Analysis of Threats Posed to EU Countries by the Republic of Belarus
- EESF
- 5 days ago
- 17 min read
Updated: 10 hours ago
1. Introduction
On February 27, President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko gave an interview[i] to a Dubai-based blogger with American roots, Mario Nawfal, who in his announcement described the conversation as one with a “powerful world leader.” Over the course of 82 minutes, A. Lukashenko spoke extensively about his commitment to peace, demonstrating openness and a reluctance to escalate the situation in the region.
However, in Europe, it is Belarus and its president who are considered one of the primary sources of threats to security. In particular, at the end of February 2025, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia[ii] submitted a document to the European Commission outlining plans to create a unified defense line along the border with Belarus and Russia, with an estimated cost of 8–10 billion euros, stating that “protecting the border with Russia and Belarus is of key importance for EU security.” On March 6, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk emphasized the need to increase the presence of European and NATO troops on the border with Belarus and Russia to ensure Europe’s security[iii].
These statements highlight that Belarus is effectively equated with Russia as an international aggressor, despite numerous political, economic, and military-technical differences between the two. While such a step appears logical and justified from a legal and diplomatic perspective—to underscore the fact of complicity and joint legal responsibility of Russia and Belarus, as well as to exert foreign policy pressure on Belarusian leadership—it clearly blurs the aforementioned differences. This, in turn, risks leading to errors in the EU’s strategic forecasts and plans for the Eastern European region. In this regard, while agreeing with accusations of co-aggression and joint responsibility, it is critically important to clearly distinguish between threats emanating from Russia on one hand, and those from Belarus or from Russia using Belarusian territory and infrastructure on the other. The scale and nature of these threats differ, as does their likelihood.
2. Main Directions of Threats to European Security Originating from Minsk
An analysis of the rhetoric and actions of official Minsk, under the strict leadership of President A. Lukashenko, identifies several directions from which threats to the security of the Eastern European region emanate.
Threat 1: Provision of Belarusian Territory for the Deployment of Military Groupings for Aggression in the northwestern (against Lithuania and Latvia), western (against Poland), and southern (against Ukraine) directions.
This threat appears well-founded in light of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine launched on February 24, 2022, which included the use of Belarusian territory. Additionally, Minsk continues to periodically transfer equipment and weapons to its western or southern borders, thereby provoking international escalation. However, it cannot be ignored that, to date, these actions have been exclusively used within the framework of psychological warfare against Ukraine.
Both Minsk’s rhetoric and its practical actions, particularly on the southern border, aimed at raising tensions, clearly align and coordinate with Moscow’s actions.
For instance, during Russia’s preparations for a summer offensive[iv] in the Donetsk direction, in the initial phase (April–May 2024), Lukashenko actively promoted the need to resume negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in both Moscow and Minsk[v].
In June, as Moscow completed preparations for the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive in Donetsk[vi], Minsk launched a coordinated information-psychological operation with Moscow aimed at diverting Ukrainian Armed Forces’ resources to the northern direction. On June 20, the Belarusian State Border Committee claimed a sharp increase in Ukrainian military formations in the border area, including with heavy weaponry[vii]. The next day, June 21, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced[viii] a surprise inspection of the readiness of military units, with troops deployed to operational and combat areas near the state border in Brest and Gomel regions. Units and subdivisions of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ Special Operations Forces, as well as reactive artillery (Polonez MLRS and BM-21 Grad), were deployed to the Ukrainian border[ix]. These actions were widely covered by Belarusian state media, as well as Russian media and “war correspondents”.
On July 2, the Belarusian president once again threatened Ukraine with a “harsh response” to the escalation and Kyiv’s buildup of troops on the Belarusian border[x]. This narrative was echoed in the Kremlin: Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that the concentration of Ukrainian troops on the Belarusian border was “a cause for concern not only for Minsk but also for Moscow” [xi].
However, by mid-July, as the main Russian offensive in the Donetsk direction began, A. Lukashenko ordered the withdrawal of Belarusian Armed Forces’ units and assets, previously deployed to reinforce the Ukrainian border in late June, back to their permanent bases[xii].
