Analysis of the Mass Violation of Polish Airspace Using UAVs on the Night of 9–10 September 2025
- EESF
- 4 days ago
- 12 min read
Note: The title deliberately avoids using the terms “attack” or “Russian” to prevent prejudging conclusions. Several aspects related to the mentioned incident remain unexplained and require careful examination.
This article will address the following questions concerning the violation of Polish airspace:
Who launched the drones?
What was the purpose of their launch?
What role did the authorities of the Republic of Belarus play in the incident?
1. Background Information on the Incident
The first violation of Polish airspace was recorded on 9 September at 23:30, with the last one at 06:30 on 10 September.A total of 19 cases have been reported, primarily involving drones, although there is mention of one case involving the discovery of “debris from a missile of unknown origin.” However, this likely refers to debris from missiles used to intercept drones.
Four drones deemed “dangerous” were shot down by Polish and NATO forces. The criteria for determining the danger posed by specific objects were not disclosed.
In addition to ground-based systems, the operation to neutralise the drones involved long-range radar detection and control aircraft, including Saab and AWACS. Two F-35s, two F-16s, and helicopters—Mi-24, Mi-17, and Black Hawk—were deployed to the suspected area of activity.
Most drones fell or were shot down in the (south)-eastern voivodeships of Poland, although one reached near Gdańsk.
Some drones crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border; however, as stated by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, “a significant number of drones entered Poland from Belarusian territory for the first time”.
Of particular interest is the statement by the Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Republic of Belarus, Major General Pavel Muraveiko, published at 9:37 a.m. (Belarus time) on 10 September:
“During the night-time exchange of strikes by UAVs between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the Air Defence Forces and assets of the Republic of Belarus on duty continuously tracked UAVs that had lost their track as a result of the impact of the parties' electronic warfare assets.
Some of the lost drones were destroyed by our country's Air Defence Forces over the territory of the republic.
Through existing channels of communication, between 11 p.m. on 9 September and 4 a.m. on 10 September, our forces and equipment on duty exchanged information on the air and radar situation with the forces and equipment on duty in Poland and the Republic of Lithuania. In doing so, they alerted them to the approach of unknown aircraft to their countries' territory.
This allowed the Polish side to respond promptly to the actions of the drones by scrambling their forces on duty”.
The following points stand out in this statement:
The Chief of the General Staff deliberately avoids specifying the origin of the drones, although this should be well-known to him based on data regarding the drones’ entry into Belarusian territory, debris analysis, and potential additional information received from Russia.
Muraveiko emphasises the neutralisation of potentially dangerous objects by Belarusian Armed Forces’ air defence systems.
He also highlights the fact of informing the Polish side, underscoring cooperation in the field of international security.
Most facts listed by Muraveiko were later confirmed by the Chief of the Polish General Staff, General Wiesław Kukuła, who noted that the information from Belarus was provided with “useful advance notice”.
General Kukuła also remarked that Belarus’ readiness to cooperate came as a surprise, given its prior escalation of tensions at the land border. He also noted that Poland reciprocated by providing Belarus with data on objects heading towards their territory.
2. Positions of the Parties Involved in the Incident
Poland immediately stated that its airspace had been violated by Russian drones, based on:
Past experience (precedents had already occurred),
The fact that on that night, a large number of Russian drones (415 drones, 42 cruise missiles, and one “Iskander” ballistic missile) attacked Ukraine,
Monitoring of Ukrainian airspace. For instance, the Ukrainian Telegram channel monitorwar, which provides detailed information on air threats, reported the crossing of the Ukrainian-Polish border by three Geran-2 drones at 00:24 on 10 September.
Belarus, as noted earlier, deliberately avoided specifying the drones’ affiliation, using the vague phrasing “unmanned aerial vehicles that lost their course due to the impact of electronic warfare systems of the parties involved”.
