Trump’s Attempt to Reinvent the West: Reasons, Aims, and Implications for the EU

1. Introduction to the Problem

Trump’s inauguration set in motion a series of political events that surprised not only the West but also its adversaries – Russia, China, and Iran. The American president swiftly reshaped U.S. foreign policy, violating several principles underlying the Western and global order:

a) Undermining international alliances: The Trump Administration has displayed open skepticism toward NATO and other international alliances, weakening collective security and cooperation among Western nations. The U.S. has effectively withdrawn from the NATO coalition supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia and initiated separate negotiations with Russia, the aggressor state, excluding Ukraine and the EU – essentially acting behind allies’ backs. Notably, in these negotiations, Ukraine is sidelined in favor of broader U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Arctic and other regions, particularly in joint energy projects aimed at improving long-term U.S.-Russia relations[1]. This approach clearly neglects allied obligations.

b) Disregard for key principles of international law and norms, including:

Prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 2(4)) and customary international law. This shift was evident in the U.S. stance during the UN General Assembly vote on February 24, 2025, where it opposed a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine[2].

Non-interference in internal affairs, a cornerstone recognized in the UN Charter (Article 2(7)) and treaties like the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law. The U.S. has repeatedly interfered in election campaigns in Canada, Germany, Romania, and Poland.

Sovereign equality of states, a norm reflected in the UN Charter (Article 2(1)) and the 1970 Declaration. The U.S. has sought to impose its will on states like Canada (with suggestions of making it the 51st state[3]) and Denmark (aiming to acquire Greenland “one way or another”[4]), using political and economic coercion.

c) Departure from free trade and open economies: Tariffs of 25% on Canada and Mexico, 10% on China (escalating to 20%), and planned 25% duties on the EU[5] and allies like South Korea have provoked retaliation and global economic uncertainty.

The EU first confronted this reality at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, where Vice President Vance’s speech stunned European and British leaders. The European political establishment split into three groups:

Some right-wing leaders, primarily in Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland’s opposition PiS party, aligned with the U.S. approach, prioritizing security ties with the U.S. over a robust EU.

A second group, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, advocates adapting to U.S. demands while seeking common ground.

A third group acknowledges the U.S.’s gradual withdrawal from security guarantees, exploring independent European security options while minimizing the rift with the U.S.

Overall, the EU has so far reacted passively to these tectonic shifts in the global order, often dismissing them as Trump’s eccentricities or a tactical maneuver with no lasting impact. Despite recent moves toward strategic autonomy, national indecision, a tendency to “wait out the storm,” and a preference for U.S. alignment over EU unity persist.

We argue that while Donald Trump’s unpredictable character influences his policies, the new U.S. foreign policy course stems not from personality but from systemic shifts in the worldview of U.S. political elites and their vision for the United States and NATO. This systemic nature suggests the course is neither accidental nor easily reversible. In the following sections, we will substantiate this claim, outline the U.S. government’s current trajectory, and forecast its implications for the EU.

2. Reasons for U.S. Foreign Policy Shift Toward Europe

2.1 Bipartisan Deprioritization of Europe in U.S. Strategy, 2011–2024

The gradual de-prioritization of relations with the EU in U.S. strategic planning began well before Donald Trump’s presidency, during Barack Obama’s Administration, with even pro-European politicians such as Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden actively participating in this shift."

Initially, this shift involved redirecting attention and resources from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Asia-Pacific Rebalance, starting in 2011), driven by the recognition of China as the primary threat to the U.S. However, the U.S. underestimated China’s resilience and the extent to which power vacuums in Europe and the Middle East would empower Russia.

Consequently, China remained undeterred, while Russia grew stronger, responding to the U.S. pivot with the annexation of Crimea (2014), intervention in Syria (2015), and a full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022). Russia’s aggressive foreign policy now directly threatens EU security.

Moreover, U.S. withdrawals from Iraq (2011), Syria (2019), and Afghanistan (2021) sparked waves of instability, driving mass migration to Europe. This humanitarian crisis turned political, fueling far-right movements and undermining EU unity on strategic issues, thus weakening Europe’s ability to respond cohesively to internal and external threats.

The U.S. pivot to the Pacific since 2011 has thus created two major challenges for EU security –Russia’s aggression and the destabilizing migrant crisis – both largely unaddressed by the U.S., leaving Europe to face them alone.

Economic estrangement accompanied this political distancing during the “Pivot to the Pacific,” beginning with the U.S. favoring the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TPP aimed to bolster ties with Asia, while the TTIP, intended to deepen U.S.-EU trade relations, was abandoned.

Interestingly, while the TPP achieved little beyond a political gesture to isolate China, Trump’s Administration has continued economic distancing from the EU. In 2018, he imposed tariffs on EU steel and aluminum, citing national security. The EU retaliated with counter-tariffs, complicating transatlantic trade. Trump has also threatened tariffs on European cars and criticized the EU for trade imbalances. Notably, the tariffs introduced by Trump were adjusted but not fully repealed under Biden.

Thus, the U.S.’s gradual withdrawal from multilateral trade agreements and its emphasis on trade conflicts with China reflect a long-term systemic process, progressively undermining U.S.-EU trade coordination.

2.2 Reverse Nixon Strategy and Monroe Doctrine

Even if the current shifts in U.S. foreign policy have been developing among Democratic and Republican elites for some time and are likely to persist beyond the next election, this gradual trend does not fully account for the Trump Administration’s abrupt foreign policy reversal. This includes its unfriendly actions toward traditional allies – particularly the EU – its withdrawal of support for Ukraine, and its ongoing rapprochement with Russia. To justify this shift, the Trump Administration cites, somewhat inconsistently, two historical precedents: the Monroe Doctrine and Nixon’s strategy of dividing the Soviet Union and Communist China. Below, we evaluate these analogies.

