Review of the document RED PAPER: EU-Belarus Security Framework 2025 prepared by the Office of Sviatlana Tikhanouskaya
- EESF
- Jan 15
- 12 min read
Updated: Jan 16
1. Context of the document's creation, its versions, objectives and target group, authors, novelty and relevance
The document was prepared by a group of experts on behalf of the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (hereinafter referred to as OST) and, according to official information on the OST website, “contains important and relevant information about the security of Belarus — energy, information, economic, military, migration and youth”. According to the website, “the data systematised by experts is used in the document to identify the risks facing Belarus today and their significance for the country's future”[1].
The ‘red paper’ document type does not correspond to the official typology of political documents. However, the name was clearly created by analogy with the established names ‘white paper’, ‘white book’, etc. The use of red instead of white is obviously intended to emphasise the critical importance of the information contained therein.
There are at least three versions of the document, only two of which are currently available to the public. Unfortunately, its authors did not indicate the reasons for the appearance of new versions or the list of changes made. A comparative analysis shows, however, that the volume of the document grew with each new version due to both additions and changed formatting. The analysis will use the most recent version, published in August 2025[2].
In the summary of the report posted on the website, the summary of each section ends with the question "Why is this important for Belarusians?" Thus, the information presented on the website gives the impression that the primary target audience of the document is Belarusian society.
However, this is contradicted by the text of the document itself, which focuses on policy recommendations for the West with the aim of "geopolitical reorientation of Belarus" (p. 6). The fact that the primary target audience is Western politicians is also evidenced by the fact that the document was created specifically for the NATO Summit in The Hague, where it was officially presented at one of the side events[3] .
This suggests that the authors of the document never determined which specific risks and threats they were describing, either to Belarus or to the EU/NATO. This affected the overall logic of the document, as will be shown below.
The authors of the document are as follows: Alexander Dobrovolsky, Alina Kharisova, Dmitry Kruk, Dr Victoria Levkovets, Dmitry Mitskevich, František Večerko, Anastasia Luzgina, Margarita Vorikhova, as well as unspecified "ISANS experts and others". Overall, this is a fairly small group of people representing Svetlana Tikhanoгskaya's circle. Alexander Dobrovolsky and Frantishek Vecherko are her advisers, Margarita Vorikhova is the representative for youth policy in the United Transitional Cabinet headed by Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, Dmitry Mitskevich is a journalist from the Belsat TV channel who is close to the OST, and anonymous "ISANS experts" usually accompany and participate in OST events. The only independent experts in this case can be considered the employees of the BEROC analytical centre — Dmitry Kruk and Anastasia Luzgina. Both are specialists in the field of economics, that is, they are responsible for only one section of the document.
In addition, it is important to note that some of the authors are not expert analysts, but primarily politicians who shape and support Svetlana Tikhanovskaya's foreign policy position (F. Vecherko, A. Dobrovolsky). Their co-authorship as experts may indicate the political bias of the report.
The document's novelty and relevance lie in its attempt to address virtually the entire spectrum of security issues between the EU and Belarus. It also aims to develop practical recommendations for resolving these issues and politically reorienting Belarus — a daunting task that has never been accomplished before.
2. Comments on the structure and subject matter of the document; the extent to which its content aligns with its stated objectives; and its internal logic
The first thing that catches the eye is a very short and at the same time somewhat vague one-page introduction, which briefly outlines the document's objectives (a description of threats and recommendations for key areas with the main goal of “geopolitical reorientation of Belarus through its gradual integration into pan-European security, economic, and cultural frameworks”).
For instance, the introduction does not define the key terms "risk" and "threat". Further on, both terms are simply used in the single phrase “risks and threats” or as interchangeable.
