Poland Needs a New Policy Towards Belarus
Updated: 5 days ago
by Alexander Piroznikov, PhD
Foreign Policy Analyst & Expert in Eastern European Affairs
In Search of an Approach to a „Difficult Neighbour”
Poland entered 2026 as a pivotal state upon which the security of both NATO and the EU, as well as the survival of an independent Ukraine, now largely depend. While this prominent role on NATO’s northeastern flank significantly elevates Warsaw's strategic standing, it simultaneously renders Poland a primary target for Russian hybrid warfare—and, in the event of a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, a principal objective for a military strike.
Belarus constitutes a critical source of this multidimensional threat. A May 2026 report[1] by the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) in collaboration with the Defence Institute, titled “The Economic Costs of War for Poland”, underscores this vulnerability by analyzing three scenarios of a potential Russian–Polish conflict.
In all three projections, Belarus emerges as an indispensable variable: without its territory and infrastructure, an effective Russian military assault on Poland remains virtually implausible.
In fact, until 2020, Poland's approach was predominantly guided by a single paradigm: the policy of conditionality (Polish: polityka warunkowości)[2]. Under this framework, if Minsk permitted civil society sufficient room to operate, dialogue and a European opening became possible. Conversely, if domestic repression intensified—particularly against the Polish diaspora in Belarus—Warsaw responded by escalating political and economic pressure.
Prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, this approach took the softer form of a “critical dialogue”. It involved maintaining low-level political contacts and prioritizing the protection of the Polish minority's interests, while sustaining basic economic relations.
Following EU accession, however, Warsaw’s stance became significantly more stringent. The primary mechanism of influence shifted to the threat of EU-wide economic sanctions and political isolation. The invocation of these punitive measures depended on two key indicators: the state pressure exerted on the Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB) and the overall scale of repressions against civil society.
This carrot-and-stick strategy yielded mixed outcomes. It failed to deliver lasting results in 2009–2010, despite Belarus’s inclusion in the Eastern Partnership. Conversely, after 2014, a diplomatic thaw successfully materialized. This success rendered the mass protests of 2020 all the more unexpected for Warsaw—yet they triggered an entirely predictable response: a total freeze in relations with Minsk and a pivot toward supporting exiled opposition figures within the EU. However, the absence of tangible results and the speed of the subsequent escalation demonstrated that this old formula had been exhausted.
Why Policy of Conditionality Failed
The ineffectiveness of the policy of conditionality stems not so much from single tactical missteps, but rather from its structural limitations as an instrument for projecting Warsaw's influence over Minsk.
Its continuous application by Polish policymakers—whether through rigid ultimatums or via a softer critical dialogue—appears to have constrained Warsaw's ability to cultivate a sustainable political foothold in Belarus in a timely manner. A closer examination reveals that these policy limitations manifested at several levels.
The Conceptual Level: False Premises and Inflated Expectations
International cooperation thrives when interests overlap, objectives align and both sides assess those interests accurately. In this case, however, the overlap and alignment were insufficient, and Warsaw largely misread Minsk’s strategic calculus.
Poland’s foreign policy objectives were inherently contradictory from the outset.
On the one hand, Belarusian independence was treated as a vital Polish national interest and “an important factor for stability and security in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as across the entire European continent”.[3] On the other hand, Warsaw firmly conditioned any deepening of ties with Minsk—and, by extension, its support for Belarusian sovereignty—on the requirement that the authorities adhere to democratic norms and “initiate a sincere dialogue with the democratic opposition”.
For a democratic government, these two goals are fundamentally compatible. For Alexander Lukashenko and his inner circle, however, they represented an existential conflict. Accepting Western-defined democratic rules was viewed as a direct path to losing power—and, in the regime’s own narrative, to forfeiting national sovereignty as well.
Consequently, Lukashenko dismissed Polish rhetoric regarding Belarusian sovereignty as a “smokescreen” designed to conceal a different objective: regime change. The Belarusian authorities perceived the opposition and the ZPB as instruments deployed for this specific purpose—a suspicion repeatedly fueled by remarks from senior Polish officials. For instance, President Lech Kaczyński characterized Belarus as “a phenomenon, an island in an expanding sea of democracy and freedom,” adding that “the sooner it disappears, the better for all of us”. [4]
In this context, Polish support for civil society, the 2007 launch of the Belsat TV channel, the establishment of the Kalinowski Scholarship Programme in 2006, and financial aid to independent media—offered in the absence of alternative political signals to Minsk—merely confirmed its perception of Poland as a hostile actor. With Minsk interpreting Warsaw’s intentions through this hostile lens, any potential for cooperation was structurally limited from the start, critically undermining Poland’s leverage.