Russia did not comment on the situation with the drones crossing the Polish border at the highest level: “All questions to the Ministry of Defence”. In turn, the Ministry of Defence only provided a brief comment—and quite a late one, at 2:08 p.m. Moscow time:
“No targets were planned for strikes on Polish territory. The maximum flight range of the Russian UAVs used in the strike, which allegedly crossed the border with Poland, does not exceed 700 km. Nevertheless, we are ready to hold consultations with the Polish Ministry of Defence on this matter”.
Further explanations were provided through less official sources. For example, the major Russian Telegram channel “Militarist”, attributed to the media pool of the GRU (Russian military intelligence), claimed a “Polish-Ukrainian scam regarding the alleged entry of Russian UAVs into Polish territory”, citing a significant discrepancy in the serial numbers of the “Gerbera” drones that fell in Poland as evidence.
A version of why this “scam” was “staged” was published by State Duma deputy and director of the Institute of International Political and Economic Strategies RUSSTRAT, Elena Panina: “Pro-European Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and figures like EU diplomacy chief Kaja Kallas have a direct interest in ensuring that any hint of negotiations between Moscow and Washington is blocked by a high-profile incident”.
The only fact worth noting in this narrative is the Russian Ministry of Defence’s reference to the fact that Geran-2 drones have a flight range of only 700 km (according to open sources, Gerbera drones have an even shorter range—300 km). Meanwhile, all drones identified in Poland so far are indeed Gerberas (possibly because the potentially far more dangerous Geran-2 drones were destroyed by air-to-air missiles and thus have not yet been found).
The Russian Ministry of Defence implies that it would be impossible for Russia to launch Geran-2/Gerbera drones to reach Poland and fly within its airspace.
However, this information is inaccurate. Firstly, the Geran-2 (also known as Shahed-136) has a flight range not of 700 km but from 700 km and above (up to 1,800 km), especially if it lacks a warhead, according to open sources. Secondly, the distance from the launch sites of Russian UAVs on the northeastern border of Ukraine (Bryansk Oblast border) to the Polish city of Zamość in the Lublin Voivodeship, which appears to have been a reference point, is approximately 620 km in a straight line.
There is also a logical explanation for the appearance of Gerbera drones in Poland. In the summer of 2025, information emerged about a new, modified version of the Gerbera, whose tactical-technical characteristics are currently unknown. It appears that this modified version was used in the incident under analysis, with information suggesting further specific adaptations of the Gerbera for the mission in Poland. For instance, technical experts note the presence of additional fuel tanks in the nose section of the Gerberas that fell in Poland.
The alternative explanations for the appearance of the Gerbera and Geran-2 drones in Poland pushed by Russian sources also do not hold up to scrutiny.
The first version claims that no attacks occurred, and the UAVs were planted by Ukrainians. This version, for example, is promoted by Russian political scientist Suzdaltsev, also known for his criticism of Belarusian authorities.
This version is entirely implausible, as it implies a vast number of accomplices among pilots (not only Polish!), officials, senior leadership, and even Belarusian authorities.
Another version, voiced by military expert Yuri Knutov for the popular Russian newspaper “Moskovsky Komsomolets”, suggests that Ukrainians obtained operational Gerberas and either launched them at Poland themselves or used electronic warfare to redirect Russian drones to Poland.
This version is also untenable. If Ukrainians had launched drones at Poland from their territory, radar monitoring data (Patriot, AWACS) would have revealed this, with severe consequences for Zelenskyy. Furthermore, Ukrainians would have needed to hack and reprogram Russian drones to launch them, a process that could be detected during later technical inspections in Poland.
Conclusion: The drones were launched by Russia.
3. Objectives of Using Drones to Violate Polish Airspace
According to Belarusian military officials and some Russian sources, the drones may have entered Poland accidentally, for example, due to Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. This is theoretically possible and has occurred previously, such as in Romania. However, such cases typically involve isolated drones or missiles moving along erratic trajectories.
In contrast, the incident under analysis involves 19 drones simultaneously detected over Polish territory, plus an unknown number destroyed in Belarus.
Moreover, according to a report by Polish military expert Jarosław Wolski, who analysed eyewitness accounts, the drones crossing the Ukrainian-Polish border flew in a group and followed a clear trajectory.
