On the Deployment of Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Belarus

1.  Introduction

Since 1960, four divisions from the Soviet Union’s Strategic Missile Forces have been stationed in Belarus. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus ranked eighth in the world in terms of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

On 27 July 1990, a declaration on the state sovereignty of the Byelorussian SSR was adopted, stating that the country aimed to make its territory a nuclear-free zone and become a neutral state.

This decision was driven both by public sentiment — which, following the Chernobyl disaster, viewed any nuclear technology negatively — and by pressure from the US and Russia. The US actively pressured Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to renounce nuclear weapons as part of its nuclear non-proliferation policy. Russia, for its part, wanted to retain control over all the nuclear weapons of the USSR.

In July 1993, Belarus officially acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In exchange, Belarus received security assurances from Russia, the US and the UK. These assurances were enshrined in the Budapest Memorandum, signed on 5 December 1994. Under the Nunn-Lugar programme, the US allocated approximately $250 million to Belarus for nuclear safety, dismantlement, transport and destruction of nuclear warheads. The transfer of all nuclear warheads to Russia was completed in November 1996.

On 20 July 1994, two and a half years before the completion of nuclear demilitarisation, Alexander Lukashenko became President of Belarus. At that time, 72 nuclear warheads were still located on Belarusian territory. The new head of state was already, at that time, wary of threats from NATO and viewed nuclear weapons as the only effective deterrent.   Lukashenko was seriously intent on halting the removal of strategic weapons, but Washington and Moscow did not support him on this issue.

Subsequently, Alexander Lukashenko repeatedly described the removal of nuclear weapons as a serious mistake. He believed that it was at least necessary to secure more favourable terms for the withdrawal. Moreover, he believed that if Belarus had retained its nuclear weapons, it would have been treated differently — there would have been neither sanctions nor pressure.

It can be assumed that A. Lukashenko decided to take practical steps towards acquiring nuclear weapons in response to the 2020 protests, realising that any external intervention at that time could have resulted in him losing power, even before the start of the war between Russia and Ukraine.

For example, in November 2021, the Belarusian president publicly announced his intention to propose to Russia the deployment of its nuclear weapons in Belarus in an interview with Russian media. In June 2022, the presidents of Belarus and Russia discussed this matter in person.

Meanwhile, preparations were underway in Belarus to establish the legislative framework and influence public opinion. On 15 March 2022, amendments and additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, which were adopted in a national referendum held on 27 February 2021, came into force. The new version of the Constitution excludes articles enshrining the state’s non-nuclear and neutral status. This allowed for a review of the Republic of Belarus’s military doctrine and created practical conditions for the deployment of Russian strategic nuclear forces in Belarus.

Moscow readily agreed to A. Lukashenko's request to deploy nuclear weapons, seeking to gain yet another lever of pressure over the Belarusian authorities. On 25 March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia intended to deploy its tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Belarus, in response to a request from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Lukashenko himself had not previously announced any specific plans or timelines for the deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. Putin also stated that 10 Belarusian Air Force aircraft had been prepared for the use of TNWs with Russia’s assistance, and recalled that Moscow had transferred the Iskander tactical missile system to Minsk, which is also capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

2. Deployment of the Russian TNWs on Belarusian Territory: Chronology, Geography, Composition

There is no reliable information regarding the delivery of the Russian TNWs to the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that the first components of the TNWs were delivered to Belarus in August–September 2023.

This is supported by a number of circumstantial pieces of evidence, in particular:

• statements by high-ranking officials from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Western countries;

• activity of special railway trains/convoys at possible Belarusian sites for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons;

• condition and availability of potential means of deploying TNWs, as well as the availability and readiness of personnel (specialists, crews, etc.) to deploy TNWs.

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus may be permitted at existing arsenals (bases) for the storage and maintenance of rocket, artillery and aviation munitions, as well as at aviation munitions depots on Belarusian airfields, provided they meet the following requirements:

• presence of an organised system of security and defence against ground-based threats, as well as an air defence system,

• presence of a well-developed transport and logistics infrastructure,

• sufficient distance from the borders with states from whose territory missile and artillery strikes and sabotage operations by sabotage and reconnaissance groups are possible,

• proximity to the deployment sites of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems (primarily for airborne nuclear munitions),

• availability of trained personnel possessing the necessary professional skills and being in an appropriate mental and psychological state.

At the same time, storage sites for strategic nuclear weapons must meet the following specific requirements:

• The nuclear weapons storage facility must be located separately from conventional ammunition depots.

