conflict. NAU and OPK are two Belarusian opposition organizations involved in exerting pressure on Lukashenko.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the report’s primary objective—convincing Western authorities that Lukashenko and his entourage are planning military escalation, potentially up to a full-scale war with NATO’s bordering countries, fully aligns with the political goals of the NAU and OPK.
This circumstance raises doubts about the impartiality of the authors and the analytical value of the report, highlighting its possibly biased and subjective nature.
3. Assessment of the Report’s Factual and Argumentative Basis
The report contains a significant number of instances where the factual basis does not meet analytical standards, specifically:
Facts presented without source references,
Facts relying on unverified information from opposition media,
Facts that are incorrectly interpreted.
The report is also characterized by:
Distortion of facts and substitution of concepts,
Quoting statements and covering events out of their original context, leading to distortion of their meaning and significance,
Lack of logical structure in the systematization of facts, which can be attributed to the authors’ limited understanding of the issues discussed,
Superficial and one-sided presentation of facts and events, possibly indicating a lack of professional expertise in national security matters,
Use of double standards,
Politically biased interpretation of facts and events,
Formulation of unsubstantiated and poorly argued conclusions.
Specific examples with commentary are provided below.
3.1. Mention of Facts Without Source References
In the second part of the section “3.1 Financing and Mobilization Powers”, information is provided about processes allegedly occurring in the Belarusian economy without references to the sources of this information.
In the section “4.1 Joint Exercises and Formation of a Regional Troop Grouping”, it is claimed without evidence that:
“Russian military contingents are permanently stationed on Belarusian territory”,
Joint exercises conducted had a “clearly offensive character”.
In the section “5.1 Border Fortification and Construction of Defensive Structures,” it is claimed without evidence that:
The “Khrenin Line” includes logistics hubs,
Works are being conducted “to modernize transport infrastructure,” including the renewal of “airfields, bridges, and roads”,
“The Belarusian railway is being switched to a heightened secrecy regime. Personnel reshuffles and stricter access controls have been noted”.
In “Chapter 7. Recommendations for Western Partners,” ten facts are listed regarding the pre-emptive preparation of Belarus and Russia for anticipated restrictions before the war in Ukraine began, but only one of them includes a reference to a source.
Without specifying primary sources, it is impossible to assess the accuracy and relevance of the provided information or the reliability of the source itself.
3.2. Mention of Past Events and Facts as Current or Ongoing Processes
In the section “4.2 Arms Supplies, Training, and Deployment of Nuclear Capabilities”, it is claimed that “joint training grounds in Belarus are used for combat coordination, testing weapon systems, and tactical scenarios” in the interest of Russian forces.
This situation was observed in 2022–2023 amid an acute shortage of training grounds in Russia for the accelerated training of reservists mobilized for combat in Ukraine. However, no such activities have been noted in Belarus recently, except for the joint exercises mentioned separately in the report.
3.3. Incorrect Interpretation of Facts and Events
In the section “2.2 People’s Militia and Personnel Mobilization”, the authors claim that the people’s militia, alongside special units of the internal troops, will be used to form a “second front” in case of destabilization, including suppressing potential uprisings.
This claim appears dubious, as the people’s militia is fundamentally unsuitable for use within regular armed forces or for “forming a front”. It is established solely as an auxiliary rear reserve for guarding infrastructure, countering saboteurs, etc. Thus, its preparation is more indicative of defensive rather than offensive war preparations.
In the section “4.2 Arms Supplies, Training, and Deployment of Nuclear Capabilities”, it is stated that “a significant element of military cooperation was the participation of Wagner Group representatives in training Belarusian forces”. However, given that this participation was extremely limited in scope and time and was purely tactical in nature, it cannot be considered a “significant element” of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ preparation. The presence of Wagner Group fighters in Belarus was primarily for propaganda purposes rather than training the Belarusian army.
3.4. Use of Vague Statements Unsupported by Facts or Arguments
It is striking that the authors of the report, which details Lukashenko’s preparations for an offensive war, either fail to specify which war is being referred to or make contradictory statements, such as:
“A repeat invasion from Belarusian territory into Ukraine”,
“Aggression against NATO countries”,
“A full-fledged act of aggression against Belarus’s neighbours”,
“Preventing a new escalation of aggression, including from Belarusian territory”,
“Belarus could again be used as a launching pad for destabilizing Europe.”