The perceived threat to his political survival explains why Alexander Lukashenko consistently avoided making lasting concessions regarding the Polish minority, even when offering tactical promises—such as during his meeting with Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in Kyiv on February 25, 2010.
Furthermore, Warsaw systematically overrated Minsk’s desire to “enter European salons”, to borrow Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz’s well-known phrase. For Alexander Lukashenko, normalization of ties with the EU—primarily in the economic sphere—was merely a tactical tool to reduce dependence on Moscow and consolidate his own autocratic rule. Trading regime survival for a seat in those "salons" was a bargain he was never prepared to accept.
The Implementation Level: Insufficient Leverage
This shared misreading of objectives, combined with Warsaw’s overestimation of Minsk’s desire to improve political relations with the EU, helps explain the ineffectiveness of the Eastern Partnership towards Belarus.
Launched with Warsaw’s strong backing, this initiative was designed to incentivize democratic transformation in EU-neighboring states. Minsk, however, never genuinely shared this goal. Its objective was to reduce its asymmetrical dependence on Russia without introducing domestic reforms that could destabilize the regime or provoke Moscow. This represents the fundamental divergence between the Belarusian and Ukrainian tracks of the Eastern Partnership. Consequently, when the crisis in relations with the EU peaked in 2021, Lukashenko abandoned the initiative without hesitation, effectively blocking the main channel of Western influence on Belarus.
The geopolitical shock of 2020 and the subsequent suspension of the Eastern Partnership exposed a critical vacuum in Warsaw's strategic toolkit: despite three decades of critical dialogue and conditional engagement, it possessed no viable bilateral channels of influence over Belarus.
Consequently, Warsaw was forced to fall back on the standard European toolkit: sanctions, political isolation, and support for the opposition. These "legacy" measures, however, proved fundamentally incapable of altering Minsk’s strategic trajectory under the new geopolitical conditions.
The Strategic Level: The Domino Effect and Faulty Logic
At the strategic level, the endless cycle of thaws and crises driven by the internal contradictions of the policy of conditionality could only be broken in one way: by enforcing democratisation against Minsk’s will, but this proved impossible. Instead of submitting to Western demands, Lukashenko pivoted toward the Kremlin, effectively discarding years of strained relations with Moscow. As Belarus’s dependence on Moscow deepened, its territory was subsequently leveraged as a strategic launching pad for the invasion of Ukraine. This triggered a dangerous chain reaction, culminating in a rapidly growing, direct military threat to the EU and NATO.
However, the contradiction of strategic goals is not the sole strategic weakness of policy of conditionality; the approach is also inherently rigid. The paradigm of “meet our standards or face isolation” operates as an ultimatum, leaving virtually no room for diplomatic maneuver or tactical cooperation. When both offered paths are unacceptable, the target state invariably seeks a third option—one rarely aligned with the interests of the actor issuing the ultimatum.
Moreover, this policy is fundamentally reactive. Poland presented Minsk with a binary choice and then adopted a waiting posture, granting Minsk the agency to decide when to escalate and when to simulate cooperation. It could never be more than a simulation, given that the policy of conditionality lacked any viable roadmap for genuine rapprochement.
In the final analysis, what this policy provided Poland was merely the illusion of control. While sufficient during the relatively stable decades following the Soviet collapse, in the current era of regional confrontation, this approach has transformed into a source of severe strategic risk.
The Current Situation: A Strategic Vacuum and Pathways Forward
After years of prolonged diplomatic freeze with Belarus, Poland is beginning to seek alternative approaches. However, current communication channels remain confined primarily to intelligence services—specifically the Polish Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW) and the Belarusian KGB—focusing on security-related transactions, such as information sharing and prisoner exchanges, facilitated by the United States Yet, should the migration crisis de-escalate and state pressure on the Union of Poles in Belarus (ZPB) subside, the issue of reviving working-level or higher political contacts will inevitably re-emerge.
Warsaw will then face the critical task of defining the purpose of this renewed engagement and its alignment with Polish national interests. However, the strategic outline of such a policy remains ambiguous, carrying the risk of a default return to the familiar paradigm of conditional engagement.
While a comprehensive policy shift may depend on the formation of a new government following the autumn 2027 parliamentary elections, the foundational groundwork should be be laid now.