• The storage facility’s infrastructure must include premises to accommodate a significant number of personnel involved in the maintenance and security of the nuclear weapons.

• The perimeter must be equipped with a motion detection system and, to prevent accidental activation, must have at least three levels of security (three or four rows of fencing).

• The facility must have a strip at least 12 metres wide along its perimeter that is free of vegetation.

• Underground storage facilities must have a climate-controlled system with distinctive visual features, such as numerous ventilation openings on the roof.

Based on the above, the most likely locations for the storage of tactical nuclear weapons are as follows:

1. Military Unit 94017 (2631st Air Base for Missile Weapons and Munitions, Prudok railway station) may serve as a long-term storage site for the subsequent delivery of airborne nuclear munitions to temporary storage sites.

2. The warehouses at the ‘Lida’, ‘Baranovichi’ and ‘Luninets’ military airfields may serve as temporary storage sites for airborne nuclear munitions. However, the ‘Lida’ and ‘Luninets’ airfields are located within the range of missile and artillery strike capabilities from the territory of neighbouring states (‘Lida’ is 30 km from Lithuania, and ‘Luninets’ is 50 km from Ukraine).

3. The temporary storage sites for nuclear munitions for ground-based delivery systems are Artillery Munitions Depot 1405 (village of Bolshaya Gorozha, Osipovichsky District) and Technical Missile Base 1562 (settlement of Lapichi, Osipovichsky District).

4. The 25th Missile and Artillery Weapons Depot (Novokolosovo, Stolbtsovsky District) may be used as a universal storage facility (for air and ground ammunition), equidistant from the deployment sites of air and ground-based nuclear delivery systems.

5. The 43rd Missile and Ammunition Depot (Dobrush District, Gomel Region), which was used to store nuclear weapons during the Soviet era, could be utilised as a reserve storage facility.

 

3. Training of Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus for the Use of TNWs

In April 2023, the Air and Space Forces Training Centre of the Russian Federation hosted advanced training for flight and engineering personnel of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces of the Republic of Belarus under a programme on the operation and combat use of Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. The training included both a theoretical course and practical sessions under the guidance of Russian instructors. During the sessions, new methods of using modern airborne weapons, including special munitions (TNWs), were mastered.

On 17 September 2023, P. Muraveiko, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus and a general, stated that Belarusian specialists had received nuclear munitions from the Russian Federation. They had undergone a full training cycle in Russia, practising a range of procedures on simulators and at real-world sites. They had also passed a final assessment and certification, thereby gaining authorisation to use these weapons. This most likely referred to the crews of the 116th Air Regiment.

From 4 to 22 April 2024, crews of the ‘Iskander-M’ operational-tactical missile system of the Missile Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus underwent practical training in the Russian Federation. The main areas of focus were:

• further improvement of practical skills in preparing the missile system for deployment, training in its deployment, and conducting training and combat launches.

• issues relating to the maintenance and use of tactical nuclear munitions for the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile system.

On 6 May 2024, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces announced the first phase of exercises involving Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces. The very next day, Belarusian President A. Lukashenko also ordered a ‘surprise inspection of delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear weapons’, involving the ‘delivery of special munitions to missile and aviation units’, their loading onto launchers and their mounting on aircraft.

On 9 May, it was announced that Presidents V. Putin and A. Lukashenko had agreed to „coordinate” and “jointly conduct the second and third stages” of the nuclear exercises.

The second stage of the joint Russian-Belarusian exercise involving non-strategic nuclear forces began on 11 June 2024 (hereinafter referred to as the Exercise). The stated military objective of this stage was 'to test the readiness of the armed forces of Russia and Belarus's units responsible for the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, with a view to unconditionally ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union State'.

Analysis of official reports from the Russian and Belarusian military departments shows that the following activities were practised during the second stage: the delivery of special training munitions (STM) to field storage points in the missile unit’s deployment area and the assault aviation operational airfield; the preparation and issue of missiles and airborne weapons in special configurations; and the organisation and conduct of combat duty by SCM-equipped unit personnel in deployment areas and at field airfields.

The following Russian Armed Forces units were deployed for the exercise:

• a missile brigade from the Leningrad Military District, equipped with Iskander-M missiles,

• ships from the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy, equipped with missile armaments (notably 9-C-7760 'Kinzhal' missiles),

• nuclear support units of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence (hereafter referred to as the 12th MD), responsible for nuclear technical support and safety.