The current plan to separate Russia from China, publicly dubbed the “reverse Nixon” strategy in reference to Nixon’s separation of China from the Soviet Union, responds to their growing alignment during the Ukraine war, which could threaten U.S. interests if solidified. However, this plan is flawed as it overlooks the historical conditions that enabled Nixon and Kissinger’s success with China:

Lack of deep Russo-Chinese conflict: Nixon’s rapprochement worked because the USSR and China were nearing war, evident in the 1969 border clashes. Today, Russia and China maintain a stable strategic partnership, united by opposition to U.S. dominance, lacking a major conflict or ideological rift for the U.S. to exploit.
Russia’s strong economic ties with China: In the 1970s, China was isolated and economically weak, making U.S. engagement appealing. Today, Russia relies on China for trade, technology, and energy exports, especially post-Western sanctions. Breaking with China would devastate Russia’s economy, rendering realignment with the U.S. implausible.
Lack of strategic diplomatic execution: Nixon’s strategy relied on secret diplomacy, ensuring mutual benefits before public announcement. The current U.S. effort is overt and clumsy, with no substantial backchannel negotiations offering Moscow credible incentives to abandon Beijing. Russia and China, fully aware of U.S. goals, can easily counter with coordinated diplomacy.
Russia’s deep alienation from the West: Decades of U.S. sanctions, confrontations, and deterrence contrast with China’s 1970s desire for U.S. legitimacy. Russia now views the U.S. as an existential foe, having pivoted away from the West[6].

Consequently, Russia and China could exploit this U.S. diplomatic maneuver, driving a wedge between the U.S. and its allies rather than between themselves. Russia might gain from U.S. cooperation without relinquishing its lucrative ties with China, while the U.S. risks undermining its credibility among allies by pursuing deeper engagement with Russia.

It seems unlikely that American policymakers are unaware of the “reverse Nixon” strategy’s implausibility, suggesting it may be not the ultimate goal but a sophisticated justification for a systemic U.S. foreign policy with distinct, non-Nixonian roots and objectives.

Conversely, analogies between Trump’s “America First” approach and the Monroe Doctrine are more persuasive. Trump explicitly endorsed this link in a 2018 UN speech: “Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are committed to maintaining our independence from the encroachment of expansionist foreign powers. It has been the formal policy of our country since President Monroe that we reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere and in our own affairs”[7]. First-term actions, such as sanctions on Venezuela and shifts in Cuba policy, reflect this revival.

However, unlike Monroe’s era, Trump operates in a multipolar world where the EU, China, and Russia exert influence over zones vital to the U.S., prompting him to extend claims beyond the traditional U.S. sphere. This transforms the Monroe Doctrine’s isolationism into selective interventionism – “you can’t meddle in our affairs, but we can in yours” – marking a departure from its defensive origins toward “pragmatic nationalism”.

2.3 MAGA Revolution and the Rise of New Elites

Thus, although it may seem that the foreign policy of Trump’s second Administration lacks consistency and is guided by a disjointed mix of historical U.S. concepts – such as the Monroe Doctrine, Nixon/Kissinger’s strategy of dividing China and the USSR, Obama’s “Pacific pivot,” and Biden’s anti-China stance – this is not the case. While undeniably sharing certain similarities with past approaches, it constitutes a new, unique doctrine not yet described in academic literature. This article attempts such a description, with particular focus on U.S.-EU relations.

The emergence of this new foreign policy doctrine stems from significant changes within the Republican Party, namely the triumph of the MAGA movement – which its intellectual leaders call the “second American revolution”[8] – and the ascendance of two new dominant elite groups: right-wing national populists and leaders of Silicon Valley tech giants (henceforth termed “Tech Oligarchs”). Meanwhile, traditional Republican factions – moderates, conservatives, and Reaganites – have receded to secondary roles.

This replacement of political elites has automatically reshaped the political agenda. Neither right-wing populists (MAGA) nor ambitious Tech Oligarchs adhere to the Republican Party’s classic values or its traditional foreign policy goals as articulated by Reagan.

During Trump’s first term, this transformation had not yet occurred. The first Trump Administration saw fierce competition among different political agendas – MAGA’s rising influence, Reaganite traditionalism, and the Moderates’ balancing act. This struggle culminated in August 2017 with the forced departure of Stephen Bannon, Trump’s chief political strategist, advisor, and “godfather” of MAGA, which was widely interpreted as a victory for the moderate faction. Consequently, despite reformist rhetoric, Trump’s foreign policy in his first term remained relatively restrained.

This marks the fundamental distinction between Trump’s first and second Administrations. In 2025, most Administration members are hand-picked to implement the new MAGA agenda including its foreign policy doctrine with the only possible exception of Marco Rubio whose nomination seems to be a favour to the Reaganite group in GOP.

The table below provides an overview of the factional affiliations of the most influential Cabinet members during Trump’s first and second terms, highlighting the evident trend.

Table 1. Comparative Analysis of the Composition of Trump’s First and Second Administrations (Based on the 10 Most Influential Figures)

Administration	Name	Position	Primary Affiliation
First (2017-2021)	Jared Kushner	Senior Advisor	Business Elites
	Reince Priebus	Chief of Staff	Moderate Republican
	Gary Cohn	Chief Economic Advisor	Moderate Republican
	Stephen Miller	Senior Advisor	MAGA
	Rex Tillerson	Secretary of State	Business Elites
	Mike Pence	Vice President	Reaganist
	Mike Pompeo	Secretary of State / CIA Director	Reaganist
	Steven Mnuchin	Secretary of the Treasury	Business Elites
	James Mattis	Secretary of Defense	Moderate Republican
	Steve Bannon	Chief Strategist	MAGA
Second (2025-present)	JD Vance	Vice President	MAGA
	Russell Vought	Head of the office of management and budget (OMB)	MAGA
	Marco Rubio	Secretary of State	Reaganist
	Pete Hegseth	Secretary of Defense	MAGA
	Pam Bondi	Attorney General	MAGA
	Scott Bessent	Secretary of the Treasury	Business Elites
	Stephen Miller	Deputy chief of Staff for Policy	MAGA
	Susie Wiles	Chief of Staff	MAGA
	Elon Musk	Co-Head, Department of Government Efficiency	Tech Oligarchs
	Michael Waltz	National Security Advisor	MAGA

To summarise, in the new Trump Administration, the absolute majority of the most important positions are occupied by MAGA leaders. In addition, the following groups are represented:

“Tech Oligarchs” are primarily the leaders of the big tech industry who supported Trump by using their wealth, technological expertise and influence to shape domestic policy. They have a clear futuristic vision for the US and the technological reforms needed to make it happen. Key figures include: Elon Musk, Vivek Ramaswamy, Peter Thiel, David Sachs. This group has its own views on foreign policy, partially aligned with MAGA.