Based on the analysis, several core guidelines should be considered in this new strategy:
Reorder Strategic Priorities: The traditional formula of “democratization first, sovereignty later” should yield to a framework of “sovereignty first, followed by de-escalation of domestic repression”. Enhancing Belarusian sovereignty against Russia now represents the most viable shared interest between Minsk and Warsaw, offering a pragmatic baseline for tactical cooperation. Only in a more secure environment will Minsk be willing to facilitate a reduction in internal repression, including against the Polish minority.
As for the political transformation, it is not vanishing from the political agenda. However, against the backdrop of the war, it has receded as an immediate priority.
Establish Attainable, Short-to-Medium-Term Objectives: The current discourse lacks a pragmatic, strategic agenda. Instead, it oscillates between the abstract maximalism of the 2020 paradigm—demanding an immediate transition and the release of all political prisoners—and narrow, transactional preconditions, such as assistance in apprehending the individual responsible for the death of the Polish soldier Mateusz Sitek. Without a balanced middle path, supported by pragmatic goals and a doable roadmap, any new diplomatic initiative will inevitably stall.
Forge a Cohesive Allied Stance: Warsaw should build a common line among European allies that stand to benefit most from regional de-escalation, leveraging platforms like the Weimar Triangle or the Council of the Baltic Sea States (where Belarus's observer status remains suspended). Despite Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s 2024 assertion that Poland possesses the capacity to shape European policy toward the Eastern flank[5], its practical implementation has been lagging. Notably, nations like France have independently maintained discrete security-related contacts with Minsk for some time.
Revitalize Track-II Diplomacy: Restarting informal, expert-level consultations is essential for mapping underlying interests and testing policy concepts prior to formal official negotiations. Track-II dialogues offer a low-risk environment where setbacks do not compromise official diplomatic reputations.
Centralize the Belarus Policy Framework: Responsibility for the Belarus portfolio is currently fragmented across the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW), and the Chancellery of the President. The efficacy of their coordination remains questionable. Formulating and executing a cohesive strategy requires a single centralized hub, backed by dedicated budgetary resources, specialized personnel, and clear organizational authority.
4. Conclusion
In the “post-historical” era following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus was long relegated to a secondary priority for Poland—viewed as a country destined to democratise and eventually integrate into the European Union along the path Warsaw had created”. Consequently, Warsaw placed its primary emphasis on democratisation, civil society support, and the political opposition in the country. This strategic wager, however, failed to yield tangible leverage within Belarus or establish reliable institutional channels for crisis resolution.
Perpetuating this obsolete logic will inevitably yield the same outcomes. While the policy of conditionality rests on a solid values-based foundation, it remains fundamentally incapable of altering the regional balance of power and provides no workable bilateral mechanisms for de-escalation with Belarus. Today, the cost of such political inertia is vastly higher than it was in the 1990s, or even in 2020: the stakes have risen from a mere deficit of geopolitical influence to direct military and hybrid threats emanating from Belarusian territory.
Current interactions between Belarus and Poland through intelligence services, prisoner exchanges, and sporadic security-related signals demonstrate a mutual interest in pragmatic solutions. Yet, these discrete contacts are structurally unsuited for a broader rebuilding of relations. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect the Belarusian authorities to seize the diplomatic initiative. Confined within an informational bubble and subjected to intense Kremlin pressure, Minsk is far more prone to generating unrealistic expectations and unviable proposals.
The proposed logic of engagement—“from de-escalation to an end to repression”—demands a fundamental recalibration of goals and success metrics during the initial phase. The immediate benchmark should not be the establishment of a “free Belarus” characterised by democratic elections and the absence of political prisoners; rather, it must focus on mitigating threats emanating from Belarusian territory, establishing reliable governmental communication channels beyond intelligence frameworks, increasing the level of diplomatic presence, and securing initial progress on cross-border issues to facilitate broader regional de-escalation.
Only after achieving concrete results in these areas, and following a substantial reduction in bilateral tensions, will a pivot toward ending systemic repression in Belarus become politically viable. This approach does not remove Belarus’s internal transformation from the political agenda; instead, it defers the issue until regional stability is sufficiently restored.
[3] Response by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Enquiry No. 5233 on the foreign policy of the Government of the Republic of Poland towards the Republic of Belarus, 20 December 2000. https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ3.nsf/main/7196A099
[4] Speech by Polish President Lech Kaczyński at the conference ‘A Shared Vision of a Common Neighbourhood’, dedicated to the enlargement of the EU and NATO, Vilnius, 4 May 2006. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/582,Udzial-Prezydenta-RP-w-miedzynarodowej-konferencji-Wspolna-wizja-na-rzecz-wspoln.html
