Presidential elections-2025 in Belarus: violations committed by the authorities
- EESF
- Jan 29
- 21 min read
Updated: Jan 30
1. Special political conditions for the presidential elections
On January 26, 2025, the main voting at the presidential election of the Republic of Belarus took place. The incumbent president A. Lukashenko, who has been leading the country for the last 30 years (since 1994), allegedly won the election by a huge margin.
Despite the seventh consecutive "victory" of A. Lukashenko, it should be noted that the recent election campaign took place in new, unprecedented for the country conditions and required from the incumbent president and his entourage unconventional moves not only to ensure the necessary voting results, but also to keep the society under control during this critical period for the authorities.
The main goals of Lukashenko's election HQ at the time of planning the election campaign became the following:
1. Return to the scheme of “sterile” (i.e., fully controlled and not subject to opposition interference) elections, following the example of the 2015 presidential election, in order to ensure Lukashenko's victory with the highest possible result and exclude popular protests.
2. Maximum successful imitation of the main attributes of democratic elections in order to claim international recognition of the elections, and thus of Lukashenko himself as president of the Republic of Belarus.
Due to the partial incompatibility of both goals, it was possible to realize them only partially – despite the good organization of the presidential election and a new, rather creative approach to the election campaign (see more about it in our article "Presidential Election 2025 in the Republic of Belarus: a detailed analysis of political nuances"). This is due to the fact that A. Lukashenko's election HQ could not but go to a number of obvious violations of both the electoral legislation and the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, as well as international democratic norms in connection with the need to ensure an unrealistically high number of votes for A. Lukashenko.
It is interesting that A. Lukashenko obviously chose the final number of votes, focusing on the previous result of V. Putin, in order to demonstrate the same, if not greater degree of popular support. However, chasing after votes, A. Lukashenko essentially sacrificed his legitimacy. What violations were committed during the election campaign will be discussed in detail below.
2. Use of state resources and capabilities of the state administration apparatus by presidential candidate A. Lukashenko
In order to achieve the set goals, A. Lukashenko used capacities of the state administration apparatus at all levels: organizational, financial, informational, etc., to the maximum extent possible. Admittedly, he acted the same way during all of his election campaigns. However, in the current election campaign, this activity has become the most extensive, involving the entire system of state administration of Belarus in the processes of the election campaign.
2.1 Involvement of organizational and financial capabilities of the state apparatus for the benefit of A. Lukashenko
Lukashenko has enlisted the direct support of the country's most important officials, creating several working platforms for this purpose.
Organizational support
For comparison: in 2020, the first meeting on socio-economic and political issues (read: election campaign) of Lukashenko was attended by the head of the presidential administration I. Sergeenko and three co-heads of Lukashenko's election headquarters - N. Kochanova, V. Sheiman and M. Orda. Later, only N. Kochanova and V. Sheiman were really involved in the election campaign, and both of them acted uncoordinated and contrary to each other.
In 2024, A. Lukashenko invited to the meeting, in addition to the head of the administration D. Krutoy and chairperson of the Council of the Republic N. Kochanova, state secretary of the Security Council A. Volfovich, head of the Operational and Analytical Center under the President of Belarus A. Pavliuchenko, KGB chairman I. Tertel, head of the Central Election Commission I. Karpenko, foreign minister M. Ryzhenkov. During the meeting Lukashenko directly assigned them tasks in connection to the elections.
Later, all the above-mentioned officials actively participated in the election campaign. For example, D. Krutoy and his deputy N. Petkevich coordinated the efforts of Lukashenko's election HQ. A. Wolfovich, A. Pavlyuchenko, and I. Tertel ensured the creation of an atmosphere of fear to prevent protests (see Section 2.2. "Use of security agencies for intimidation and tension building before the elections").
On January 3, A. Lukashenko held two more events dedicated to the upcoming elections: a meeting with his election agents and a meeting with regional governors.
Lukashenko's election agents included the country's top officials – Speaker of the Council of the Republic Natalia Kochanova (again), former Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Rusyi, as well as heads of the leading media in Belarus – Chairman of Belteleradiocompany Ivan Eismont, director of the publishing house "Belarus Today" Dmitri Zhuk, director of the national branch of MTRK "Mir" Olga Shpilevskaya (she also heads the Belarusian Union of Women).