“Business Elites” – familiar and trusted figures from Trump’s business life. They are present in both the first and second Administrations and often carry out delicate and personal assignments for Trump. This group is distinguished by opportunism and a lack of clear political principles, which limits their influence on foreign policy.

Finally, the „classic Republicans” group is the weakest and is represented by only a few Reaganites, the most significant of whom is Secretary of State Marco Rubio. However, his influence in the Cabinet seems to be low and his personality has become the subject of jokes and memes on social media[9].

Of course, not all influential actors are represented within the Administration. Some prefer to operate outside the government’s hierarchical structure, avoiding formal duties and focusing on global issues or informal leadership, such as MAGA’s informal leader Stephen Bannon and Tech Oligarchs’ informal leader Peter Thiel. To account for this, we present below a ranking of influence groups in Trump’s inner circle, encompassing both official and unofficial actors. This ranking is based on our proprietary methodology, detailed in our publication, “The Internal Dynamics of the Major Influence Groups in Trump’s Inner Circle and Their Impact on U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy.”

**Figure 1. Ranking of Power Groups in President Trump’s Inner Circle (2025)**

Figure 1 helps uncover the significant influence of a second new elite group within the Republican Party – Tech Oligarchs[10] – who largely prefer to remain in the shadows despite their critical roles: Musk and Ramaswamy focus on “purging” the federal government and reshaping the federal budget, while David Sacks oversees the state’s cryptocurrency reserves.

Given these new facts, we proceed on the premise that the “shocking” foreign policy of Trump’s new Administration is rooted in the domestic and foreign policy programs of these two emergent groups – MAGA and Tech Oligarchs. This article is dedicated to analyzing this policy, particularly in relation to the EU.

3. The MAGA Foreign Policy Doctrine: Stephen Bannon and Project 2025

MAGA is a novel political movement, inherently anti-elitist and disruptive (i.e., aimed at dismantling existing political institutions), rendering its theoretical foundations limited and straightforward.

These foundations include the political views of MAGA’s “godfather”, Stephen Bannon, which lack a unified codified form but can be discerned from his tenure as Trump’s chief strategist and MAGA leader, and the well-known political playbook Project 2025.

Stephen Bannon crafted a sophisticated MAGA framework positioning Trump as a vehicle for a populist uprising against “leftist” elites. Trump launched the MAGA movement with his “Make America Great Again” slogan on June 16, 2015, during his candidacy announcement at Trump Tower in New York City[11] and became its face and “political vessel”.

A new generation of MAGA theorists, notably Stephen Miller (White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Homeland Security), Russell Vought (Head of the Office of Management and Budget), and Peter Navarro (Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing), draw heavily from Bannon’s ideas.

These figures codified, under the Heritage Foundation’s leadership and with support from approximately 80 allied organizations, codified MAGA’s major policy positions in Project 2025, a comprehensive conservative initiative designed as a policy guide for Trump’s new Administration.

The core tenets of Project 2025 are outlined in “Mandate for Leadership”. Prepared by experts and politicians from over 100 organizations under the Heritage Foundation’s leadership, it serves as a policy roadmap for Trump’s Administration following his election victory. While predominantly practical, detailing fundamental reforms for the U.S. government, it also articulates key principles, largely derived from Bannon’s views.

This 922-page document is pivotal because, despite Trump’s pre-election attempts to distance himself from it, his post-victory Administration is staffed with its architects, and his executive orders closely adhere to its guidelines[12].

Notably, “Mandate for Leadership” devotes surprisingly little space to foreign policy. However, it still offers a brief blueprint for future relations with key global players, including the EU, providing a starting point for our analysis. The general recommendations for the Trump Administration regarding the EU are:

Prioritization of Bilateral Relations: The U.S. will favor relationships with individual EU member states over Brussels as a centralized authority, with special attention to key allies in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, Romania, and Hungary.
Economic Policy: The U.S. will review trade arrangements with the EU to ensure fair treatment of U.S. businesses and foster productive reciprocity.
Defense and NATO: European allies must increase defense spending to 2-3% of GDP, with potential U.S. military reductions in Europe if they fail to assume greater security responsibility. The U.S. will explore alternative military cooperation formats, including bilateral agreements with select European nations.
Relations with the United Kingdom: A special economic and military partnership with the UK will bypass EU regulations, aiming to keep the UK outside the EU’s orbit.

These recommendations are revealing in their strong EU-scepticism and signal an intent to weaken and sideline Brussels – a policy currently in action. Yet, they don't explain Trump's overall political vision behind this scepticism.

To grasp the roots of MAGA leaders’ sharp foreign policy shift after taking office, we must explore Stephen Bannon’s influential, yet uncompiled, doctrine – the ideological bedrock of MAGA.

In 2016, Stephen Bannon managed Donald Trump’s election campaign and, following the victory, became his senior advisor and chief White House strategist, often dubbed the second most powerful person in the world. He formulated the overarching strategy for Trump’s first term, aimed at revising foreign policy principles and combating domestic political adversaries. This strategy has remained consistent over the years and now shapes the perspectives of Washington’s new political elites.

Earlier, we traced the origins and evolution of U.S. political elite views, which, by Trump’s first term, began coalescing into “pragmatic nationalism.” At the time of his 2016 rise to power, this approach was broad, serving as a guiding principle focused on advancing U.S. interests with minimal ideological baggage. As Trump stated, “We will pursue a new foreign policy that puts America first – great deals, great strength, no nonsense” (2016 campaign speech). This breaks into three components:

Economic nationalism: “We’re going to bring jobs back to America”.
Transactionalism: “I’ll get along with anybody who wants to get along with us”.
Multipolarity (cheap hegemony): “Why are we paying for everyone else’s defense?”

Steve Bannon, however, overlaid this with a more ideological vision. He offered the emerging MAGA political elites a clear worldview and action plan, distinct from traditional Republican approaches.