As a result, it remains unclear whether the discussion pertains to a joint military operation against Ukraine, an attack on Poland and Lithuania, or some form of hybrid “destabilization of Europe”. These are three entirely different courses of action, each implying different objectives, actors, and means.
3.5. Distortion of Facts and Substitution of Concepts
In the “Summary” part, the report claims that “the Belarusian army is being strengthened in terms of numbers and organization”. In the section “2.1 Increase in Numbers and Reorganization of the Army”, the authors state that there are alleged plans “to expand the army to 80,000 personnel, particularly in connection with the creation of the Southern Operational Command,” citing three-year-old information from the Ukrainian General Staff.
However, the authors fail to mention that no progress has been made in this direction over the past three years, and the size of the Belarusian Armed Forces has not undergone significant changes. Thus, either such plans never existed, or their implementation has been postponed or extended over a long period. Moreover, the figure of 80,000 seems implausible, especially considering that the two operational commands in Belarus comprise no more than 10,000 personnel, and the total strength of the Belarusian Armed Forces, excluding civilian personnel, is approximately 48,000 (as noted by the authors themselves).
Additionally, even if Belarus has the equipment and weaponry necessary to create a new operational command, including 2–3 motorized rifle brigades, combat and logistics support units (up to 300 BMPs/BTRs, up to 100 tanks, at least 100 artillery pieces and MLRS), this equipment is outdated, unmodernized, and has been in storage for at least 25 years.
In the same section, it is claimed that “the reserve of the Armed Forces is estimated at 289,000 personnel,” citing the “Global Firepower” resource for 2024[1]. However, according to the latest “Global Firepower” data, Belarus’ active reserve is 145,000 personnel, and only with mobilization over 6–12 months could an additional 52,000 personnel be conscripted. Even in this case, the figure does not match the 289,000 claimed in the report.
Furthermore, according to recent “Global Firepower” data, Belarus’s military power ranking dropped six places over the past year (from 64th to 70th out of 145 countries), which contradicts the report’s conclusions about the enhancement of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ capabilities. Thus, the authors either did not delve deeply into the issue or deliberately omitted data that does not align with the report’s narrative.
In the section “2.2 People’s Militia and Personnel Mobilization”, an incorrect claim is made that “the Ministry of Defence is simultaneously strengthening special units of the internal troops”. The internal troops are organizationally part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, and the Ministry of Defence has no authority over them.
In reality, over recent years, more than ten special forces units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been created in Belarus. However, this initiative came from the Commander of the Internal Troops, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs N. Karpenkov.
In the section “3.1 Financing and Mobilization Powers”, it is claimed that defence spending “increased by 32% compared to the previous year”. In fact, the authors calculated the growth of the defence budget in Belarusian rubles rather than in a stable currency. When converted to US dollars, according to “Global Firepower” data, Belarus’s defence spending increased from $903.9 million to $1,077.9 million compared to 2024, representing a 19% increase, not 32%.
Moreover, in absolute terms, Belarus’s defence budget in 2025 ranks 87th globally, between Turkmenistan and Uganda, and lags behind Latvia, which hardly appears threatening.
In the section “3.1 Financing and Mobilization Powers,” it is claimed that “Decree No. 29 of 2025 granted the Ministry of Economy powers to coordinate mobilization measures”. Here, the authors distort the facts, as this decree designated the Ministry of Economy as the authorized state body for mobilization preparation in the economic sphere only.
This is not an innovative or aggressive decision. In fact, the Ministry of Economy has always performed functions related to planning and implementing economic mobilization measures under the guidance of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces. The decree merely formalized the transfer of non-military functions from the Ministry of Defence and General Staff to the relevant ministry.