Interestingly, even such clear support for Russian plans did not shield Lukashenko from later criticism by Russian propaganda—particularly in connection with the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Kursk offensive, which caught both Moscow and Minsk by surprise. In the early days of the operation and as it progressed, Russian media sharply intensified criticism of A. Lukashenko for withdrawing Belarusian forces from the Ukrainian border in mid-July. This escalated to accusations that during separate negotiations between Minsk and Kyiv (which Lukashenko claimed took place in July), guarantees were given that Belarus would not attack Ukraine, allowing Ukraine to free up forces needed for the Kursk offensive.
In response to accusations from Russian propaganda regarding alleged bilateral agreements that contradicted Moscow’s interests, Lukashenko once again demonstrated his famous geopolitical balancing act, sharply shifting his rhetoric to a clearly “pro-Russian” stance. Minsk’s statements on peacekeeping abruptly ceased, replaced by accusations of numerous Ukrainian combat drones violating Belarusian airspace. This provided Minsk with a pretext to once again reinforce its forces and assets on the Ukrainian border, deploying units of special operations forces, missile troops (including Polonez systems and Iskander complexes), and tank units from a mechanized formation brought to combat readiness[xiii].
Simultaneously, Minsk sought to draw international attention to the situation on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. On August 12, the EU Chargé d’Affaires in Belarus, Sten Nørlov, was summoned to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and informed that “such actions carry the potential for radical escalation of the military conflict, which could lead to its significant expansion, including to EU countries.” On August 17, Belarus’ Permanent Representative to the UN, Valentin Rybakov, met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, informing him of Ukraine’s violation of Belarusian airspace and emphasizing that Ukraine’s provocation constituted “dangerous actions to expand the conflict zone.”
By threatening the international community with the potential escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Minsk aimed to pressure European countries, hoping that a frightened West would “rein in” Ukraine, whose offensive in Kursk Russia was struggling to counter at the time.
On August 16, Lukashenko held[xiv] a special meeting on the situation at the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, after which he claimed in an interview with Russia’s “Rossiya 1” TV channel that a third of the Belarusian army had been deployed to the Ukrainian border[xv]. In reality, Belarus only simulated a large-scale troop deployment to the southern direction, seeking to demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow. This narrative was actively promoted until mid-September, when the situation in Kursk stabilized. On October 8, in an exclusive interview with Russian TV channels in Moscow, Lukashenko stated that there was no threat to Belarus’ security from Ukraine[xvi].
While participating in psychological warfare on Russia’s side, Lukashenko consistently portrayed to Moscow the existence of a real threat to his personal power from Western neighbors, particularly Poland. For example, in February 2024, A. Lukashenko accused Warsaw of planning to seize western Belarusian territories up to Minsk, and in the event of Russia’s defeat, western Russian territories up to Smolensk, Bryansk, and Pskov[xvii].
In mid-March 2024, the Belarusian Armed Forces began a comprehensive combat readiness inspection of units and formations, involving mobilization and deployment to designated areas. This inspection, one of the largest in recent years and lasting over a month, involved nearly all Belarusian Ground Forces and Special Operations Forces units: the 6th, 11th, 19th, and 120th Mechanized Brigades, the 38th Air Assault Brigade, and the 103rd Airborne Brigade. For the mobilization of the 19th Mechanized Brigade alone, stationed in Zaslonovo (Lepel District, Vitebsk Region), over 5,000 reservists were called up.
While visiting a battalion deployed near the Lithuanian border as part of these activities, A. Lukashenko raised the possibility of combat operations in the Suwałki Gap and tasked forces with being ready to “seize a piece of Poland”[xviii]. This prompted Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry to issue a protest note over the Belarusian president’s aggressive statements[xix].
All activities conducted by NATO and national plans in neighboring European states are interpreted by Belarusian military-political leadership solely as threats to Belarus’ “independence and sovereignty.” This serves several objectives for Minsk.
First, it justifies the impossibility of more active participation in the Ukraine war by emphasizing the need to prepare for repelling Western aggression. Second, it provides grounds to demand increased Russian assistance to Belarus, particularly financial and military.
However, an analysis of expenditures under the “National Defense: Ensuring Mobilization Training and Mobilization” category in Belarusian regional budgets from 2022 to 2025[xx] suggests that Belarusian authorities perceive the primary threat to national security from a different direction.