The foundation of Bannon’s foreign policy doctrine is anti-globalism. In his view, the U.S. is a great nation with a unique leadership mission, yet it is constrained – like Gulliver by the Lilliputians – by burdensome multilateral treaties and international organizations that offer little benefit beyond expense. Here, Trump and Bannon align, but Bannon elaborates further. He declared a key goal of MAGA, and thus of the new U.S. political elites, to be the fight against “globalist elites” weakening the U.S. Domestically, he targeted the eradication of their local allies – Democrats, some Republicans, and the “deep state” of career bureaucrats implementing globalist agendas federally. This aim justified sweeping government reform and attacks on former international allies. The third pillar of Bannon’s doctrine is the notion of civilizational conflict. He is not merely warning of a future clash; he asserts the war has begun: “By losing its Judeo-Christian moral compass, the West has left itself vulnerable to enemies in a global clash of civilizations – and it is losing”[13]. Bannon identifies China and Islam as the West’s primary foes. China poses the chief globalist challenge, skillfully building a meticulous system of international alliances and organizations (UN, SCO, BRICS, ILO, WHO) to undermine the U.S. Islam threatens the “Judeo-Christian world” the U.S. defends ideologically. The incompatibility of Islam and Christianity fuels Bannon’s staunch anti-immigrant stance, looping his views back to pragmatic nationalism.

This description reveals that while Bannon’s anti-globalism aligns with Trump’s pragmatism, his civilizational conflict and anti-elitism are asymmetric additions that clash with Trump’s elite, deal-driven approach.

Thus, Bannon’s doctrine absorbed and sharpened Trump’s nationalist views, providing a clear ideological basis for confronting dissatisfied allies abroad and political foes at home.

Yet differences persist. Bannon views Trump as a “moderate MAGA leader”: “President Trump is actually a moderate in the MAGA movement… To the right of President Trump? Not so kind-hearted. We’re very focused and we’re to the right of him because it’s just not his nature to be as far right-wing as we are. We love him, he’s the head of our movement, but what comes after Trump is a much bigger shockwave to the liberal establishment and to the progressive establishment that basically controls the country”.[14]

The tension lies between Trump’s deal-focused flexibility and Bannon’s ideological rigidity. Trump seeks situational advantage and “grand deals,” and as a businessman, he prioritizes optimal relations with other political actors. This explains his claims of “wonderful relationships” with the leaders of China, Iran, and Russia, as well as his dual approach to Iran and China.

For Iran, Trump’s first term (2017–2021) revealed a deal-oriented intent beneath aggressive tactics. He denounced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as “the worst deal ever negotiated” (Trump, 2016 debate, CNN, September 26, 2016) and exited it in May 2018, applying “maximum pressure” through sanctions and the 2020 killing of Qassem Soleimani. Yet he hinted at openness, saying, “I think Iran wants to make a deal” (NYT interview, June 20, 2019). Iran’s intransigence thwarted this, exposing the limits of his approach when reciprocity falters.

With China, Trump’s transactionalism shaped his first-term trade war, using tariffs to secure the “Phase One” deal in January 2020, with China pledging $200 billion in U.S. purchases (USTR, January 15, 2020). In his second term, despite campaign threats of 60% tariffs (Reuters, November 2024), Trump has not enacted them as of March 2025. Instead, China signals willingness for a deal, and Asia Times notes, “the mere possibility of negotiations has provided a glimmer of hope”[15].

The broader alignment of Bannon’s and Trump’s foreign policy approaches is presented in the table below.

Table 2: Comparison of Bannon’s and Trump’s Political Agendas: Convergence and Points of Tension

Trump’s Agenda (Pragmatic Nationalism)	Bannon’s Agenda	Overlap & Bannon’s Overlay	Points of Tension
Economic Nationalism: "We’re going to bring jobs back to America" (2016 debate). Prioritizes trade protectionism and U.S. economic gain.	Anti-Globalism: "The globalists have sold out the American worker" (2017 CPAC). Rejects global economic integration.	Bannon frames Trump’s tariffs and trade policies as a populist fight against globalization, adding ideological heft to pragmatic goals.	Trump’s deal-making (e.g., USMCA, China „Phase One” deal) softens Bannon’s radical anti-globalist edge.
Transactionalism: "I’ll get along with anybody who wants to get along with us" (2017 interview). Trump values bilateral deals over ideology.	(Asymmetric – tied to Anti-Globalism): Bannon uses this to push against multilateralism.	Bannon casts Trump’s bilateralism (e.g., exiting TPP) as sovereignty reclaimed, aligning it with his anti-globalist narrative.	Trump’s flexibility with adversaries (e.g., praising Xi) undercuts Bannon’s hardline stance.
Multipolarity (Cheap Hegemony): "Why are we paying for everyone else’s defense?" (2016 rally).	(Asymmetric – tied to Anti-Globalism): "We’re done being the world’s policeman for elites" (2016).	Bannon frames Trump’s cost-cutting (e.g., NATO pressure) as a rejection of elitist burdens, enhancing its populist appeal.	Trump’s practical focus lacks Bannon’s ideological zeal, limiting revolutionary intent.
(No equivalent)	Civilizational Conflict: "We’re at war with China and radical Islamic fascism" (2016). Sees cultural clashes as inevitable.	Bannon overlays this onto Trump’s policies (e.g., China trade war, Muslim ban), framing them as existential battles.	Trump lacks this worldview – his focus is pragmatic, not civilizational.
(No equivalent)	Anti-Elitism: "The ruling class has failed the people" (2016 Breitbart). Targets elites as enemies.	Bannon frames Trump as an outsider against elites, despite his elite status, boosting his populist image.	Trump’s elite identity and insider ties (e.g., Wall Street) contradict Bannon’s narrative.

These points of tension represent potential future divergences in the Trump Administration’s foreign policy, where Trump’s allies from business elites and Tech Oligarchs may favor his flexible, transactional approach, opposing the rigid, ideologically driven stance of MAGA leaders aligned with Bannon’s ideas. Meanwhile, Trump Administration members with ties to both groups, such as Vance, could serve as mediators[16]. However, the collective strength and influence of MAGA within the Administration should not be underestimated. As noted earlier, this group is the most influential of the four represented in the government, as well as the most ideologically cohesive and active. Its current leaders in Trump’s inner circle include J.D. Vance, Stephen Miller, and Russell Vought, all linked to Bannon to varying degrees.

J.D. Vance, Trump’s Vice President, leveraged Bannon’s support across two campaigns. For his 2022 Ohio Senate run, Bannon promoted Vance on “War Room”, hailing him as a MAGA leader[17], a backing that fueled his victory[18]. In 2024, as Trump’s VP pick, Vance continued appearing on “War Room,” openly stating, “Steve Bannon and I are pretty close”[19]. Interestingly, Bannon back in 2018 also tried to install J.D. Vance “as an ally” in the leadership of the already mentioned Heritage Foundation, which later led Project 2025[20].