• The following units from the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus were involved in the exercise:

• an Iskander-M battery of the 587th Separate Missile Division of the 465th Missile Brigade (Osipovichi, military unit 61732),

• a flight of aircraft from the 116th Guards Assault Aviation Base (Lida, military unit 19764); support units.

In Belarus, the exercises were held at the Osipovichi training ground and Lida airfield.

Several distinctive features of this exercise can be highlighted.

Firstly, A. Lukashenko made the decision on Belarus’ participation in the exercise at short notice. Meanwhile, preparing international exercises is a complex, multi-stage procedure which usually takes at least six months. During this time, concepts are developed, agreed upon and approved, and then exercise plans are created. In the case of the exercise involving the non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and Belarus, however, this period lasted just over a month (from 9 May to 11 June). This demonstrates the spontaneity of the decision taken by the two presidents, as well as the poor quality of preparation for this complex military training exercise.

Secondly, Minsk sought to give this event maximum media and political significance. When commenting on the exercise, the Belarusian military and political leadership, including President A. Lukashenko, Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus A. Volfovich, and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus P. Muraveiko, used exclusively the term ‘special ammunition’. In other words, according to the Belarusian side, it was not training but real nuclear munitions that were used in the exercises.

This emphasised both the physical presence of strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory and the Belarusian side’s possession of the necessary expertise and readiness to use them should a threat arise to the sovereignty of Belarus and the Union State. For example, on 12 June, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, P. Muraveiko, stated that as part of the exercises, crews had moved to their designated positions, “received special munitions and attached them to the warheads”, after which they took up launch positions and went on combat duty against designated targets.

However, the following day, this information was refuted by the Russian Ministry of Defence. On 13 June, Igor Kolesnikov, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence,  stated that during the exercises, mobile command units had ensured “the delivery of special training munitions to field storage points in the missile brigade’s deployment area and the assault aviation operational airfield”. It is noteworthy that the airborne special training munitions were delivered to the field storage points at the assault aviation operational airfield by road transport operated by specialists from the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, presumably by an An-26 aircraft of the Russian Air Force, which landed at Baranovichi airfield on 10 June.

The preparation and mounting of the special training munitions onto the carrier aircraft was carried out by specialists from the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Servicemen of the Belarusian Armed Forces acted as observers and trainees. This fact casts doubt on the Belarusian side’s possession of special training munitions.

In addition, General Kolesnikov, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, arrived in Belarus and gave a detailed statement offering a different interpretation of the exercise. According to him, the main objective of the second stage of the exercises for Russia was to work through issues relating to the „joint training of Belarusian combat units and Russian nuclear support units”.

The combination of the above facts casts doubt on the Belarusian Armed Forces’ ability to independently conduct such high-quality training and exercises due to the lack of a command and control system and trained specialists, as well as their ability to independently carry out a surprise inspection of “delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear weapons, including the supply of special munitions to missile and aviation units, their loading onto launchers and mounting on aircraft”, as mentioned above.

The real objectives of this exercise should be considered political rather than military. Russia and Belarus have once again demonstrated to unfriendly countries their readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons against the backdrop of statements regarding the possible deployment of Western military personnel to Ukraine and the authorisation for Kyiv to strike targets on Russian territory.

In essence, whilst the exercises indirectly confirmed the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, they cast doubt on the capability and readiness of the Belarusian Armed Forces to deploy them independently, despite claims that personnel had allegedly undergone special training in Russia.

Subsequently, Minsk raised the issue of tactical nuclear weapons only once more — against the backdrop of significant international attention on the ‘Zapad-2025’ exercise; however, on this occasion, Minsk’s rhetoric changed dramatically. Whereas in 2023 P. Muraveiko had spoken of the use of special munitions during the exercise, by 2025 he was referring only to “planning the use of tactical nuclear weapons”: “As part of the exercises, planning for the use of all types of weapons is envisaged. As for their use — well, excuse me, one cannot use something that, let’s say, poses a threat to the whole world, to global security. And as for how to plan this — we will learn.”

4. Military and Political Reasons for the Deployment of Russian TNWs on Belarusian Territory

All of the above leads to the conclusion that the Belarusian and Russian authorities pursued different objectives when adopting and implementing the decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus.

For A. Lukashenko, the constant desire to possess nuclear weapons stems from a belief in the premise that countries possessing nuclear weapons need not fear external intervention. As A. Lukashenko himself stated on 27 June 2023, “no one has ever gone to war with a nuclear power”.

