A New Special Operations Brigade in the Belarusian Armed Forces: Objectives, Location and Geopolitical Context

On 2 August 2026, in an appearance on Belarusian television, Colonel Alexander Ilyukevich, Commander of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, spoke about the implementation of plans to create a new SOF formation — the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade. According to him, a number of units and sub-units have already been formed, officers have been recruited and personnel have been conscripted. In 2027 the new brigade will be deployed to the south-east of the country, near Gomel. At present there are three Special Operations Forces brigades in Belarus: the 103rd Airborne Brigade in Vitebsk (north-eastern Belarus), the 38th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade in Brest (south-western Belarus) and the 5th Special Purpose Brigade in Maryina Gorka (central Belarus). Once the formation of the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade is complete, the deployment of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus will be as follows (see fig. 1):

The date of the interview with the commander of the Special Operations Forces is no coincidence: 2 August is the day on which Belarus celebrates Paratrooper and Special Operations Forces Day. The idea of forming a new Armed Forces unit on the southern border is neither new nor unexpected.

As far back as 26 May 2022, Belarusian President A. Lukashenko ordered the “immediate establishment” of an operational command of the country’s armed forces in the southern sector, i.e. on the border with Ukraine. At the same time, having realised that Russia’s plans for a swift capture of Kyiv had failed, A. Lukashenko ordered army units of the Belarusian Armed Forces to be sent to the Ukrainian border to secure the state border and to enable Belarusian servicemen to “gain experience”, without waiting for the new operational command to be established.

In this regard it is interesting to note that, as of 2026, despite regular statements by Belarus’s military and political leadership regarding threats from the south due to the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, a new Southern Operational Command has still not been established.

It would appear that the military and political leadership of the Republic of Belarus has decided that a quicker and more effective solution is to establish a new formation within the Special Operations Forces, which requires far fewer resources yet enables a wide range of tasks to be carried out.

The new Special Operations Forces formation can be regarded as an alternative to the Southern Operational Command, as Special Operations Forces formations are not part of operational commands and report directly to the Commander of the Special Operations Forces and the General Staff. Operational commands, by contrast, form part of the standard structure of the Army and bring together combined-arms formations (mechanised, artillery and anti-aircraft brigades) under their command to conduct conventional defensive and offensive operations. This does not mean that plans to establish the Southern Operational Command will not be implemented; however, they are clearly being sidelined.

Priority has been given specifically to the Special Operations Forces formation, as the SOF are inherently the most combat-ready units within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. SOF units and sub-units have a high level of staffing with contract servicemen and are equipped with the latest weapons and military equipment. For example, the 38th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade has been equipped with new Russian BTR-82A armoured personnel carriers; the 147th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment has been placed under the direct command of the Special Operations Forces; and the 92nd “BelGrad” Rocket Regiment has been formed within the Special Operations Forces (the BM-21A “BelGrad” multiple launch rocket systems represent a Belarusian variant resulting from the extensive modernisation of the Soviet “Grad” system).

The efforts of the Special Operations Forces command to develop this branch of the armed forces are highly regarded by the country’s military and political leadership and by A. Lukashenko personally. For example, on 12 January 2026, upon the retirement of Major-General Vadim Denisenko, who had headed the Special Operations Forces for 12 years (since 11 January 2014), he was awarded the Order “For Service to the Motherland” First Class, becoming the first full cavalier of this order in the armed forces of sovereign Belarus.

The personnel of the Special Operations Forces are engaged in intensive combat training, including drawing on the experience of combat operations in Ukraine. At the same time, the Special Operations Forces are highly mobile and can be deployed to areas of combat operations by various means, including airdrops from aeroplanes and helicopters. Therefore, the creation of a new military unit specifically within the Special Operations Forces seems entirely logical.

As regards the formation of the 37th Airborne Assault Brigade and the choice of the Gomel area as its base, 3 key points should be highlighted.

Firstly, the time factor is of importance. The commanders of the Special Operations Forces have twice publicly announced the formation of the new 37th Brigade: V. Denisenko in August 2025 and A. Ilyukevich in February 2026. It follows from this that the decision to create the new formation was taken well before August 2025.