The inclusion of the heads of state bodies, organizations and leading state media in the number of election agents allowed A. Lukashenko to fully utilize the capacities of the state authorities when campaigning for his support among the population of Belarus.
Finally, at the meeting with the chairmen of the regional executive committees and Minsk City Executive Committee A. Lukashenko set a number of tasks in the interests of organizing and holding elections, thus deliberately ignoring the fact that local authorities are not organizers of elections and referendums according to the law.
At the preliminary stage of the election campaign, when the legislation prohibits campaigning for future presidential candidates, A. Lukashenko extensively used the format of the “Dazhynki 2024” festivals annually held in Belarus and paid for from the state budget for the purpose of hidden campaigning among the population. In fact, each such festival in 2024 served the sole purpose of praising the personality of A. Lukashenko.
Financial support
Another large-scale event that served the purpose of campaigning for A. Lukashenko was the republican social and cultural action "Marathon of Unity". Unlike "Dozhinki", which is held annually and therefore was only used by A. Lukashenko as a convenient format for campaigning, "Marathon of Unity" was invented and initiated by A. Lukashenko’s HQ[1], held entirely on state funds to campaign for the incumbent president, and his election agents were active participants of the event.
It started as early as September 17, 2024 (even before the parliament decided to hold elections!) and turned into an advertisement of the achievements of the state under Lukashenko's leadership, for which huge resources of the state, in particular ministries (culture, information, antimonopoly regulation and trade, sports and tourism), Minsk City Executive Committee, regional executive committees, the state institution "Palace of the Republic", the state information agency "BelTA", the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, BRSM, Belteleradiocompany, the National Library of Belarus, etc. were used, naturally against the election legislation, which allowed campaigning for presidential candidates only from January 1, 2025[2].
Anna Lukashenko (using the pseudonym Seluk), the wife of Dmitry, the middle son of A. Lukashenko, headed the working group for the preparation and holding of the Marathon[3].
А. Lukashenko committed other violations of electoral legislation. For example, despite the ban on campaign activities during the period of collecting signatures for presidential candidates, on November 22, Lukashenko visited Minsk State Linguistic University, embraced by the protest movement in 2020, to hold there a meeting in the format of "Open Microphone" with students of humanities universities[4].
Finally, on December 7, A. Lukashenko attended the sports and entertainment show "Time of Our Victories" in Minsk Arena, which gathered seven thousand spectators. On the eve of the event the state mass media, at the suggestion of the press secretary of the Belarusian president N. Eismont, massively disseminated the narrative that the show was entirely the idea and merit of A. Lukashenko[5]. The fact that financing of the event was financed by state enterprises (read, from the taxpayers' pockets) and "voluntary" donations of private commercial structures was deliberately concealed.
In these conditions, other presidential candidates could only use officially permitted ways to present their election programs and communicate with voters within the framework of the airtime provided on TV and radio. Traditionally, A. Lukashenko refused to participate in such events, just as he did not take part in the televised debates of presidential candidates.
None of Lukashenko's election opponents held a single mass event either before or after January 1, 2025. Thus, we are talking about a blatant violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, according to which "candidates elected to public office participate in elections on an equal basis"[6] (Article 65, Chapter 1, Section III).
A similar situation was observed with regard to the funds received by the election funds of possible candidates. According to the CEC, as of November 13, the election fund of A. Lukashenko received Br427 240. The fund of O. Gaidukevich - Br200 (Br140,88 were spent). The funds of the other four participants admitted to the election campaign had no funds at all at that time[7].
2.2 Use of security agencies to intimidate and inflame tensions before and during elections
From the first days of the election campaign, A. Lukashenko set a course to prevent the development of the situation in the country according to the scenario of 2020. For this purpose, all elements of the national security system were prepared in advance for mass protests.
However, this preparation had not only a technical, but also an openly propagandistic dimension. The coverage of the preparation process in the state media was aimed, first, at consistent formation in the minds of Belarusians of a collective image of the enemy represented by NATO, the USA and their allies, as well as the Belarusian opposition, and second, at intimidating Belarusians with the toughest measures in case of their participation in the protests.