Russell Vought, a key architect of Project 2025 and Trump’s Head of the Office of Management and Budget, shares a strong ideological and media connection with Bannon. Leading the Center for Renewing America, Vought has advanced a nationalist agenda, frequently appearing on Bannon’s “War Room” to promote Project 2025[21]. He also contributed to “War Room: Battleground,” a 2022 film tied to Bannon’s efforts. The New York Times describes Vought as the “second man” in Trump’s team (the same as Bannon in the first Trump Administration), tasked with “implementing a sophisticated version of what Steve Bannon has called a battle for ‘deconstruction of the administrative state’”[22].

Stephen Miller, deputy chief of staff for policy, whose title in many ways understates the massive influence he commands both with the president and across the government, began his political career as a close aide to Steve Bannon, who nicknamed him “my typist”[23].

Bannon’s influence extends to economists (e.g., Navarro) and security and migration officials (e.g., Hegseth, Ratcliffe, Homan). For further details on Bannon’s ties to the current Trump Administration, see our article, “The Internal Dynamics of the Major Influence Groups in Trump’s Inner Circle and Their Impact on U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy.”

4. Tech Oligarchs’ Foreign Policy Approach

Unlike MAGA, which builds its foreign policy on well-defined principles (economic nationalism, anti-globalism, and civilizational conflict), the Tech Oligarchs’ foreign policy approach lacks a cohesive doctrine. Their views are fragmented, focusing on specific priorities like safeguarding innovation, securing market and resource access, and reducing foreign regulatory barriers. For instance, they rarely articulate a stance on broader issues like NATO or international law, as MAGA does, instead homing in on areas where technology intersects with state policy – such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and space exploration. This narrowness reflects a reactive, interest-driven outlook rather than a proactive, overarching vision.

Despite their narrower focus, the Tech Oligarchs share key foreign policy interests with MAGA, fostering a practical alliance within Trump’s Administration. Both groups champion economic nationalism, advocating for the return of manufacturing to the U.S. and countering China as a technological and economic rival. Additionally, their mutual emphasis on sovereignty –technological for the Tech Oligarchs and national for MAGA – creates a foundation for aligned policies, such as limiting international alliances that hinder U.S. interests (e.g., weakening the EU or WTO). In 2025, this convergence strengthens as both view dismantling globalist structures as a means to enhance U.S. power, blending the Tech Oligarchs’ pragmatic tech-centric goals with MAGA’s broader nationalist agenda.

Table 3. MAGA and Tech Oligarchs' Objections to International Organizations

Organization	MAGA Movement's Objections	Tech Oligarchs' Objections
United Nations (UN)	Encroaches on national sovereignty; promotes global governance.	Viewed as bureaucratic; potential hindrance to rapid technological deployment.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Imposes disproportionate burdens on the U.S.; questions relevance.	Limited direct objection; some alignment on reducing international commitments.
European Union (EU)	Promotes globalist policies conflicting with nationalism.	Imposes regulations like GDPR and DMA that are restrictive to innovation.
World Trade Organization (WTO)	Constrains protectionist trade policies; limits unilateral actions.	Trade regulations may hinder global business strategies.
World Health Organization (WHO)	Viewed as inefficient; mishandling of global health crises.	Criticized for bureaucratic delays affecting technological responses to health emergencies.

From this general description, a clear angle of attack on the EU emerges: a drive to deregulate the IT industry, in particular, to manage user data more freely, abolish monopoly charges, and stop fining U.S. corporations. All this can only be achieved if EU law is reformed and not prioritized over national law. After that, U.S. corporations will be able to seek necessary preferences at the national level with the support of the U.S. government. The main obstacles are regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA).

5. MAGA and Tech Oligarchs’ Anti-EU Power Play Unfolding

All of the above allows us to describe the foreign policy doctrine of the new political elites who took charge of the Trump Administration in 2025. This doctrine is entirely distinct from the Reaganism/neoconservatism that dominated the Republican Party for 30 years, with its prioritization of foreign alliances, an open economy, and democratic values. At its core are:

Pragmatic Nationalism of Trump:

Protection of national interests at the expense of any external interests, including those of allies (strict defense of the domestic market, tariffs, and political pressure on both partners and opponents).
Transactionalism, that is, prioritizing interests over agreements and alliances: “It is past time to revisit the wisdom of Palmerston, Washington, and Jefferson: the United States should have no permanent allies. Alliances that no longer serve US interests should be done away with or modified.”
Cheap hegemony: instead of positioning itself as a global hegemon, it is simpler for the U.S. to acknowledge that several major global players (China, India, Russia) have their own national interests and spheres of influence. The U.S. does not contest this, provided these players do not openly challenge the U.S. and accept a lower position in the global hierarchy. The U.S. does not pay for its presence in other countries; on the contrary, it is all the other countries needing U.S. protection that pay for it (gradual increase in defense spending in NATO countries, a deal with Ukraine on rare earth metals).

Bannon’s Anti-Globalism and Civilizational Conflict view (borrowing Huntington’s Theory):

A struggle against international organizations attempting to weaken the U.S. (EU, WTO, WHO, UN), withdrawing from them, and reducing their influence on the global stage.
A quest to defeat globalist China as the political antipode of the U.S. (limited by Trump’s interest in a “good deal” and the global corporate interests of Tech Oligarchs), as well as a struggle against the Islamic world as an ideological antipode to the Judeo-Christian world: “You have an expansionist Islam, and you have an expansionist China. Right? They are motivated. They’re arrogant. They’re on the march. And they think the Judeo-Christian west is on the retreat… The one thing the Chinese fear more than America … they fear Christianity more than anything”[24].

Technical Elitism and Corporatism of Tech Oligarchs:

Protection of the interests of American corporations worldwide, ensuring the dominant position of American Big Tech globally, if necessary, with the involvement of state resources, technological hegemony, and hegemony in the fields of AI and social media.