Of course, this argument is not without its flaws, as, for example, Iran has been waging an undeclared war for many years against Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons. The same applies to Pakistan and India, which possess nuclear weapons and periodically engage in full-scale military operations against one another. Nevertheless, A. Lukashenko clearly regarded Russia’s nuclear umbrella as a necessary security guarantee, even in the absence of the ability to use it independently.

For its part, Moscow addressed two objectives at once by deploying tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.

Firstly, this served as a form of nuclear blackmail against the West ahead of a large-scale counter-offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with the aim of reducing aid to Ukraine. Russian media outlets emphasised that this deployment significantly expanded the strike radius of potential targets within Ukraine and European Union countries.

Secondly, Moscow gained additional leverage to keep Minsk within Russia’s sphere of influence. Should there be a threat of Belarus' foreign policy shifting towards the West, or an unforeseen change of power in Minsk, Russia could deploy troops to Belarusian territory to “protect nuclear weapons and prevent their uncontrolled proliferation”, in accordance with its international obligations.

5. Control over TNWs on the Territory of the Republic of Belarus

An analysis of numerous statements by Belarusian and Russian officials regarding the possible use of strategic nuclear forces stationed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus

reveals a significant divergence in the parties’ positions regarding who exactly exercises control over the tactical nuclear weapons located on Belarusian territory, and to what extent.

Russia has never declared a full transfer — with the possibility of independent use — of nuclear weapons to Belarus. On the contrary, it has always emphasised that it retains control over nuclear weapons in the Republic of Belarus, citing international obligations:

• On 25 May 2023, Russian Defence Minister S. Shoigu stated that control over the tactical nuclear weapons remains with Russia, as does the decision on their use.

• On 24 June 2023, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov stated that, in accordance with international obligations, “Russia retains control over the strategic nuclear forces to be deployed in Belarus”.

• On 5 October 2023, during a meeting of the First Committee (on Disarmament) of the UN General Assembly, K. Vorontsov, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that control over the nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus is exercised entirely by the Russian Federation.

The Belarusian side, in turn, represented by A. Lukashenko himself, has repeatedly stated that Minsk has the ability to make independent decisions on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, merely coordinating this matter with Moscow in a formal capacity:

• On 31 March 2023, A. Lukashenko stated that nuclear weapons in Belarus are “our weapons”, and that the decision on their use would be taken by Belarus.

• On 13 June 2023, A. Lukashenko stated that, if necessary, he would use tactical nuclear weapons without hesitation and immediately, having first agreed on the matter by telephone with V. Putin.

• On 27 June 2023, A. Lukashenko tasked Defence Minister V. Khrenin, Chief of the General Staff V. Gulevich and KGB Head I. Tertel with developing a protocol for the use of nuclear weapons.

• On 30 June 2023, A. Lukashenko stated that he had approved a decision to strike foreign “decision-making centres”, if necessary. It is most likely that this decision was approved on 27 June 2023 during a meeting between Lukashenko and Defence Minister V.Khrenin, who, before beginning his closed-door briefing, presented Lukashenko with a symbolic ‘gift with a hint’ — a model of the first nuclear bomb produced in the USSR.

It is noteworthy that, in parallel with this, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to declare on international platforms Belarus’ commitment to its international obligations, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

For example, on 28 March 2023, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Belarusian side would not have control over the tactical nuclear weapons, and therefore “the deployment of nuclear warheads on the country’s territory without transferring control over them to Minsk would not contravene the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.

On 19 November 2024, Vladimir Putin approved the Russian Federation’s revised nuclear doctrine, which grants the Russian Federation the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of a “critical threat” to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belarus and Russia.

Nevertheless, on 6 December, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, A. Volfovich, stated that the President of Belarus has his own "red button’ and his own ‘nuclear briefcase’.

Finally, in the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State, which entered into force on 6 December 2025, the procedure for the use of nuclear weapons is described in vague terms: “The decision to use nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation stationed on the territory of the Republic of Belarus for the defence of the Republic of Belarus shall be taken in accordance with the procedure established by the Parties”.

The above indicates that, officially, the political decision-making process regarding the use of nuclear weapons may be shared by both parties. However, the ultimate authority and the technical capacity to deploy strategic nuclear forces remain within Moscow's domain.

6. Forecast Regarding the Future Role of TNWs Deployed on the Territory of the Republic of Belarus

Based on an analysis of the current geostrategic situation, the use of TNWs located on the territory of the Republic of Belarus appears unlikely, primarily due to the positions of the United States of America and China on this issue.