A few examples:
On December 20, Chairman of the House of Representatives I. Sergeenko at a meeting with BSU students stated about the desire of the "fifth column" to drag Belarus "into chaos, into confusion, to ruin, to destroy the country"[8].
On January 16, 2025 the State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus A. Volfowich accused the USA and their allies of continuing to implement a complex strategy of pressure on Belarus in international legal, political, economic and other spheres in order to influence the electoral campaign. In his opinion, the key goals of this activity are the change of power in Belarus and the break of allied relations with Russia[9].
Such aggressive rhetoric served as a justification to establish strict control over the country's public life down to the behavior of single citizens at polling stations.
The key role was assigned to the internal affairs bodies and their main force component – the internal troops. In particular, I. Kubrakov, the head of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Belarus, has repeatedly announced plans to involve veterans of this department, who number about 27 000 people, in the elections. "Former employees of the department are planned to be involved in the protection of public order at polling stations, and ‘the elders’ from among them will become members of commissions and observers," Kubrakov said[10].
On November 19-22, large-scale command and staff exercises were held in all regions of Belarus on behalf of the President in preparation for the election campaign under the auspices of the Security Council and the leadership of the Minister of Internal Affairs I. Kubrakov[11].
On November 21, the State Security Committee introduced the counter-terrorist operation mode in Grodno and Grodno district within the framework of the exercises.
Since January 20, the bodies of internal affairs and internal troops have been put on a reinforced duty regime. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all polling stations were inspected, equipped with video surveillance systems and alarm buttons, and placed under 24-hour guard. During the voting period, the police were assisted by volunteer squads, veterans of internal affairs bodies and cadets of departmental educational institutions. For an immediate response, the Main Department of Internal Affairs deployed an operational and situational headquarters and also used the resources of the Public Security Monitoring Center[12].
In addition, the government took non-standard steps aimed at preventing protests:
On January 15, 2025 A. Lukashenko signed the Decree "On the State Inspectorate for the Protection of Fauna and Flora under the President of the Republic of Belarus", which envisages the expansion of the State Inspectorate's participation in ensuring the national security of Belarus through new tasks and powers. In particular, the officials of this body were granted the right to conduct personal searches of citizens and their belongings, including with the help of technical and special means, at the entrances to the protected objects of the department, as well as to seize prohibited items and substances. Drivers of vehicles of this State Inspectorate involved in the suppression of unlawful acts have been authorized to use and employ weapons, physical force and special means[13].
The Investigative Committee published the names of the coordinators of the actions of Belarusians abroad and threatened them with criminal prosecution, "including special proceedings" (trials in absentia)[14]. As A. Lukashenko stated during a press conference on January 26, it was he who instructed the relevant services to identify the participants of the action in Warsaw, related to Belarus. At the same time, he openly admitted that the authorities were going to use "relatives, parents, relatives, relatives" of his opponents living in Belarus as hostages[15].
The Belarusian authorities introduced new amendments to the legislation - now children can be recognized as being in a socially dangerous situation if their parents have been prosecuted under political articles (including administrative ones), for example, for reposting information that the authorities considered extremist or using the slogan "Zhyve Belarus". According to the Belarusian legislation, such children can be removed from their families and transferred to special institutions, which is a blatant violation of human rights.
In order to minimize the possibility of financing protests for the period of the active phase of the election campaign - from December 20, 2024 to February 1, 2025 - Belarus introduced restrictions on cash withdrawals from ATMs in the amount of up to 25 basic units (BV) within one calendar month on one card issued by a non-resident bank. According to official information, the relevant decision was made by the Board of the National Bank of RB "taking into account operational information coming from law enforcement agencies"[16].
Finally, at a meeting with the chairmen of regional executive committees and Minsk City Executive Committee A. Lukashenko ordered to use not only internal affairs bodies, but also units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus to ensure the security of election commissions[17], which directly contradicts the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus and the current legislation.
2.3 Use of state media for one-sided agitation
The principal difference between the actions of the incumbent authorities in the current election campaign is a skillful and sophisticated manipulation of public consciousness with the help of the state media and the results of opinion polls.