In the section “4.1 Joint Exercises and Formation of a Regional Troop Grouping”, inaccurate information is provided that the joint Russian-Belarusian exercises “Soyuznaya Reshimost”, “Schit Soyuza”, “Zapad”, and others “had a clearly offensive character”. According to our information, obtained directly from Belarusian Armed Forces officers involved in both the planning and execution of these exercises, at least until 2021, these manoeuvres focused on conducting strategic defensive operations to repel aggression against the Union State. The only “offensive” aspect could be the planning and execution of a counteroffensive to expel the enemy beyond state borders and restore territorial integrity.
The claim that “the planned West-2025 exercises in September 2025 cause particular concern among neighbouring countries” omits significant changes in Western rhetoric following Minsk’s announcement of a revised format for the exercise: a significant reduction in the number of participants and distancing from EU borders.
For example, on June 3, 2025, the Lithuanian Prime Minister stated that “the military exercises ‘West’ planned for the fall in Belarus do not pose an additional threat to Lithuania”[2].
Similarly, the authors baselessly claim that “up to 100,000 military personnel may participate in the September 2025 exercises”. However, the report itself references a six-month-old statement from a Belarusian Ministry of Defence representative indicating that over 13,000 personnel will participate in the “Zapad-2025” exercise. There are also several official assurances from Belarusian authorities, such as the statement by the Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, P. Muraveiko, on July 23, that “the number of troops participating in the exercise has been effectively halved” [3]. According to Ukrainian officials, only a few hundred Russian soldiers arrived in Belarus for the exercise[4].
As evidence of strategic infrastructure preparation, the section “5.1 Border Fortification and Construction of Defensive Structures” mentions the “creation of temporary crossings suitable for heavy armoured vehicles”. In reality, such activities are a standard part of practical training for engineering troops, and the term “temporary” indicates their short-term use (only for the training).
In the section “6.2 Repressive Policy and Elimination of Regime Opponents”, it is claimed that mobilization is already underway in Belarus. This claim does not correspond to reality.
3.6. Use of Double Standards
As noted earlier, in the section “3.1 Financing and Mobilization Powers,” the 32% increase in Belarus’s defence spending in 2025 compared to the previous year is cited as evidence of preparation for direct participation in an armed conflict on Russia’s side.
It has already been pointed out that this involves manipulation of figures. However, even accepting the 32% growth figure, Belarus’s defence budget growth lags significantly behind, for example, Poland, which in 2025 will increase its defence spending from 115.6 billion zloty[5] to 186 billion zloty[6], a 60% increase. It is unclear why an increase in defence spending is interpreted as evidence of aggressive intentions in Belarus’s case but not in Poland’s.
As negative factors, the section “3.1 Financing and Mobilization Powers” cites “increased production capacity, strengthened labour discipline, and controlled access to raw materials”. However, these are merely signs of the Belarusian authorities’ attempts to organize efficient production aimed at generating profit. Such measures are universal. The report does not explain why, in Belarus’ case, they are interpreted as evidence of preparation for aggression.
In the section “3.2 Development of the Military-Industrial Complex”, it is stated that “since 2025, serial production of new models has begun. Priority is given to the development of drones and electronic warfare systems. Production of ammunition and electronic warfare systems is expanding”. This reflects a global trend driven by the experience of combat operations in Ukraine. This trend equally applies to European Union countries, so these actions by Belarusian authorities cannot be considered evidence of preparation for aggression.
In the section “4.1 Joint Exercises and Formation of a Regional Troop Grouping”, it is noted that the exercises emphasized “coordination between different types of troops, logistical support, and the use of missile and artillery systems and unmanned systems”. Again, these activities are driven by the experience of the war in Ukraine and are now standard in the operational and combat training of most countries’ armed forces, including NATO members. Thus, using this information in a report dedicated to Belarus’ preparation for a new war is inappropriate.
In the section “5.1 Border Fortification and Construction of Defensive Structures”, no evidence is provided of Belarus strengthening its borders. Moreover, it is unclear why a state’s efforts to fortify its borders amid rising military-political tensions in Eastern Europe should be considered evidence of aggressive intentions. Similar defensive measures are currently being undertaken by Poland and the Baltic states.
3.7. Quoting Statements and Covering Events Out of Context
In the “Summary” part, the report claims that “a number of strategic documents have been adopted that allow Belarus to participate in military actions at the initiative of its ally—Russia.” In the section “1.2 Updating Military Legislation and Strategic Documents”, it is stated that a legal framework has been created “for participation in military actions at the initiative of an ally—primarily Russia” [emphasis added by the review authors].