Additionally, the simultaneous appearance of two groups of drones from Ukraine and Belarus, clearly coordinated in time, should be noted.
Conclusion: The violation of airspace was not accidental but orchestrated by Russia to carry out specific reconnaissance tasks.
Based on the information available, the violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones may have had the following objectives:
Testing the readiness of Polish air defence systems and the Polish military-political leadership to respond to a drone attack. Unlike previous accidental incursions by Russian drones and missiles, this time the Polish authorities’ response was comprehensive. All prescribed security protocols were activated, providing Russia with a clear picture of Poland’s and NATO’s readiness for a potential attack.
Analysing NATO’s response to a threatening situation below the threshold of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
According to some reports, some drones attempted to execute an attack manoeuvre on targets in Ukraine from Polish territory.
Finally, some Polish media outlets cite an information attack that began on the night/morning of 10 September as the “true” objective of the drones.
The first two objectives were fully achieved, though it should be noted that the results were beneficial not only to the Kremlin but also to Poland, even if this is not openly acknowledged.
Poland’s military-political leadership was able to test the effectiveness of planned measures to protect airspace, inform the public, mobilise territorial defence, identify shortcomings, and take steps to address them, meaning that future responses will be more effective.
NATO’s response was also noteworthy. The nature of the incident excludes the activation of the well-known Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but Article 4 was activated—for the eighth time in NATO’s history—which states:
“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”.
Undoubtedly, the invocation of Article 4 served as a valuable exercise, including psychologically, for EU political leaders.
The third objective, mentioned only by military expert Jarosław Wolski, remains questionable for now.
Finally, the fourth objective, though considered by information analysts as almost the primary one, is more of an auxiliary nature, highlighting the dual, i.e., hybrid, character of the Russian operation, consisting of reconnaissance (objectives 1–2) and informational-psychological components.
Testing the readiness of Poland and NATO to protect their airspace provided Russia with unique, new data, while the information attacks lacked a qualitatively new character and did not yield qualitatively new results.
The attack involved the mass posting of negative comments about Ukraine under articles, which, according to experts, accounted for up to 40% of the total. However, such work of “bots” and “trolls” criticising Ukraine in Poland’s information space has been ongoing routinely since 2022 and is closely linked to the rise in anti-Ukrainian sentiment recorded in Poland.
Thus, the negative information backdrop surrounding the violation of Polish airspace does not create a new trend but merely highlights a longstanding issue, revealing a simple fact: over three years since the start of the war, Polish authorities have failed to ensure the country’s information sovereignty and limit Russia’s informational interference. Meanwhile, such measures are routinely implemented worldwide, and sufficient experience has been accumulated that could be used in Poland’s interests.
4. The Belarusian Dimension
In conclusion, we would like to address an interesting nuance—the response of Belarusian authorities to the violation of Polish (and Belarusian) airspace by Russian drones. As a reminder, Chief of the General Staff Muraveiko officially stated that the UAVs entering Belarusian airspace en route to Poland were partially shot down, and information about the rest was promptly relayed to Polish authorities.
Overall, Polish experts and media see a direct link between the drone attack and the “Zapad-2025” military exercise beginning on 12 September, viewing both events as part of a broader escalation strategy, including by Belarusian authorities. However, this perspective appears to be an oversimplification, as over the past six months, two distinct trends can be clearly traced in and around Belarus, developing simultaneously and in opposite directions: a trend towards escalation and a trend towards de-escalation.
The de-escalation trend was first noted in March 2025 and documented in our “Escalation Barometer,” see Figure 3, as well as the website eesf.info for more details on the methodology behind the infographic.
As the curve shows, Belarusian authorities made significant efforts to reduce foreign policy tensions, which, in our view, is linked to the following factors:
The start of unofficial consultations between Minsk and Washington (via Rybakov and Cole),
Initial signals that the Russian-Ukrainian war might end or pause in autumn 2025–spring 2026,
The strengthening of Russia’s military machine and preparations by both sides (NATO and Russia) for a new war, which would inevitably involve Belarusian territory.