This doctrine is by no means isolationist; as noted above, it completely excludes external influence on the U.S., yet encourages aggressive, invasive U.S. intervention worldwide to protect national interests understood in an extremely broad sense: you cannot meddle in our affairs but we can meddle in yours. It allows us to explain a number of facts that until now fit into the overall picture of U.S. foreign policy, for example:

Double standards in foreign economics and politics, particularly the closure of its domestic market, the pursuit of full control over its social media (TikTok, owned by the Chinese company ByteDance, has faced pressure from the U.S. government to sell TikTok’s U.S. operations by January 19, 2025, or face a ban[25]), an extremely harsh reaction to any form of interference in American elections (political consequences for Ukraine due to Zelensky’s visit to Pennsylvania during the 2024 presidential campaign and for the UK due to the participation of British volunteers on the side of the Democratic Party), and at the same time, unabashed interference in elections in other countries (Germany, Romania).
Aggressiveness, even a certain political obsession toward the EU (a globalist project, “nurtured at the breast” of the U.S. and robbing ordinary Americans through unequal business conditions), gradual withdrawal from international organizations, and violation of international agreements.
An unusual combination of toughness and willingness to negotiate with China and Iran (a contradiction between Bannon (MAGA) vs. Trump, as noted above).
A surprising desire to get along with Russia by any means. Russia in the understanding of the main MAGA ideologist Bannon is the most important, most conservative part of the ‘Judeo-Christian world’, its bulwark against China and Islam – unlike the liberal EU. D.J. Vance hinted at this in his speech at the Munich 2025 Conference: “The threat that I worry most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, not China, it’s not any other external actor. What I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values“[26]. Bannon himself says it even more clearly in his recent interview: “Saudi Arabia was a mini-Yalta… It was all about a framework to finally put together the two allies in World War II. Ukraine is a sideshow… This has been my obsession. It has to happen. This is a much bigger discussion now between the United States and Russia. This is a reframing – geopolitically. The reason I met Dugin in Rome in 2018 was exactly this: we have to have some sort of partnership or strategic understanding [with Russia].” [27]

Notably, on 20 March in an interview with CNN Dugin confirmed that in his opinion President Trump is closer ideologically and politically to Vladimir Putin than he is to his Western allies[28].

In the new MAGA foreign policy doctrine, based on nationalism, anti-globalism, and civilizational conflict, Russia is, in terms of values and ideology, in the U.S. camp and a natural enemy of China and the Islamic world. It is this simple ideological formula that explains the rapid and persistent determination of the U.S. to begin active cooperation with Russia as soon as possible.

In addition, rapprochement with Russia is and has always been supported by the opportunistic group of Trump's friends and business acquaintances (group Business Elite). They realize that such a rapprochement promises huge political and economic dividends, from the energy system to joint development of the Arctic and control of the Northern Sea Route. It should be emphasized that this is an old sympathy that was evident early in Trump's first term. Back then, Rex Tillerson oversaw rapprochement with Russia.

The Tech Oligarchs are also interested in cooperation, attracted by control over reserves of rare earth elements and collaboration in the aerospace industry. The only group opposing rapprochement with Russia is the Reaganites/moderate Republicans, who, however, at the level of decision-makers, are currently represented only by Marco Rubio. However, his influence in Administration is highly doubtful, and his personality has become the subject of jokes and memes on social media[29].

Therefore, the trend toward rapprochement with Russia is neither a random idea nor a tactical maneuver. It is a strategic and long-term process, the results of which are still ahead.

This is one of the most important conclusions of the analysis of the MAGA foreign policy doctrine, which shows in a completely new light the process of rapprochement between the United States and Russia, which has so far been generally described as “strange” and associated with Trump's psychological peculiarities: „Donald Trump is susceptible to charm and flattery; he is impulsive”[30] or his cooperation with Russian intelligence services[31].
A strategic pivot past Ukraine. For the Biden administration, Ukraine was a vital instrument in countering Russia, viewed as the primary threat to global stability, warranting robust support if not outright victory. The Trump administration, by contrast, prioritizes Russia as a strategic partner, diminishing Ukraine’s relevance. Russia’s threat status fades in Trump’s calculus, recasting Ukraine and its anti-Russia ally, the EU, as impediments to a U.S.-Russia realignment. This shift drives pressure on Ukraine to accept a swift peace – potentially at steep cost – not out of concern for Kyiv, but to clear the path for broader gains with Moscow.

As can be seen from the above, the EU is part of the systemic picture of the world of the new US political elites and is assessed negatively in it. The clearest assessment of the EU is given by Stephen Bannon, the main ideologist of MAGA.

In a 2018 interview with The Daily Beast, Bannon stated: "The EU is a flawed concept – it’s a globalist project that will never have the legitimacy or the unity of the United States. The U.S. became great because it forged a single nation out of shared values and a common destiny. Europe can’t do that; it’s just a collection of tribes pretending to be a nation. They should stop trying to be something they’re not and embrace their national identities." This quote explicitly denies the EU the same federal future that Bannon celebrates as the source of U.S. greatness, framing the EU’s integration as an illegitimate, doomed endeavor. He contrasts the U.S.’s success – rooted in "shared values and a common destiny" – with the EU’s diversity, which he disparages as a "collection of tribes," incapable of forming a cohesive nation-state.

Of course, this stance reveals a profound contradiction. Bannon celebrates the U.S.’s federalism – where states ceded sovereignty for national greatness – but denies the EU the same path, dismissing its integration as a "globalist project." This isn’t just a double standard; it’s a deliberate strategy to maintain U.S. dominance. A unified EU could rival the U.S. geopolitically, as it did during the 2003 Iraq War split. By rejecting the EU’s federal aspirations, Bannon ensures it remains divided and susceptible to U.S. influence, while the U.S. leverages its unity to project power. Bannon’s nationalism is U.S.-centric, viewing the U.S. as the only legitimate model of unity, while European integration is framed as an unnatural, elitist imposition ("pretending to be a nation").

In other cases, Bannon has expressed his view of the EU much more directly: “The beating heart of the globalist project is in Brussels. If I drive the stake through the vampire, the whole thing will start to dissipate”.[32]

A key feature of Bannon is that he is not merely a theorist but also a highly skilled political technologist, capable of independently executing his plans. It is this practical, applied political dimension that interests us most, as it directly relates to the current political crisis facing the EU. In 2018, he began implementing his idea of “returning Europeans to their national identities” in the EU through The Movement to unite Europe’s far-right parties and increase political pressure on Brussels.