These activities had the following objectives:
restoring/winning the trust of the population while actively imitating the solution of urgent problems,
preparing public opinion to accept the fact of A. Lukashenko's "convincing victory" in the elections,
projecting of the opinion that Lukashenko's candidacy is alternative-free,
forming an image of Lukashenko as a "strict but fair father of the nation".
To achieve the first objective, the authorities used various formats of public events with the participation of A. Lukashenko, which received the widest coverage in all state media. For example, the incumbent president opened a swimming pool in Minsk (07.11.2024), visited the renovated park named after the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution and the reconstructed stadium "Tractor" in Minsk (14.11.2024), took part in the opening ceremony of new stations of Minsk subway (30.12.2024), took part in the ceremony of launching artesian water for Minsk (10.01.2024).
On November 27, 2024, a seminar for officials "Topical issues of work with appeals of citizens and legal entities" was held in Minsk with wide coverage in the state media. The seminar was attended by First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration N. Petkevich and Chairman of the House of Representatives I. Sergeenko. During the seminar the attention was emphasized on a better and more responsible approach of local authorities to citizens' appeals in order to avoid the emergence of new points of social tension[18]. In fact, it was about instructing officials how to talk to population during the elections to avoid criticism of the presidential vertical.
On December 3, 2024 A. Lukashenko signed Decree No. 452[19], which updated the decree "On the response of officials to critical statements in the state mass media", which had been in force since 1997. The state media claimed that this decree was aimed at improving the system of the authorities' response to the problems of the population.
However, an analysis of the changes shows that its real goal is to strengthen control over the activities of the media and Internet resources and to expand the potential of the state media in communications with the population, including through the involvement of the expert community controlled by the authorities.
At the same time, the state media conducted a purposeful preparation of public opinion to accept the fact of Lukashenko's "convincing victory" in the elections. For example, a political observer of the Belarusian state TV channel Tur more than two months before the voting date publicly stated that "the absolute majority of citizens of the Republic of Belarus are absolutely convinced that the incumbent president will win the elections in 2025"[20].
On November 21, Belarus held the Uniform Information Day dedicated to the theme "The Election of the President of the Republic of Belarus: the Future Depends on Us". Although formally the event was supposed to talk about the importance of the presidential election as such, in reality the day was fully devoted to the campaign for A. Lukashenko by the forces and means of the entire state apparatus – and even before the formal start of the campaign.
A direct confirmation of this is the development by the Presidential Administration and sending to all bodies of state power, state organizations and state enterprises of special methodical materials containing detailed instructions on how to convince Belarusians of the necessity to "elect" Lukashenko for the seventh term[21]. The whole content of this document was reduced to direct propaganda for Lukashenko, whom the authors call "the national leader" and with whose name, in their opinion, "all the achievements of the sovereign Republic of Belarus for the last decades are inseparably connected".
In addition, the state media published materials about pickets and the process of collecting signatures mainly in support of Lukashenko, regularly "forgetting" about other candidates.
2.4 Manipulation of public opinion through social surveys
Back in October 2024, the results of a survey conducted by the analytical center EcooM were published, according to which 80,4% of respondents allegedly answered "I trust him" to the question "To what extent do you trust Lukashenko?" At the same time, 67,5% expressed trust in the government[22].
In December 2024, state media disseminated information that according to the sociological research conducted by the Belarusian Committee of Youth Organizations, 86,6% of respondents trust A. Lukashenko, 68,2% trust the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, 70,5% trust the parliament, 72,8% trust the government, and 68,7% trust local authorities[23].
In January 2025, the results of sociological research of the Center for Social and Humanitarian Research of the BSEU were published, according to which 85,5% of the Belarusians polled stated their plans to vote in the elections[24]. In addition, to the question "If elections were held today, for whom would you vote?", 82,5% of respondents allegedly answered "For the current head of state"[25].
The results of sociological surveys published by the state mass media categorically diverge from the results of surveys conducted by independent organizations. Thus, in January experts of Chatham House presented a study of how Belarusians perceive the presidential elections-2025, according to the results of which only 36% of respondents will "definitely" go to the elections – it is 2 times less than in 2020[26].