The introduction also lacks a description of the methodology for assessing risks and threats (for example, at least in the range "highly probable – unlikely"). Judging by the results, the authors did not set themselves the goal of assessing the realism of the risks and threats they identified. As a result, direct threats are mentioned alongside extremely unlikely ones, threats to Belarusian statehood or Belarusian civil society alongside threats to the EU. Technical failures, such as those affecting hydroelectric power stations, are also mentioned as threats, which unacceptably blurs the categorical framework of the problem under consideration.
The above shortcomings have a negative impact on the logic and persuasiveness of the document, as will be shown in more detail below.
One of the notable features of the document's structure is the presence of recommendations at the end of each thematic section. It is striking that in almost all cases, except for energy security, the recommendations include a mandatory point on assistance to the Belarusian opposition. This recommendation seems justified, for example, in the section “Information Security”, but rather far-fetched in the sections on “Migration Security” and “Military Security”. For example, the section “Military Security” recommends integrating opposition “OSINT groups, diaspora analysts, and military defectors” into “early warning systems, military foresight units, and disinformation tracking networks under EU and NATO auspices” (p. 25).
This recommendation obviously carries serious risks and runs counter to all possible security protocols of the armed forces and special services. It can be assumed that the presence of these recommendations is related to the authors' backgrounds, some of which represent opposition interests.
However, the main drawback that calls the document's value into question is the internal inconsistency of its logic. The standard formula for an analytical document with recommendations is as follows:
a certain existing suboptimal state A (reality) is identified,
an optimal state B (goal) is formulated,
actions are proposed that will allow a transition from state A to state B (policy recommendations).
If we compare this formula with the content of the Red Paper, we get the following picture:
the authors describe Belarus' situation as suboptimal: under Lukashenko's rule and Russia's influence, it poses a threat to the EU (corresponds to the formula).
the optimal, target state of Belarus is described: breaking free from Russia's influence and integrating into the EU (corresponds to the formula),
BUT: there are no recommendations on how to remove Belarus from Russia's influence, i.e. on how to transition from state A to state B (a gap in logic).
Instead, the document provides two other types of recommendations:
1. Recommendations on how to prepare for the target state B, in which Russia's influence and Lukashenko's regime disappear and Belarus can be integrated into the EU without hindrance, cf.:
- Develop a plan for integration into the European energy system. The European Union should begin to consider Belarus as a potential future partner within its broader regional energy framework (p. 40).
- Support Security Sector Planning for a Post-Lukashenka Transition (p. 25).
At the same time, the text contains no recommendations that explain the process of Belarus' political reorientation, despite this being the main objective of the document, as stated in the “Introduction”.
2. Recommendations for protection against threats from Belarus. This group of recommendations actually contradicts the logic of the reorientation of Belarus.
In particular, the report proposes to “recognize Belarus as a strategic military frontier by integrating Belarus-specific threats’ assessments into the EU and NATO strategic planning, intelligence sharing, and defense cooperation frameworks” (p. 25). The quoted proposal means that Belarus is to be treated as a separate strategic (i.e. long-term) military and hybrid threat to the EU and NATO in key NATO documents. Accordingly, “scenario planning for military escalation involving Belarus within joint EU–NATO exercises, especially in the Baltic region and Poland” should be prioritized.
However, it is impossible to simultaneously prepare for the European integration of Belarus and for a full-scale war with Belarus. Thus, there is also a strong contradiction between the two sets of recommendations.
It should be noted that the substitution of concepts — i.e. the consideration of measures to prepare the EU for the integration of Belarus rather than the political reorientation of Belarus — is a common issue in documents produced by the Belarusian opposition.
In this sense, the Red Paper is similar to the “Strategy for the Transition to a New Belarus” published in 2023 by Sviatlana Tikhanouskaya's Office[4], whose authors honestly admitted that they “do not yet know exactly how and when the transition from dictatorship to democracy will take place” and suggested addressing a more comfortable topic — planning the first 180 days of governing a free, democratic Belarus.