The project aimed to create a "super group" in the European Parliament, targeting a third of its seats to render the EU "ungovernable"[33]. Bannon’s strategy mirrored his MAGA playbook: mobilize populist sentiment against globalist elites, using data-driven microtargeting (e.g., Cambridge Analytica tactics[34]) to amplify anti-EU narratives. Key participants included Nigel Farage[35], Marine Le Pen (National Rally, France), Matteo Salvini (League, Italy), Viktor Orbán (Fidesz, Hungary), Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom, Netherlands), and Mischaël Modrikamen (Belgium), who hosted The Movement’s Brussels headquarters[36].

A major success for Bannon was Brexit, which validated his vision of nationalist resurgence. Brexit demonstrated that a major EU nation could reject integration, setting a precedent for others. Bannon's plan at the time included a repeat of Brexit in other EU countries.

However, The Movement itself appeared to fail by 2020. Internal disagreements – such as Le Pen's strategic divergence with Orbán – combined with funding problems, as well as European nationalists' fears of publicly associating with the American project, have halted the process. The biggest blow was funding, as Bannon, accustomed to more straightforward funding for his initiatives, massively supported by anonymous million-dollar donations, would not be able to provide the necessary level of political club work (he conducted his work from a 1200-square-metre fashionable villa near Brussels and a 13th-century Italian medieval monastery).

However, this "alleged failure" masks a deeper, long-term success. Bannon’s efforts planted seeds that bore fruit by 2024–2025. The far-right parties he supported gained significant ground, as he predicted. National Rally (31,5%), Brothers of Italy (26%), AfD (16%), Smer (24,8%), and AUR (12%) surged in the 2024 EU elections, while Fidesz (43%) maintained leading position.

In national elections, right-wing populists perform even better. Bannon's microtargeting tactics – e.g., targeting working-class voters with anti-immigration messages were adopted by these parties, amplifying their reach via social media.

Even the choice of wording of MAGA's European allies remains unchanged from Bannon's 2018 statements. For instance, compare Orbán's recent statement on his objectives in Brussels: "It is our shared task to restore a Europe of nations… The agents of the Soros network must be excluded from the European Commission, and corrupt lobbyists must be removed from the European Parliament… The cleaning that our friends in America are doing now will be needed here in Brussels as well.”[37]

The same goes for plans for European governments. In autumn 2024, Bannon's strategy of supporting right populist parties is firmly back on track, this time with full support for platform X, which provides so-called “new media’” (Musk-backed right-wing populist influencers) with millions of views per day, and full support for Musk himself, one of the most resonant and recognisable people in the world.

Bannon assesses the capabilities of his spiritual successor as follows: “Money and information are the twin tactical nukes of modern politics – and he can deploy both at unprecedented scale… Musk just spent a quarter of a billion dollars to elect Trump. If he puts the same amount of money into all of Europe that he put behind Trump, he will flip every nation to a populist agenda. There’s not a centrist left-wing government in Europe that will be able to withstand that onslaught“[38].

Finally, this time the representatives of anti-EU pro-MAGA parties in Europe began to receive political support from the American government in the USA. The CPAC conference in the USA, the largest international right-wing event brought together all potential pro-MAGA protégés in Europe. With significant participation from U.S. government leaders, the conference amplifying their shared agenda.

6. Implications of U.S. Policy for the EU: Impact and Response Outlook

In the previous sections, we described the changes within the U.S. political elites, the impact of these changes on the composition of the Trump administration, the features of the emerging new U.S. foreign policy doctrine based on MAGA principles and values with elements of Trump’s convictions and the foreign policy interests of Tech Oligarchs, and listed some of the actions already taken under this new doctrine.

Summarizing all of the above, we propose the following working description of this doctrine:

The United States has abandoned its role as the sole global leader in favor of "cheap hegemony," i.e., a multipolar world divided into zones of influence, each with its own rules of the game, in which the U.S. will not interfere provided its national interests are respected. In this scenario, the U.S. no longer needs to invest in the security of other regions, enter into agreements disadvantageous to itself, or defend democratic principles in countries thousands of kilometers away. Security guarantees will no longer be provided by default but will instead be part of "big deals" dictated by the U.S., similar to the one currently being negotiated with Ukraine or the one Russia concluded with Belarus.

The U.S. considers its primary adversaries in this endeavor to be China, which, from the MAGA perspective, is a global hegemon akin to the pre-Trump U.S., skillfully leveraging international alliances and dependencies – such as the SCO, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative – to form an anti-American coalition, and the Islamic world, which aggressively spreads its religion and culture using globalization as a tool. On this path, the U.S. seeks to establish cooperation with Russia, based on a shared Christian-conservative foundation. Simultaneously, the U.S. is increasingly harsh in its attacks on former allies in the liberal-democratic camp – Canada, the United Kingdom, and EU countries – whose governments are also influenced by "globalist organizations," aiming to install pro-American and anti-European governments in these nations.

However, this doctrine represents the highest level of abstraction, a general goal that requires clarification on how to move from the starting point to the endpoint—in other words, a grand foreign policy strategy. During Trump’s first term, his team was too heterogeneous to develop such a strategy, although certain individual steps proved quite successful (e.g., Bannon’s activities in Europe).

The second administration has only just begun its work, so what has been done so far – Elon Musk’s activities, negotiations regarding Ukraine – remains a series of isolated tactical moves. Nevertheless, the information available to us already allows us to make informed assumptions about the future actions of the U.S. on the European front.

As a general theoretical framework for this forecast, we use the classic formula of Zbigniew Brzezinski, outlined in his book “The Grand Chessboard”. Its principles are universal, regardless of the U.S. government or even its political system:

“Eurasia is the globe's largest continent and is geopolitically axial. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world's three most advanced and economically productive regions... About 75 percent of the world's people live in Eurasia, and most of the world's physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about 60 percent of the world's GNP and about three-fourths of the world's known energy resources... All of the potential political and/or economic challengers to American primacy are Eurasian. Cumulatively, Eurasia's power vastly overshadows America's. Fortunately for America, Eurasia is too big to be politically one. Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played.”

Brzezinski’s conclusion is straightforward: “In that context, how America "manages" Eurasia is critical… That megacontinent is just too large, too populous, culturally too varied, and composed of too many historically ambitious and politically energetic states to be compliant toward even the most economically successful and politically preeminent global power. This condition places a premium on geostrategic skill, on the careful, selective, and very deliberate deployment of America's resources on the huge Eurasian chessboard.” [39]

Europe is thus an important part of the U.S. strategic game of securing world primacy.