However, the updated “Military Doctrine-2024”[7] states that the Republic of Belarus aims to “develop and strengthen collective security systems within the framework of the Union State, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States”. It also notes that “the Republic of Belarus acknowledges the possibility of participating in an international armed conflict beyond its territory within the framework of ensuring collective security”. Thus, the report’s authors deliberately manipulate data by artificially singling out Russia, which pursues an aggressive policy, among other allies.
In the “Introduction”, it is claimed that “Lukashenko has repeatedly emphasized the need to prepare for a possible war.” As evidence, the authors cite his October 2024 statement: “We need to prepare for war”. However, this is an incomplete quote. Lukashenko further stated that he hopes no war will occur[8]. Overall, it is unclear why Lukashenko’s statements are used as evidence at all, given their contradictory nature and aim at psychological impact.
3.8. Superficial and One-Sided Presentation of Facts and Events
In the section “4.1 Joint Exercises and Formation of a Regional Troop Grouping,” it is claimed that “since October 2022, based on interstate agreements between Belarus and Russia, a Regional Troop Grouping was formed.” In reality, the Regional Troop Grouping (Forces) of the Union State was established in 2000, and in October 2022, it was merely deployed for the first time, primarily based on the Belarusian Armed Forces.
Considering this deployment as evidence of Belarus’ preparation for a new war is incorrect. In 2022, these actions were prompted by the situation on Belarus’s southern border, where the protracted nature of the military conflict in Ukraine became evident. The deployment of the Regional Troop Grouping served, on one hand, as Moscow’s demonstration of its commitment to allied obligations and, on the other, as a means to maintain heightened tensions on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, forcing Ukraine to maintain a significant military contingent there.
Currently, there is no evidence of preparations for deploying the Regional Troop Grouping.
3.9. Formulation of Unsubstantiated and Poorly Argued Conclusions
In the “Summary”, the report claims that in Belarus, “the civilian economy is transitioning to a war footing”.
The main characteristics of economic militarization are as follows:
Redistribution of resources: Increased production of military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and other goods necessary for military needs at the expense of reduced civilian production.
Industrial mobilization: Factories previously producing civilian goods (e.g., cars or household appliances) begin producing military products (tanks, aircraft, military equipment).
State regulation: Introduction of centralized economic management, including price controls, allocation of raw materials and labour, and prioritization of defence sector funding.
Changes in labour policy: Involving citizens in work at military enterprises, possible militarization of labour, or introduction of mandatory military service.
Sharp increase in military spending: Increased state defence budget at the expense of reduced spending on social programs, infrastructure, or other civilian needs.
None of these are observed in Belarus.
The claim that Belarus is “rapidly modernizing strategic infrastructure” is also largely unsubstantial. The authors provide only general, unsupported statements (e.g., “airfields, bridges, and roads are being updated…”). The only confirmed fact in the section “5.1 Border Fortification and Construction of Defensive Structures” is the creation of defensive fortifications, which are essentially platoon- or company-level strongpoints and pertain solely to the tactical level.
The claim that “military cooperation with Russia has reached the level of full integration” is based on facts such as joint exercises and the creation of the Regional Troop Grouping. However, as noted earlier, close military cooperation between Belarus and Russia has been ongoing for over 20 years. The report does not explain what has changed recently.
In the section “1.1 Strengthening the Role of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (APA)”, it is claimed that the APA “is becoming a key element in the decision-making process regarding entry into war, including within the framework of allied obligations with Russia”.
This claim is highly dubious, as the sole decision-maker on strategic national security matters in Belarus is Alexander Lukashenko. Examples include:
In 2023, he unilaterally decided to deploy Russian nuclear weapons in the country.
In late 2024, he initiated the preparation and signing of the Treaty on Mutual Security Guarantees with Russia.
In December 2024, Lukashenko initiated the deployment of the Russian “Oreshnik” missile system in Belarus.