For instance, the highest cumulative defense expenditures in regional budgets over the past four years are observed in Mogilev Region, located in eastern Belarus and sharing no borders with Ukraine or NATO countries (see Figure and Diagram 1):
Moreover, in 2023, defense expenditures in Mogilev Region, which borders only Russia, were nearly double those in Gomel Region, which shares a 660-km border with Ukraine (see Diagram 2):
A comparative analysis of defense expenditures in local budgets of regions bordering NATO (Brest, Grodno, and Vitebsk Regions), Ukraine (Brest and Gomel Regions), and Russia (Vitebsk, Gomel, and Mogilev Regions) is also revealing (see Diagram 3):
It reveals two key points. First, defense expenditures in regions bordering Russia have significantly exceeded those in other regions since 2023, reaching their peak in 2024 during preparations for the Belarusian presidential election.
Notably, in 2023, Mogilev Region, with the longest border with Russia, recorded the highest defense expenditures compared to other regions. This suggests that Minsk seriously feared active Russian intervention in Belarus, including the possibility of direct military intervention, both during the early years of aggression against Ukraine and in the lead-up to the elections.
Second, total defense expenditures in regions bordering NATO countries slightly decreased in 2023 compared to 2022, surged several-fold in 2024 compared to 2023, and dropped nearly twofold in 2025 compared to 2024.
Therefore, Minsk also assessed as significant the threat of Western interference in Belarus’ internal affairs during the pre-election period, but notably lower than the threat from Russia. Consequently, despite repeated statements by Belarusian and Russian officials about threats from Ukraine and the West, Belarusian leadership actually considers the eastern direction as the most likely source of threats.
Regarding the southern and western directions, since 2022, all military-political activities of Belarusian leadership have been geared toward supporting Russia’s psychological operations.
However, is there a threat of Belarusian territory being used for actual military operations in the future?
Given the military-political ambitions of Russia’s leadership, it cannot be ruled out that, in the event of victory in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s aggressive plans could extend to the EU. In this scenario, Belarus, with its well-developed military infrastructure, would be an ideal staging ground for an offensive operation.
Threat 1: Direct Russian aggression from the territory of Belarus.
The most favorable moment for realizing such aggressive intentions would likely be the spring 2026. Spring 2026 is a critical point, because on the one hand, by that time, the Kremlin may decide to sign a peace agreement with Ukraine and withdraw approximately 700,000 troops fighting there. On the other hand, Europe will not yet be ready for military confrontation.
However, a prerequisite for such actions would be a buildup of a sufficiently large military grouping in Belarus. Given the complete lack of surprise in this scenario and significant EU investments in strengthening state borders, the threat of full-scale aggression should not be considered high.
A more likely scenario is an attempt at a rapid military isolation of the Baltic states using the Suwałki Gap, coupled with threats of nuclear war in the event of an EU military response. Preventing this threat, including countering Russian forces in Kaliningrad, should be a priority for EU military-political planning. Another significant limiting factor is the interests of Belarusian leadership, which is undoubtedly interested in weakening the EU but has no desire to become the center of military operations threatening their physical safety. Therefore, any Russian military moves from Belarusian territory would face resistance from Belarus.
Threat 2: Launching Missile or Air Strikes from Belarusian Territory using either national armed forces or Russian weaponry stationed in Belarus.
This is supported not only by numerous statements from Belarusian military-political leadership but also by Minsk’s efforts to deploy Russian long-range strike weapons, including nuclear ones, on its territory.
By initiating the idea of deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Belarus in the summer of 2023, Lukashenko hoped to gain what he considered a powerful trump card, enabling him to join the “nuclear club” and ensure his personal safety. However, reality did not meet his expectations, primarily because the international community did not believe that actual nuclear warheads had been redeployed to Belarus. As early as summer 2024, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) expressed doubts about the presence of Russian TNW in Belarus[xxi].
Consequently, Minsk and Moscow made every effort to convince others otherwise. On May 7, 2024, A. Lukashenko announced[xxii] a surprise inspection of “non-strategic nuclear weapon carriers, with special munitions supplied to missile and aviation units, loaded onto launchers, and mounted on aircraft”. In June 2024, Belarus hosted the second phase of non-strategic nuclear forces exercises, officially aimed at practicing joint actions between Belarusian units and Russian nuclear support units from the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense in the use of TNW[xxiii]. However, available information indicates that the Belarusian missile unit involved in the exercise used standard training munitions without special equipment. Special training munitions (SUB) for aviation were delivered to field storage points at an operational assault aviation airfield by vehicle by specialists from the 12th Main Directorate. The preparation and mounting of SUB on carrier aircraft were also handled by these specialists, with Belarusian Armed Forces personnel acting as observers and trainees.