And even in the event of critical changes to this situation (for example, a deterioration of the situation on the Ukrainian front, an escalation of the conflict with other foreign policy opponents, etc.) it would be easier for Russia to deploy its own nuclear weapons, over which the Kremlin has full and sole control, whereas in the event of using tactical nuclear weapons located in Belarus, the matter would, one way or another, have to be agreed with A. Lukashenko.

Nevertheless, the presence of Russian TNWs on Belarusian territory currently serves the strategic interests of both the Belarusian and Russian authorities.

For the Belarusian authorities, as mentioned above, the presence of the TNWs serves as a safeguard against attempts at external interference in the complex domestic political situation. The mass protests of 2020, Ukraine’s successful operations on Russian territory (Kursk Oblast), Ukraine’s unique capabilities in the use of drones, and US military operations in Venezuela and Iran are perceived by the Belarusian leadership as serious threats to national security, which cannot be countered by conventional means. Therefore, the Belarusian authorities will not abandon nuclear weapons until they receive 100% security guarantees, which are impossible in the context of a disintegrating world order.

The withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons from Belarusian territory is theoretically possible only after the formation of a new international security architecture in Europe, one that includes Russia. Only in this case will Belarus, firstly, feel sufficiently secure to begin discussing the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons, and secondly, have a compelling argument to justify its desire to withdraw the weapons to the Kremlin.

For the Russian authorities, the presence of the TNWs on Belarusian territory is an effective measure to ensure the loyalty of the Belarusian authorities, including after Alexander Lukashenko leaves power. At a time when Minsk continues its attempts to regain its foreign policy sovereignty, the TNWs acts as a kind of ‘anchor’, preventing the Belarusian authorities from making too abrupt a move.

In this regard, the Kremlin will, on the one hand, continue its information and psychological operations against Alexander Lukashenko and his entourage in the future, with the aim of convincing them of the West’s hostility and, consequently, the need to maintain the Russian strategic missile forces on Belarusian territory; and, on the other hand, it will continue to involve the Belarusian authorities in its confrontation with the West.

7. Conclusions

1. For A. Lukashenko, the issue of nuclear weapons has long held considerable interest, as they offer robust protection against external interference. However, it was only following the events of 2020 and 2022 that concrete steps were taken in this direction.

2. Despite the TNWs having been on Belarusian territory for almost four years, it seems that the level of training of the Belarusian specialists responsible for using special munitions is insufficient.

Firstly, Russian specialists have played a key role in TNWs training exercises, while their Belarusian counterparts have acted as observers and trainees.

Secondly, it is unclear whether Belarus possesses any special training munitions.

Thirdly, after the initial certification courses for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, held in the Russian Federation, Belarusian specialists participated in only one exercise involving tactical nuclear weapons, in which they played a limited role.

Furthermore, the most recent exercise involving tactical nuclear weapons (Zapad-2025) ultimately turned into an 'exercise in planning the use of tactical nuclear weapons', i.e. rather than practising their use, the exercise focused on staff planning.

3. The military and political leaderships of Belarus and the Russian Federation have different approaches to the issue of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. At the same time, each side seeks to use the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus to its own advantage.

Minsk views the presence of strategic nuclear forces on its territory, and the possibility of their hypothetical use, as the primary means of deterring the West. According to Alexander Lukashenko, the West continues to harbour plans to overthrow the current government by force. The Belarusian president is convinced that 'no one overthrows regimes that possess nuclear weapons'. The Belarusian president and the country’s military leadership periodically emphasise the presence of strategic nuclear forces, A. Lukashenko’s right to independently select targets, and the high state of readiness of the Belarusian Armed Forces to use strategic nuclear forces.

Moscow, however, views the deployment of strategic nuclear forces outside its territory as a means of blackmailing the West, as well as a tool of military and political influence that strengthens Belarus’ dependence on Russia in the security sphere.

4. Despite its dependence on Russia and the associated risks, Minsk sees more advantages than disadvantages in the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Accordingly, relevant amendments have been made to the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, and the Military Doctrine has been revised. Accordingly, the new version of the doctrine regards the deployment of Russian Federation nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory as "an important component of preventive deterrence against potential adversaries launching armed aggression".

5. Theoretically, abandoning this means of deterrence is possible in two cases. The first case is if a new European security architecture is established that resolves the contradictions between the EU and Russia and provides reliable mutual guarantees to all interested parties, excluding external interference in the Republic of Belarus's internal affairs. Secondly, Russia could agree to withdraw nuclear weapons from the territory of Belarus within the framework of certain new treaty obligations, for example with the EU or the US.