The possibility that this transition may not happen at all, and that the upcoming transfer of power could result in leaders emerging who are more pro-Russian than Lukashenko, raises questions about the feasibility of such strategies and recommendations.
3. Chapter-by-chapter analysis of the document
A chapter-by-chapter analysis has revealed a number of significant issues that require consideration. Due to space limitations, only a few particularly relevant comments will be provided:
1. In the section “Information Security”, the recommendations on creating a strategic platform for interaction between the EU and Belarusian democratic forces appear to be unpromising.
This is not only because of the obvious mismatch in institutional levels and, accordingly, opportunities for interaction, but also because of the dual status of both the Belarusian diaspora and Belarusian democratic forces. These are, on the one hand, the object of direct influence and, on the other, the conduit (willingly or unwillingly) of Belarusian state propaganda.
For more details on this, using the example of “Nexta” and blogger Motolko, see, for example, the “Report of the Disinformation Group of the Polish Commission for the Study of the Influence of Russia and Belarus” dated 10 January 2025, pp. 64–67 et seq.[5]
2. In the section “Migration Security”, some of the recommendations on security measures seem unnecessary and outdated, cf.: “Reinforce frontline defences and hybrid threat preparedness... Scaling up real-time surveillance systems, counter-drone infrastructure, and mobile patrol technology, enhancing early warning systems and data-sharing protocols across borders” (p. 80).
Poland and the Baltic republics consider the protection of the eastern border to be one of the main areas of EU security. At the time of publication of the Red Paper, detailed plans for the “Eastern Shield” had already been published. These include powerful, deep, layered border protection against both migrants and military threats. The repetition in the recommendations of plans, which have already been announced and are in the process of being implemented, gives the impression that the authors of the report are unaware of this.
3. The section “Military Security” raises the most questions. For instance, it provides the following, quite inaccurate interpretation of the Regional Grouping of Forces of Belarus and Russia:
According to the agreements between Belarus and Russia, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are fully included in the “Regional Group of Forces of Belarus and Russia” on the territory of Belarus. All Belarusian military infrastructure can be used by the Regional Group of Forces, i.e., Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in wartime. Within this framework, the Regional united system of air defense of Belarus and Russia has been created, which also gives the Kremlin control over the territory of Belarus. At the same time, the size of Russian troops, included in the Regional Group of Forces isn’t precisely limited in the documents, which makes it completely legal for the Kremlin to deploy as many army units in Belarus as it wants (p. 9).
Firstly, the Belarusian Armed Forces are not simply “included” in the RGF, but form its backbone, as the RGF is intended to defend the borders of the Union State on the territory of Belarus and the adjacent territory of the Russian Federation primarily by the Belarusian Armed Forces[6].
Secondly, although representatives of Belarus and Russia have emphasised that the composition of the RGF may change[7], this does not mean that changes can occur spontaneously and at the will of one of the parties. The size and tasks of the components are determined/specified, as a rule, every five years during the update of the plan for the use of the regional group of forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation.
Until 2020, the Russian component was the 20th Tank Army stationed in Smolensk, and since 2020, it has been the 1st Tank Army[8]. Now, since the 1st Tank Army has suffered heavy losses in Ukraine, the composition of the RGT may have changed again. However, overall, the size of this component remains unchanged: as a rule, the figure is around 9,000 personnel plus military equipment — 200 combat vehicles, 170 tanks, and about 100 guns and mortars[9]. A. Lukashenko himself, for example, has publicly stated that the Russian component consists of 10,000–15,000 military personnel[10].
Thirdly, it is incorrect to say that the RGF somehow ensures Russia's control over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. The Russian component of the RGF is located on Russian territory and only comes to Belarus for exercises and in limited numbers. A. Lukashenko himself is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Belarusian Armed Forces, and all colonels and generals are appointed and controlled by him personally.