These inspections and exercises did not confirm the presence of TNW in Belarus, nor the Belarusian Armed Forces’ ability or readiness to use it independently. Moreover, the possibility of Belarus conducting such training or exercises independently was questioned due to the lack of SUB and trained specialists. In order to provide more convincing evidence, during the Independence Day parade on July 3, Minsk showcased Iskander-M operational-tactical complexes bearing radiation hazard symbols (see photo), emphasizing that these systems are capable of using nuclear-armed missiles[xxiv].
Realizing that the TNW initiative did not yield the desired results, the Kremlin decided to provide Minsk with its “strategic nuclear umbrella”. In September 2024, amendments were made to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, expanding the grounds for Moscow’s use of nuclear weapons[xxv]. On December 6, 2024, Belarus and Russia signed a Treaty on Mutual Security Guarantees within the Union State, which includes the use of Russia’s entire nuclear arsenal in the event of aggression against Belarus[xxvi].
To amplify the international resonance of the treaty, Lukashenko publicly requested Putin to deploy the Oreshnik missile system in Belarus[xxvii], which Russia first used in combat on November 21, 2024[xxviii]. Although Putin agreed to this request, Russia has not yet begun practical implementation of these plans.
Meanwhile, Belarus’ military-political leadership, led by Lukashenko, regularly raises the possibility of launching missile and artillery strikes in response to the slightest threat of aggression from neighboring states. Speaking at the opening of the first session of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly (VNS) in its new format in April, A. Lukashenko threatened the West with “asymmetric measures” and stated the possibility of “open armed confrontation, up to the use of nuclear weapons” [xxix]. He also reminded Western countries that “their capitals are very close” to Belarus’ border.
Based on our analysis, despite numerous threats by Minsk to use “all available means of destruction” against Western neighbors, this scenario appears unlikely, even considering Lukashenko’s propensity for impulsive actions, particularly when it comes to the safety of his power and family. Regarding nuclear weapons, even if they have indeed been redeployed to Belarus, there is no doubt that Moscow retains full and absolute control over the “nuclear button” and will make decisions on the use of both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
Such weapons have not been used by Russia even during the full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, despite hundreds of thousands of losses. Consequently, verbal threats of nuclear weapon use from Belarusian territory are essentially another psychological operation aimed at destabilizing societies in EU countries. The psychological impact should be considered the primary aspect of risks related to the hypothetical placement of nuclear weapons in Belarus.
Moreover, the Belarusian Armed Forces possess their own means of destruction capable of targeting strategic objects in neighboring countries. However, Belarusian military-political leadership is fully aware of the consequences of launching preemptive strikes on foreign territory. Therefore, the likelihood of using long-range weapons from Belarusian territory should currently be considered low. The same limiting factor as in Threat 1 applies: the Belarusian leadership’s concern for their physical safety.
Threat 3: Potential Escalation of Hybrid Warfare Against European Countries Through Migrant Pressure on the Border
The hybrid war unleashed by Minsk, with direct support from Moscow, using migrants has been ongoing for four years, starting in 2021. Annually, EU countries neighboring Belarus record tens of thousands of illegal border-crossing attempts with the full acquiescence of Belarusian authorities.
In 2024, EU countries neighboring Belarus recorded 36,291 attempts by migrants to illegally cross the border from Belarus—a 13.8% decrease compared to 2023 (42,078).
The lowest number of illegal crossing attempts on the Polish-Belarusian border was observed in February 2024. The peak occurred in May 2024, when over 7,000 migrants attempted to cross, primarily heading to Poland. In April, 6,237 attempts were recorded. For comparison, October saw 2,211 attempts, November 1,403, and December 668.
Thus, in the fourth quarter of 2024, migrant pressure on the Polish-Belarusian border significantly decreased, with 4,282 attempts recorded over three months, or 14% of the annual total.
Some experts attribute the decrease in illegal crossings to actions taken by Polish leadership to mitigate this threat. At the end of June, Polish President Andrzej Duda visited Beijing, where he accused A. Lukashenko and official Minsk of waging a hybrid war on EU borders using migrants seeking to reach the West[xxx].