2.5 Use of political prisoners in A. Lukashenko's election campaign
Another specific feature of Lukashenko's election campaign was the use of political opponents (political prisoners) in penitentiary institutions, i.e. under his control. In particular, such a move as pardoning political prisoners was actively used to form the image of the "strict but fair Belarusian father of the nation".
In addition, M. Kolesnikova, who had been kept in the "incommunicado" regime for almost two years, was allowed a visit with her father, the footage of which was then widely broadcasted by state media[27] (November 18, 2024). Then a meeting was organized between R. Protasevich, a former oppositionist cooperating with the authorities, and another political prisoner – ex-presidential candidate for the 2020 elections Viktar Babariko (8 January 2025), who was also held in the "incommunicado" regime for more than two years (630 days)[28].
These meetings were actively commented by the state mass media as an extraordinary act of mercy by A. Lukashenko, who allowed them “in violation of the laws and regulations in force in Belarus regarding the serving of sentences by convicts”.
Lukashenko's use of political prisoners, whose health and life are constantly at risk and whose content is particularly inhumane, for his own political advertising is a particularly cynical manifestation of the undemocratic nature of the presidential campaign
3. Falsifications during the election campaign
3.1 Falsifications at the stage of collecting signatures in support of presidential candidates
Despite the considerable efforts made by the government to imitate the democratic nature of the presidential election, the main tool to ensure A. Lukashenko's victory in the election was and remains a well-thought-out and constantly improving system of falsifications at all stages of the election campaign.
The fact of falsifications is so obvious that even A. Lukashenko himself on October 24, 2024 in his interview to the Russian newspaper "Izvestia" admitted the possibility of falsification by Belarusian authorities, explaining the additions by the initiative of governors[29].
One of the areas of falsification is the collection of signatures to nominate persons as candidates for the presidency.
Against the background of Lukashenko's obsessive desire to demonstrate a steep rise in popular support from the very beginning of the election campaign, thus justifying the necessity of another presidential term, Lukashenko's election HQ announced that it allegedly collected 2,5 million signatures for his nomination to the presidency. However, there are reasonable doubts about both the authenticity of the record number of signatures (at least 30% of the number of voters) and the adequacy of their verification.
A properly executed signature sheet contains up to 18 signatures[30]. Consequently, 2,5 million signatures require 138,9 thousand A4 sheets or 280 packages of printed paper weighing 0,7 tons. The CEC had only five days (including two days off) to check the validity of the collected signatures in support of Lukashenko alone: the documents were submitted on December 17. Such a short timeframe casts doubt on the possibility of adequate verification of the submitted information and may be evidence of falsification at the stage of collecting signatures in support of candidates.
In addition, an analysis of the information on collected signatures by region shows that, for example, in Grodno region, 36,3% of the total population living in the region, including children and teenagers, or about 47% of the number of voters, gave their signatures in support of Lukashenko[31]. In Mogilev region these figures amounted to 41,4% and about 50% respectively[32]. At the same time, the total number of signatures collected for the other four candidates is 16,81% in Mogilev region and 17,78% in Grodno region of the signatures registered in support of A. Lukashenko:
The uniquely high figures of collected signatures in support of the candidates (about 50% of the total number of voters) according to the idea of the Presidential Administration of Belarus should, firstly, show a high level of public involvement in the election campaign, and secondly, prepare the ground for Lukashenko's convincing victory. However, both the abnormally high numbers of collected signatures and the almost equal ratio of collected signatures for all candidates in both regions (a statistical anomaly) cast doubt on the figures reported.
Unfortunately, only data on two regions of Belarus are publicly available; the authorities have subsequently stopped publishing this extremely interesting information.
3.2 State control over election commissions and election observers
The second area of falsifications is the manipulation of the number of votes cast by voters directly at the polling stations. For this purpose, the current government has created a powerful system of total control over vote counting.