All statements from the Trump administration claiming that the EU is irrelevant or that Europeans are weak are intended to obscure the fundamental importance of Europe to the U.S. – to "lower its political price."

To prevent Eurasia from having any chance of uniting and becoming as strong as the U.S., the latter must constantly maintain a balance of power on this supercontinent. During the Cold War, this was achieved by supporting Western Europe against the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, the situation changed: three centers of power emerged – the EU, Russia, and China –with the EU gradually slipping out of the U.S.’s sphere of influence, while China steadily grows stronger, partly through its alliance with Russia.

From the U.S. perspective, it is therefore logical to offer Russia, as the weakest of these power centers, an ideological and political partnership, elevating its political ambitions from a "junior partner" of China back to an independent center of power, thereby restoring balance on the continent, while simultaneously weakening the EU and blocking China. In the long term, this would result in a renewed division of Europe into U.S. and Russian spheres of influence.

Therefore, the U.S.’s grand strategy on the Eurasian chessboard consists of three components:

"Keep China out, Russia up, and the EU down."

“Keeping the EU Down” means: Dismantling the EU as a political entity, replacing it with a symbolic “Europe of nations” – weak, nationalist states reliant on American protection. This vassal system locks in U.S. dominance over Eurasia.

In this effort, U.S. uses pro-American, anti-European governments and parties within EU countries, exploiting internal contradictions of the EU as an anvil. Russia – and to a lesser extent China – serves as a hammer, applying constant threat and pressure to expose the EU’s inability to address existential challenges.

What are the EU's options for responding?

Option 1. Waiting out

The idea of avoiding escalation and waiting for transatlanticists to return to power is futile.

First, MAGA has already launched the political project “The Third Term”[40], aimed at enabling Trump to run in the 2028 elections. The fact that Trump may be physically too weak for this is of little consequence – he could be immediately replaced by Vance (replacing the president due to health issues being a primary function of the U.S. vice president).

Second, the ongoing implementation of Project 2025, which seeks to replace professional bureaucrats with MAGA activists, is proceeding at full speed. Within two years, the federal government apparatus will be staffed exclusively with officials loyal to MAGA, paving the way for election manipulation.

Therefore, even if an unforeseen failure occurs with Trump, it changes little: MAGA is now the dominant political force in the U.S., the Democrats are in a state of collapse, and Reaganites have lost all influence within the Republican Party except in the Senate, which is also temporary.

Option 2. Continuing the current course

Launching a financial aid project for Ukraine
Strengthening Europe’s military-industrial complex
Implementing the "Eastern Shield" to protect military borders.

This may be enough to reduce anxiety about possible Russian aggression, but it does not address the EU's core problem of election interference and support for right-wing populist parties by Russia and the US. Victories of Trump-loyal parties in upcoming elections in France, Germany, and possibly Poland (e.g., a PiS/Confederation alliance) would mark the end of the EU as a political player.

Option 3. Gearing Up

Shifting gears means a consistent strengthening of the EU to counter the US grand strategy. Below will be listed the main actions that seem to us necessary for this purpose.

Political Steps

Act 1: Weaken the populist agenda at national and EU levels: Ease the Green Deal stifling industry and agriculture.
Act 2: Toughen immigration laws (Poland-style).
Act 3: Streamline Brussels – launch a reform campaign to cut bureaucracy and boost professionalism. Stage a high-profile political show for all three acts.

Security/Military

A EU Defence Union with active participation of all EU members is unfeasible for now. Instead, a core group of EU countries should launch an initiative – potentially via Enhanced Cooperation – inviting external partners like the UK and Turkey. A successful alliance of several countries could compel broader participation.

Foreign Policy

Forge and implement new policies: Eastern (Russia), transatlantic (U.S.), and Eurasian (China, India, Saudi Arabia).

Media/Cyber

Secure EU media-digital sovereignty. Limit U.S. Big Tech giants’ activities in Europe and protect EU data from U.S., Russian, and Chinese manipulation via informational, psychological, and cognitive operations.

Weakening popularity of right-populist parties due to the loss of political bargaining chips, weakening influence of the US and Russia on the EU domestic political agenda. Strengthening of the EU to the level where it will be more favourable for opponents to choose a non-confrontational approach.

7. Conclusion

Trump’s foreign policy is a systemic, elite-driven effort to reinvent the West, with the EU as a primary target. Anchored in pragmatic nationalism, anti-globalism, and technological elitism, it builds on a decade-long U.S. retreat from Europe, using the “reverse Nixon” pretext to mask an ideological pivot to Russia and unilateral dominance. This doctrine – executed by MAGA and Tech Oligarchs – exploits EU weaknesses, threatening its security, economy, and unity with lasting consequences. The new Republican elite won’t merely cut ties with the EU; they aim to remake Europe as a cluster of loyal, U.S.-dependent states. The EU faces a critical juncture – its response will determine whether it retains agency or is reshaped in Trump’s image.

[1] https://apnews.com/article/us-russia-rubio-lavrov-ukraine-saudi-arabia-94bc4de5ecc86922d6ea4376e38f1cfd

[2] https://www.thetimes.com/comment/the-times-view/article/us-siding-with-russia-and-north-korea-in-ukraine-vote-defies-belief-9x6639qpl?utm_source=chatgpt.com&region=global

[3] https://time.com/7214321/trump-canada-51st-state-fox-super-bowl-interview/

[4] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/03/04/trump-says-the-us-will-take-greenland-one-way-or-the-other.html

[5] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/26/trump-european-union-tariffs

[6] https://geopoliticalmonitor.com/trumps-russia-strategy-breaking-the-sino-russian-alliance-or-strengthening-it/

[7] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/brookings-experts-on-trumps-unga-speech/

[8] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/07/04/leader-of-the-pro-trump-project-2025-suggests-there-will-be-a-new-american-revolution-00166583

[9] https://www.newsweek.com/internet-reacts-marco-rubio-body-language-trump-zelensky-meeting-2038065

[10] https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/opinion/europe-cannot-bow-down-to-the-tech-oligarchs-our-democracy-and-rule-of-law-are-at-stake/

[11] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/make-america-great-again-who-said-it-first-n645716

[12] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jan/08/trump-project-2025