As a result, official Minsk’s rhetoric changed significantly. Belarusian propaganda began publishing information about the activation of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs in combating illegal migration: on June 29, a guilty verdict was issued in Minsk against two foreigners for organizing illegal migration[xxxi], and on July 19, Belarus unilaterally introduced visa-free entry for citizens of European countries until December 31, 2024[xxxii]. However, on July 2, during a speech at the Palace of the Republic, A. Lukashenko stated[xxxiii] that he “will not catch migrants” fleeing through Poland to Germany and that he “has no intention of ordering border guards, military, or others to protect the European Union on the Belarus-Poland border”.
Thus, the primary reasons for the reduced migrant activity should be attributed not so much to Warsaw’s actions but to measures taken by Minsk ahead of the 2nd International Conference on Eurasian Security, held in Minsk on October 31–November 1, 2024, and preparations for the electoral campaign in Belarus, which prompted unprecedented border security measures.
There is no doubt that the migrant crisis on EU borders is controlled and regulated by official Minsk, which is fully capable of halting the hybrid war on the western direction. However, this situation is highly advantageous for Moscow, so significant reductions in illegal migrant activity, let alone an end to the proxy war, should not be expected in the near future.
Moreover, unlike full-scale aggression or missile strikes from Belarusian territory, in the case of the hybrid migrant crisis, Lukashenko is confident that the West lacks an effective response mechanism equivalent to Article 5 of the NATO Charter. From his perspective, the West can only continue to fortify the border or impose sanctions, the damage from which is offset by Russia. Until the EU finds an effective asymmetric response to migrant pressure, the crisis will persist. On the contrary, depending on the military-political situation, it could escalate at any moment. Thus, this threat is direct and immediate, with a tendency toward escalation.
Threat 4: Information-Psychological War
This threat runs as a common thread through the entire analysis, being, in essence, the main aspect of Threats 1–2. Like the migrant crisis, it involves aggression that is poorly covered by international law and less overt. Most importantly, the EU lacks both symmetric and asymmetric responses to it, except for clearly insufficient sanctions. As evidenced by the relevant report of the “Commission on the Influence of Russia and Belarus on Poland’s Internal Security and Interests”, Poland’s informational sovereignty—and, by extension, that of the European Union—is weak and inadequately protected[xxxiv].
While the exact number of Russian-speaking EU residents is unknown, it is estimated at no less than 7–8 million, including Ukrainian refugees. They use Russian or Russian-language social networks in daily life, read Russian news, and are targeted by Russian-language influencers and online media. This extensive infrastructure is largely beyond EU control and, with sufficient funding, easily becomes a source of disinformation and manipulation, which can seamlessly infiltrate national information spaces of EU countries from the Russian-language sphere.
Moreover, unlike participation in a direct Russia-EU (NATO) confrontation, which would turn Belarus into a battlefield and is therefore undesirable for Belarusian leadership, psychological warfare allows weakening the EU and undermining its integrity from within without risking anything. This is a significant advantage of this activity from Lukashenko’s perspective, and further escalation of this threat should be expected.
3. Conclusions
An analysis of the activities of Belarusian authorities necessitates viewing Belarus as one of the primary sources of threats to regional security. The main factor contributing to this is Belarus’ total dependence on Russia in the economic and security spheres. Consequently, Belarus is forced to follow Moscow’s policy, which currently benefits from maintaining high tensions on the western borders of the Union State for several reasons. However, the analysis shows that:
1. Military threats are the most significant but not the most likely. Their realization is constrained by several factors, including Russia’s reluctance to fight on two fronts, the loss of the element of surprise, and resistance from Belarusian authorities due to concerns for their own survival.
2. The most pressing threats with potential for further escalation are hybrid threats from Belarus—migrant and information-psychological. These offer several advantages from Minsk’s perspective:
They enable destabilization and internal weakening of the EU, diverting resources from aiding Ukraine without requiring direct confrontation with the EU (NATO).
They employ methods for which the West still lacks adequate symmetric or asymmetric responses. This is a comfortable mode for Minsk to create threats to the EU, allowing Lukashenko to avoid fearing for his life while believing that persistent pressure will eventually force the West to seek peace.
3. The role of Threats 1 and 2 is largely explained by providing content for Threat 4. Topics such as the deployment of TNW in Belarus, Russia’s nuclear umbrella for Belarus, and the transfer of Oreshnik missile systems to Belarus have become key tools of Belarusian and Russian state propaganda, consistently injected into the EU’s information space.