This is also indirectly supported by the fact that in December 2024 it emerged that a military town covering an area of around 60 hectares was being built 35 km from Gomel — in the Pribor area at the junction of the M-8 and M-10 motorways — intended to house personnel and military equipment. According to available information, the nine 3- and 4-storey barracks can accommodate up to 3,000 personnel, whilst the armaments and equipment depot can house up to 300 units of equipment. Work was scheduled to be completed by 31 March 2026. It is most likely that the 37th Brigade will be stationed at this military town.

Thus, at least two years elapsed between the inception of plans to create a new military formation within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus and their partial implementation. This suggests that financial and organisational problems arose during the implementation of these plans.

Secondly, the location chosen for the new brigade is of interest.

On the one hand, the leadership of the Special Operations Forces and the country’s military and political leadership have repeatedly stated the need to secure the southern front in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine. The potential for escalation is also evidenced by Zelensky’s recent ultimatum to the Belarusian authorities. Moreover, Kyiv’s new, hardline policy towards Minsk may indicate that a thaw in relations between Kyiv and Minsk may not occur even after a peace agreement is concluded between Ukraine and Russia. In this context the deployment of the 37th Brigade near Gomel, 40–50 km from the state border with Ukraine, appears at first glance entirely logical.

On the other hand, the length of Belarus’s state border with Ukraine is over 1,000 km, and Brest (38th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade of the Special Operations Forces) and Gomel (37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade of the Special Operations Forces) are stationed at the western and eastern ends of this border respectively. This could create difficulties when deploying Special Operations Forces units and sub-units to operational areas up to 500 km away, and is hardly an optimal location from the perspective of specifically countering the threat from Ukraine. Therefore, Minsk’s decision to deploy a new Special Operations Forces brigade in the very south-east of the country may be due to its proximity not only to the Ukrainian border but also to the Russian state border. It is striking that, once the formation process is complete, the 37th Brigade, together with the 103rd Airborne Brigade stationed in Vitebsk, will effectively cover the state border with the Russian Federation, which stretches for over 1,200 km. Thus, it is Belarus’s southern and eastern borders, rather than its western or northern borders (with NATO countries), that are proving to be the most heavily defended by the SOF.

In this regard it can be assumed that Minsk takes potential threats to Belarus’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from the east quite seriously, ranging from hybrid provocations to the open use of military force by Russia.

Thirdly, the domestic political context must be taken into account. Following the largest popular protests in the history of sovereign Belarus in 2020, the Belarusian authorities deployed Special Operations Forces personnel against the protesters. The deployment of a new Special Operations Forces unit in the Gomel Region, where no major Armed Forces formation had previously been stationed, undoubtedly resolves the issue of military support should the socio-political situation deteriorate.

In view of the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The formation of a new unit — the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade — within the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus is not a spontaneous move, but a well-considered decision taken in light of the complex foreign-policy situation surrounding Belarus and taking into account a wide range of threats to the country. This decision is primarily geared towards defence needs and does not currently pose a direct threat to Ukraine, nor to European countries or NATO as a whole. The formation of the Special Operations Forces brigade allows for the rapid creation of a combat-ready unit in the south-eastern direction, which evidently causes particular concern for the Belarusian authorities.

   
   

2. The formation of the 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade and its deployment near the city of Gomel enables Minsk to address several objectives at once:

• to provide cover for the eastern flank of the southern border with Ukraine;

• to provide cover for the southern flank of the eastern border with the Russian Federation and thereby enhance the level of protection against a possible threat from Moscow to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Belarus should Minsk’s foreign-policy direction change;

• to reinforce the territorial defence forces and people’s militia units in the south-eastern part of the country;

• to provide military support to units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus should the socio-political situation in the Gomel Region deteriorate.

3. The lengthy timeframe (at least two years) for implementing plans to establish the 37th Airborne Assault Brigade may indicate the existence of certain problems — political, financial, personnel-related, technical and others — in the formation process. It is likely that this is also the reason for the slow pace of formation of the Southern Operational Command.