According to the Agreement between Belarus and Russia on Joint Regional Security in the Military Sphere, command of the RGF is exercised on a parity basis by representatives of the General Staffs of both countries[11]. However, when preparing for exercises, the commander of the Russian component submits his decision on the use of the formation under his command to the Chief of the General Staff of Belarus for approval, and not vice versa.
Fourthly, the unified regional air defence system, also mentioned in the Red Paper, also does not give Russia control over the Republic of Belarus. The inclusion of Belarusian air defence in the all-Russian system simply allows Lukashenko to use powerful Russian air defence to protect Belarusian borders, and the Russians to increase the depth of their defensive perimeter by an additional 650 km. According to available estimates, the creation of the ERPAD has increased the overall effectiveness of air defence for Belarus by 1.4–1.6 times, and for Russia (in the region of its operation) by 1.7 times[12] .
The claim that a large number of KGB officers are trained at the FSB Academy in Russia (pp. 9–10) raises serious doubts, as it is not supported by sources.
This statement is contradicted by practical considerations, such as:
the existence in Belarus of its own higher education institution specifically for KGB officers, which is consistently expanding its capabilities (until 2022, the Institute of National Security, and thereafter, the Academy of National Security),
the inability to accept the necessary number of students from Belarus within the framework of the FSB Academy's training groups in Russia,
and security considerations that are very important to Lukashenko. His personal safety and that of his family depend primarily on the KGB. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Lukashenko, who is extremely suspicious and even paranoid and does not allow his subordinates to have unauthorised contact with Russia, will permit the possible mass recruitment of KGB officers on Russian territory.
Finally, the prospect of direct aggression by the Russian Armed Forces from Belarusian territory also seems doubtful. Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyse their shortcomings in detail within the scope of this review. However, it is worth noting that despite Lukashenko's willingness to support Putin, he is well aware that a war with NATO on Belarusian soil would result in consequences similar to those of World War II, as well as the inevitable loss of his power and potentially his life. In 2022, he was convinced that Kyiv would fall within three days. He has no such illusions now, which means he will resist war with all his power.
4. Conclusion
The RED PAPER: EU-Belarus Security Framework 2025, prepared by the OST, is an ambitious attempt to describe the main risks that Belarus under Lukashenko's control and Russia's influence poses to the EU and NATO, and to recommend ways to overcome these risks in order to politically reorient and integrate Belarus into the EU and NATO.
However, despite setting themselves this ambitious task, the authors of the document did not do enough to achieve it. They made the following mistakes and inaccuracies:
They did not prepare a categorical, terminological and methodological basis (definition and types of risks, differentiation between risks and threats, and risk assessment methods).
There was confusion over how to define threats, and over who the audience for the recommendations was: the West or the Belarusians?
There was also an issue regarding the influence of private political interests on the text's content, with repeated recommendations to support democratic forces.
However, the main problem with the document lies in its overall logic, which is inconsistent between the framing of the issue and the solutions (recommendations) proposed by the authors.
Rather than formulating measures for Belarus's political reorientation, such as its withdrawal from Russia's sphere of influence and integration into the EU, the authors of the document merely describe how to respond to existing and potential threats, and how to prepare for a time when Belarus has already emerged from Russia's sphere of influence.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the document does not achieve its main goal. Instead, it resembles an unsystematic catalogue of risks and threats, along with general and controversial recommendations on how to combat them, as well as advice on preparing a political and infrastructural interface for the integration of a democratic Belarus into the EU and NATO.
[1] https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/red-paper-what-needs-to-be-known-about-belarus-here-and-now.html
[5] https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/raport-zespolu-ds-dezinformacji-komisji-ds-badania-wplywow-rosyjskich-i-bialoruskich
[6] https:// www. mid. ru/ ru/ foreign_ policy/ international_ contracts/ international_ contracts/2_ contract/47455/
[7] https:// sputnik./20221230/ casus- belli- - -- vyzovy- dlya- belarusi- intervyu-- volfovicha-1070763867.