The APA played no role in these critical decisions, indicating its low significance in both the national security system and the decision-making process. This, rather than the report’s claim of preparation for “extraordinary decisions, likely related to military matters and requiring special conditions”, explains why the APA session scheduled for spring this year did not take place. The APA simply does not play a real role in Lukashenko’s decision-making and can convene at any moment to vote in favour of his decisions.
Furthermore, in the section 3.2, the authors baselessly claim that “Belarusian enterprises play a key role in supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex”. A key role implies the most significant contribution to success or outcomes.
While some Belarusian military-industrial products are indeed in demand in Russia, they constitute a mere drop in the ocean of Russia’s needs. This is detailed in analyses by Russian military experts, such as the 2023 article “The Belarusian Military-Industrial Complex Remained on the Sidelines of the Special Operation in Ukraine”[9], which examines the range of available Belarusian military-industrial products. In 2025, the same experts concluded that “the situation has not changed in the slightest”.[10]
Similarly, the construction of the “Khrenin Line” objects, which are purely defensive and tactical in nature and used for training assault groups in platoon/company strongpoints, is baselessly cited as evidence of Belarus’ aggressive intentions. The trench systems in these objects range from 340 meters[11] in the Grodno region to 2 kilometers[12] in the Gomel region.
The report also claims there is evidence of Belarus preparing “to logistically support a large troop grouping on its territory or the transit of Russian forces to western and southern directions.” Again, no specific evidence is provided.
The information in the sections “5.2 Preparation of Territorial Troops and Civilian Reserves,” “6.1 Military-Patriotic Education and Ideological Preparation,” and “6.2 Repressive Policy and Elimination of Regime Opponents” contains no facts indicating aggressive intentions or preparation for participation in an armed conflict on Russia’s side. It appears that this information was included simply to justify the need for financial and political support for Belarusian democratic forces.
3.10 Questions Regarding the Recommendations
In “Chapter 7. Recommendations for Western Partners”, the evidence provided suddenly shifts to an analysis of joint efforts by Russia and Belarus to circumvent sanctions. While such cooperation is widely known, it is unclear how this fact relates to the claim that Belarus’ preparation for entry into an aggressive war.
The authors then proceed to specific recommendations “for Western partners”. These recommendations are redacted, but even the visible portion strongly suggests that the entire report serves one goal—to convince the West to impose even harsher sanctions on Belarus, thereby delivering a “pre-emptive sanction strike to prevent a possible repeat invasion from Belarusian territory into Ukraine or aggression against NATO countries”.
The report then describes measures to counter sanction circumvention and increase pressure on the Lukashenko regime (details redacted).
Thus, instead of specific proposals for immediate EU preparations to counter potential aggression, the authors express confidence that sanction pressure on the Lukashenko regime, combined with “support for Belarusian democratic forces and independent structures”, will allow the West to pre-emptively “restrain and deprive the regime of resources” before it can “commit a new full-fledged act of aggression against Belarus’s neighbours”.
It is evident that these recommendations are not aimed at preventing alleged aggression by Lukashenko but at enhancing the influence of the Belarusian opposition, which, after the imposition of new sanctions, could claim credit for initiating them.
In this regard, it is difficult to speak of any analytical or expert value in this document. The report appears to be another populist move by the Belarusian opposition, aimed at reminding the world of the threat posed by the Lukashenko regime and securing support and political legitimacy for itself.
[2] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2581057/prem-er-ministr-litvy-ucheniia-zapad-ne-predstavliaiut-ugrozy?srsltid=AfmBOoo5ZBTGABCPGgLAM0ieOJWX1DcDUuR7vkyGLgN6n1Rx1Yz2KbcC
[4] https://hromadske.ua/ru/voyna/249416-kilka-soten-rosiyskykh-soldativ-prybuly-na-navchannia-do-bilorusi-zahrozy-narazi-nemaye-dpsu
[8] https://belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-ob-oboronosposobnosti-nado-gotovitsja-k-vojne-i-daj-bog-chtoby-etoj-vojny-ne-bylo-663476-2024/
[11] https://motolko.help/ru-news/novaya-liniya-hrenina-poyavilas-v-6-km-ot-graniczy-s-litvoj-opublikovany-novye-sputnikovye-snimki/