First, to this end, a careful selection of persons for inclusion in regional and territorial election commissions (TECs) is carried out. For example, in the 2025 election campaign, of the 1725 TEC members, 1179 were nominated from pro-governmental (there were no others left after the purge of civil society) political parties and public associations (see Diagram 2):[33]
Besides, in order to ensure total control over the voting process, for the first time in the history of sovereign Belarus, the authorities decided not to set up polling stations abroad[34] due to the impossibility of organizing control outside the country. Belarusians wishing to vote were offered to come to Belarus specially for this purpose, which in fact is a restriction of citizens' electoral rights. As a result, out of an estimated 500,000 Belarusians living abroad, about 100 came to Belarus to vote[35].
The third area of election falsification is manipulation in arranging independent observation of the election campaign and voting.
Here, the CEC demonstrated understandable selectivity. The missions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Organization of Turkic States, the Non-Aligned Movement, the League of Arab States, and the Pan-African Parliament were invited as international observers to the elections in advance[36]. In total, according to the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, as of January 26, the CEC accredited 486 international observers from 52 countries, including 15 EU countries[37] (these are well-known pro-Russian activists from these countries). Only 112 observers were "independent". As the CEC noted, they "do not represent any observation missions or organizations, but act solely as independent experts"[38].
As for the invitation of OSCE observers, Belarusian authorities stated that the issue was under consideration, but they took the tactic of delaying the deadlines. On January 3, during the meeting with the authorized persons A. Lukashenko once again raised the issue of inviting Western observers to the elections[39]. Of course, he knew perfectly well that due to the limited time it would be impossible to do it. Thus, he imitated his openness and commitment to democratic procedures and shifted the responsibility for non-recognition of the elections to the seeming sluggishness of the OSCE. As a result, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry announced that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) had been sent an invitation to observe the 2025 elections only on January 16[40].
It is noteworthy that Lukashenko used the same move back in 2020[41]. Now he is just copying it, which once again emphasizes the insincerity of the actions of the Belarusian authorities.
At the end of the meeting on January 3, A. Lukashenko set his election agents the task to "meet and decide once again" with the Central Election Commission on this issue, thus directly recognizing the possibility of his influence on the decisions made by the CEC.
A total of 44 000 observers were accredited as domestic observers. The number of these observers was also maximized to ensure total control over the voting and counting process. Public organizations presented 30138 observers (67,9%), political parties – 4901 persons (11%). In addition, 5 060 private persons who submitted special application (11,4%), as well as 4262 nominees of labor collectives (9,6%) were registered as observers. Thus, out of 44 361 national observers, pro-governmental associations and parties are represented by 35 039 persons – 78,9% (see Diagram 3):[42]
4. Conclusions and forecast
The presidential election-2025 demonstrated once again the lack of aspiration of A. Lukashenko and his entourage to comply with the generally accepted democratic norms and principles. The main reason for this is A. Lukashenko's desire to keep the power in his hands at any cost.
That said, the current election campaign has been different in many ways from previous presidential elections, especially the 2020 election.
First, Lukashenko's election headquarters was significantly strengthened and was engaged not only in campaigning for him, but also in the whole process of "election management". This time there was a clear strategy to ensure Lukashenko's victory, and the necessary human and financial resources were prepared and allocated for its realization.
Second, the authorities prepared thoroughly for the election campaign, having drawn the relevant conclusions from the events of 2020. This ensured quick, clear and coordinated actions of all elements of the state administration system. The most important and powerful officials actively participated in the elections in one role or another, providing support to A. Lukashenko.
Third, the national security system was prepared in advance for any scenarios and was the central for “election management”. Large-scale repressions became an integral part of the preparation and conduct of election campaigns in order to intimidate civil society and prevent public protests.
Fourth, the Belarusian authorities have made significant efforts to conduct "sterile elections", in which internally all results and actions, including those of the opposition, were planned in advance and managed. The Belarusian authorities no longer allow any "games in democracy" and real alternative candidates. Their task is to demonstrate the complete lack of alternatives for A. Lukashenko.
Fifth, the Belarusian authorities made considerable efforts for the international recognition of the election results, which demonstrates a high degree of Lukashenko's interest in the foreign policy legitimization of power and is an important warning to the West that the strategy of engaging in cooperation on Minsk's (and Moscow's) terms will continue in the future using increasingly sophisticated methods.