One of the goals of these de-escalation efforts was to resume cooperation between the defence ministries of Belarus and Poland, particularly by sending Polish military observers to the “Zapad-2025” exercise.
This sustained de-escalation trend was interrupted only from 12 August, when, after receiving a negative response from Poland to the proposal to resume cooperation, Belarus took three consecutive escalatory actions:
On 13 August, Khrenin delivered a closed report to Lukashenko, one of the topics of which was the planning of nuclear weapon use and the “Oreshnik” system.
On 21 August, State Secretary of the Security Council Alexander Volfovich stated that equipping the Polonez missile system with nuclear warheads was under consideration.
On 5 September, a Polish citizen, Grzegorz Paweł, was detained in Belarus on espionage charges.
Poland, in turn, from 11 September, completely closed its state border with Belarus, including railway goods transit, citing the threat posed by the “Zapad-2025” exercise. However, Polish authorities did not limit the border closure to the duration of the exercise. According to a statement by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Poland will reopen the border with Belarus only when it is confident that there is no threat to its citizens from the neighbouring state.
How does the appearance of Russian UAVs in the airspace of Belarus and Poland fit into this situation of a sharp escalation peak between Belarus and Poland? Clearly, it significantly reinforces the results of the new escalatory trend and counteracts the prolonged de-escalation trend observed previously.
If we set aside the rhetoric about tactical nuclear weapons and the “Oreshnik” system, which can be considered ritualistic for Minsk, there are effectively only two events that serve as clear triggers for escalation—the detention of a Polish citizen on espionage charges (a KGB operation) and the provocation against Poland using drones and, to some extent, Belarusian sovereign territory (an operation by Russia’s top leadership).Both events have clear precedents in the recent past.
The arrest of Grzegorz Paweł continues the provocations by Belarusian special services (the Ryanair plane incident, the orchestrated migrant crisis, and operations involving Belarusian special services in Poland).
The use of Belarusian territory to violate Polish airspace also has a direct precedent: the attack on Ukraine from Belarusian territory in 2022.
This fact was undoubtedly evident to the Belarusian side as well. This explains its relatively firm and public response (destroying some drones and promptly informing Poland), which aligns with the previously observed de-escalation trend. Previously, Minsk typically did not comment on the entry of Russian drones into Belarusian territory, quietly destroying them when necessary.
In this regard, two important points should be highlighted:
Firstly, without the firm and swift response of Belarusian authorities, the situation could have developed as it did in 2022, with Belarus being regarded as a co-aggressor.
Secondly, Russia had no technical reason to route some drones through Belarus. The entire southeastern part of Poland is protected by the same air security protocol, which has been strengthened since the summer of 2024 under Operation “Eastern Dawn”. The response of air defence and air forces to the appearance of UAVs is identical, involving the same air and ground assets.
Based on the above, albeit incomplete, data, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the “Belarusian dimension” not only in relation to the recent incident but also in the broader perspective of international security developments on the Poland-Belarus border:
There is currently an internal conflict within Belarusian leadership between advocates of a return to a multi-vector policy (the Foreign Ministry, parts of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and parts of the Presidential Administration) and supporters of a single-vector policy (unconditional support for Russia), including parts of the special services leadership. This may explain the constant escalation by the special services.
Russia, in this situation, supports the policy of its pro-Russian allies and the trend of Belarus’ escalation with the West. This explains the entry of Russian drones into Belarusian territory before violating Polish airspace.
Poland’s current hardline policy, focused on its role as the “shield of the European Union” and preparation for war, fails to account for these nuances and leverage them in the national interest and for EU security. In particular, it ignores the opportunities presented by the aforementioned divergence of trends.
Belarus, for its part, is a hostage to the foreign policy confrontation it became part of in 2022. As part of the problem, it is unable to formulate an effective solution, as Lukashenko must carefully respond to contradictory external impulses from the East and West. Contrary to the principles of strategic art, strategy is subordinated to tactics. In this context, further contradictory actions by Belarusian authorities can be expected, aligning with the logic of the divergence between the internal trend of de-escalation and the external trend of escalation driven by Russia, in which Belarus is involved.