4. In the future, high attention should be paid to Belarus’ role in realizing Threats 3 and 4. These threats must not be underestimated amid the constant focus on Threats 1 and 2. They pose a direct threat to the EU’s sovereignty and integrity while presenting relatively low risks for Belarusian leadership.
5. This assessment of the likelihood of threats from Belarus is based on the current situation in Belarus and—crucially—the current state of Belarus-Russia relations. However, it should be assumed that Russia is already seeking and will do everything to disrupt this balance. If Russia succeeds in further limiting Belarus’ sovereignty, the aforementioned constraints will disappear, creating a new situation on EU borders where the likelihood of Threats 1 and 2 significantly increases.
6. In this regard, the measures currently taken by EU country leaderships toward the Lukashenko regime appear insufficiently proactive and strategic.
For instance, reliance on the “Eastern Shield” is a classic passive approach, well-known from military history. As history shows, border fortifications have never prevented aggression when the aggressor has sufficient resources and will. Moreover, the current level of economic and societal interconnectedness renders the idea of an “iron curtain” largely ineffective.
Equally ineffective is the reliance on pro-Western opposition and hopes for its rise to power in the event of Russia’s weakening. Belarus’ situation cannot be compared to Poland in 1989, as political sentiments, the quality of military-political elites, and—most importantly—Belarus’ political and symbolic significance to Russia are entirely different from Poland in the late 1980s.
Consequently, the focus should be on creating a new, pragmatic, effective, and proactive Eastern policy for the EU, primarily aimed at mitigating threats that already exist or may arise in the near future due to Russia’s confrontational foreign policy.
References:
[i] https://videobel.by/ru-RU/movies/intervu-lukashenko-amerikanskomu-blogeru-polnaya-versiya-zachem-vy-gnobite-rossiu-naufal
[iv] https://meduza.io/feature/2024/07/03/rossiyskaya-armiya-gotovit-novyy-udar-po-ukrainskoy-oborone-dazhe-bolee-moschnyy-chem-shturm-avdeevki-kakie-territorii-mogut-poteryat-vsu-i-est-li-im-chem-otvetit
[v] https://sputnik.by/20240411/vstrecha-vladimira-putina-i-aleksandra-lukashenko-v-moskve--translyatsiya-1085402492.html
[vi] https://meduza.io/feature/2024/07/03/rossiyskaya-armiya-gotovit-novyy-udar-po-ukrainskoy-oborone-dazhe-bolee-moschnyy-chem-shturm-avdeevki-kakie-territorii-mogut-poteryat-vsu-i-est-li-im-chem-otvetit
[vii] https://www.sb.by/articles/v-gpk-predupredili-o-nedopustimosti-provokatsiy-na-ukrainsko-belorusskoy-granitse.html
[viii] https://www.sb.by/articles/v-gpk-predupredili-o-nedopustimosti-provokatsiy-na-ukrainsko-belorusskoy-granitse.html
[ix] https://belta.by/society/view/v-belarusi-nachalas-vnezapnaja-proverka-gotovnosti-soedinenij-i-voinskih-chastej-vs-642687-2024/
[xii] https://president.gov.by/ru/events/posesenie-dislokacii-zenitnogo-raketnogo-polka-v-lunineckom-rajone
[xiii] https://rtvi.com/news/privedeny-v-gotovnost-belarus-pokazala-perebrosku-tankov-k-granicze-s-ukrainoj/
[xviii] https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/03/26/lukashenko-poruchil-gotovit-armiyu-k-protivostoyaniyu-so-stranami-baltii-a125816
[xxi] https://www.dw.com/ru/sipri-net-dokazatelstv-razmesenia-v-belarusi-rossijskogo-adernogo-oruzia/a-69366355
[xxii] https://www.dw.com/ru/belarus-obavila-o-vnezapnoj-proverke-takticeskogo-adernogo-oruzia/a-69019058
[xxiii] https://topwar.ru/244152-vs-rossii-i-belorussii-nachali-vtoroj-jetap-uchenij-s-nestrategicheskim-jadernym-oruzhiem.html
[xxix] https://www.slova.by/obshchestvo/33427-polnaya-rech-lukashenko-na-vii-vns-pryamaya-translyatsiya-iz-minska-dvorets-respubliki-aprel-2024
[xxx] https://cdn2.belsat.eu/ru/news/25-06-2024-duda-rasskazal-drugu-si-o-migrantah-na-granitse-s-belarusyu-kitaj-teper-nazhmet-na-lukashenko