Sixth, the incumbent authorities have demonstrated their readiness and ability to use various non-standard forms and methods in their activities, which introduces a certain element of surprise into the further steps of official Minsk.
Seventh, from the first day of the election campaign, Moscow publicly supported Lukashenko's decision to run for a new presidential term, thus dispelling rumors about possible Russian attempts to interfere in the election campaign and prevent Lukashenko from running. At the moment, it is obvious that Moscow's strategy will be to wait for a convenient moment to interfere in the transit of power in Belarus.
The main reasons for the fact that the current presidential campaign in Belarus took place in full compliance with the wishes of Minsk and Moscow are:
thorough and advance preparation of the current government for the election campaign, application of non-standard methods and forms based on the analysis and rethinking of the events of 2020,
total purging of the political field and destruction of the "political infrastructure" of the opposition inside the country,
lack of a clear strategy of the opposition abroad. The actions of S. Tikhanouskaya and her allies led to the situation when by 2025 she ceased to influence the domestic political field,
Belarusian authorities made the most of the situation in the region: against the background of the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, official Minsk staked on the image of "Lukashenko - protector and guarantor of security", which enjoys support in Belarus,
lack of external interference in the internal political situation during the election campaign period, both from the West and Russia.
All the above-mentioned also allows to conclude that the presidential election-2025 has become the next stage of consistent strengthening of A. Lukashenko's power in Belarus, as well as his strategy of international legitimization.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that Lukashenko’s domestic political strategy has long ago crossed the equator of its success and is rapidly leading Belarus to a serious demographic and, consequently, economic crisis. Further " political sterilization” of the country will not lead to the strengthening of not popular support for A. Lukashenko, but to increased emigration, as it is happening, for example, in Venezuela.
As for the foreign policy strategy, it will not undergo any significant changes in the light of Lukashenko's relatively successful elections. Another activation of Lukashenko's foreign lobbyists – former foreign ministers Sergei Martynov and Sergei Aleinik, as well as their contacts in Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Germany (BSW, AfD and SPD parties) should be expected in the near future.
In addition, Lukashenko will try to use for his own purposes a part of the Belarusian opposition, which, against the background of a complete lack of ideas and increasing demoralization, can also be used as lobbyists for the legitimization of the Belarusian president. However, under the conditions when A. Lukashenko is in a military-political alliance with Russia and ensures Russian military presence on the border with three NATO countries, these actions have no chance of success. Thus, this strategic initiative of Lukashenko will be doomed to failure.
[1] https://belta.by/society/view/marafon-edinstva-masshtabiruetsja-organizatory-o-rasshirenii-geografii-i-napolnenii-aktsii-678189-2024/
[2] https://euroradio.fm/ru/kak-marafon-edinstva-stal-agitacionnoy-kampaniey-vopreki-zakonodatelstvu
[3] https://www.sb.by/articles/anna-lukashenko-o-marafone-edinstva-my-realizovali-vse-chto-bylo-zaplanirovano-i-dazhe-bolshe.html
[4] https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-so-studentami-vuzov-v-formate-otkrytyj-mikrofon-s-prezidentom-v-mglu
[17] https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-s-predsedatelami-oblispolkomov-i-minskogo-gorispolkoma
[22] https://www.sb.by/articles/absolyutnoe-bolshinstvo-belorusov-doveryayut-prezidentu-analiticheskiy-tsentr-esoom-predstavil-novyy.html
[23] https://belta.by/society/view/naskolko-belorusy-doverjajut-organam-vlasti-v-bkmo-ozvuchili-rezultaty-onlajn-oprosa-683534-2024/
[27] https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/11/12/roman-protasevich-soobshchil-o-vstreche-marii-kolesnikovoi-s-ottsom-news
[28] https://www.dw.com/ru/opublikovany-foto-politzaklucennogo-babariko-s-nim-ne-bylo-svazi-15-goda/a-71245268
[29] https://reform.news/lukashenko-dopustil-fakt-falsifikacij-do-5-na-prezidentskih-vyborah-v-2020-godu
[33] https://www.sb.by/articles/tsik-dlya-provedeniya-vyborov-prezidenta-v-territorialnye-komissii-vydvinuto-1725-predstaviteley.html?amp=1
